voluntary subdivision rule in Texas

1986Railroad Commission v. Miller, 165 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.Civ.App.1942, no writ); Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.Civ.App.1933), aff'd sub nom, 84 S.W.2d 693 (1935); Bennett v. Sun Oil Co., 84 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.1935); Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.Civ.App.1934), aff'd sub nom, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935); Brown v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 83 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.1935).

1938The writer concurs in the disposition of this appeal made in the original opin *442 ion herein by Associate Justice BLAIR; and in his conclusion that the voluntary subdivision rule originally announced by this court in December, 1933, and January, 1934 (see the several rule 37 cases reported in 68 S.W.2d 609 -628, supra), should not and does not apply to instances where one in good faith acquires fee title to land in unproven territory; and such acquisition was not in contemplation of oil development.

1955The effect of the voluntary subdivision rule on the right of the owner of land to produce the oil thereinunder is well stated in the case of Gulf Land Company v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Texas, 59 , 131 S.W. 2d 73, 80 .

1955The effect of the voluntary subdivision rule on the right of the owner of land to produce the oil thereinunder is well stated in the case of Gulf Land Company v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Texas, 59 , 131 S.W. 2d 73, 80 .

1986Railroad Commission v. Miller, 165 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.Civ.App.1942, no writ); Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.Civ.App.1933), aff'd sub nom, 84 S.W.2d 693 (1935); Bennett v. Sun Oil Co., 84 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.1935); Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.Civ.App.1934), aff'd sub nom, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935); Brown v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 83 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.1935).

1986Railroad Commission v. Miller, 165 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.Civ.App.1942, no writ); Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.Civ.App.1933), aff'd sub nom, 84 S.W.2d 693 (1935); Bennett v. Sun Oil Co., 84 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.1935); Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.Civ.App.1934), aff'd sub nom, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935); Brown v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 83 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.1935).

1986Railroad Commission v. Miller, 165 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.Civ.App.1942, no writ); Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.Civ.App.1933), aff'd sub nom, 84 S.W.2d 693 (1935); Bennett v. Sun Oil Co., 84 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.1935); Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.Civ.App.1934), aff'd sub nom, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935); Brown v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 83 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.1935).

1986Railroad Commission v. Miller, 165 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.Civ.App.1942, no writ); Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.Civ.App.1933), aff'd sub nom, 84 S.W.2d 693 (1935); Bennett v. Sun Oil Co., 84 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.1935); Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.Civ.App.1934), aff'd sub nom, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935); Brown v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 83 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.1935).

1986Railroad Commission v. Miller, 165 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.Civ.App.1942, no writ); Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.Civ.App.1933), aff'd sub nom, 84 S.W.2d 693 (1935); Bennett v. Sun Oil Co., 84 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.1935); Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.Civ.App.1934), aff'd sub nom, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935); Brown v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 83 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.1935).

1986Railroad Commission v. Miller, 165 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.Civ.App.1942, no writ); Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.Civ.App.1933), aff'd sub nom, 84 S.W.2d 693 (1935); Bennett v. Sun Oil Co., 84 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.1935); Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission, 68 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.Civ.App.1934), aff'd sub nom, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935); Brown v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 83 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.1935).

1962The reasoning of those cases as to why every landowner of an involuntary subdivision is entitled to at least a first well as a matter of law is given in Stanolind Oil and Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 96 S.W. 2d 664 (no writ history, 1936) which is perhaps the first case stating this rule: “Total deprivation of the landowner’s vested right to a fair share of the recoverable oil in place under his land is not a proper remedy under our present conservation laws and rules promulgated thereunder.” Stanolind Oil and Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 96 S.W. 2d 664 , at page 665.

1962The reasoning of those cases as to why every landowner of an involuntary subdivision is entitled to at least a first well as a matter of law is given in Stanolind Oil and Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 96 S.W. 2d 664 (no writ history, 1936) which is perhaps the first case stating this rule: “Total deprivation of the landowner’s vested right to a fair share of the recoverable oil in place under his land is not a proper remedy under our present conservation laws and rules promulgated thereunder.” Stanolind Oil and Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 96 S.W. 2d 664 , at page 665.

1941The first case in which this majority interpretation of the rule appears to have become material was Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Railroad Commission, Tex.Civ.App., 105 S.W.2d 787 , commonly referred to as the Century case.

1939We hold that the order of the Commission must be upheld under the decision in the Century case (Railroad Comm. v. Magnolia P. Co., 130 Tex. 484 , 109 S.W.2d 967 ), as interpreted by this court in the following excerpt from the Lasseter case (Humble, etc., Co. v. Lasseter, 120 S.W.2d 541, 542 ), and as applied to the facts of this case: “Where, independently of the voluntary segrega-' tion, the larger tract, including the segregated tract, is entitled to an additional well in order to protect the vested rights of the owners of such larger tract to recover their fair share of the oil thereunder

1939We hold that the order of the Commission must be upheld under the decision in the Century case (Railroad Comm. v. Magnolia P. Co., 130 Tex. 484 , 109 S.W.2d 967 ), as interpreted by this court in the following excerpt from the Lasseter case (Humble, etc., Co. v. Lasseter, 120 S.W.2d 541, 542 ), and as applied to the facts of this case: “Where, independently of the voluntary segrega-' tion, the larger tract, including the segregated tract, is entitled to an additional well in order to protect the vested rights of the owners of such larger tract to recover their fair share of the oil thereunder

1939We hold that the order of the Commission must be upheld under the decision in the Century case (Railroad Comm. v. Magnolia P. Co., 130 Tex. 484 , 109 S.W.2d 967 ), as interpreted by this court in the following excerpt from the Lasseter case (Humble, etc., Co. v. Lasseter, 120 S.W.2d 541, 542 ), and as applied to the facts of this case: “Where, independently of the voluntary segrega-' tion, the larger tract, including the segregated tract, is entitled to an additional well in order to protect the vested rights of the owners of such larger tract to recover their fair share of the oil thereunder

1938Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 116 S.W.2d 439 , the voluntary subdivision rule does not apply, and appellants Nash and Turner (holders of the permit) were entitled as a matter of law to drill one well on the tract.