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10 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1950–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fayette County National Bank v. Lillygreen2 sentences2014A key factor in the Court’s decision in Lilly was the Court’s express recognition that “[t]he issue of permitting a grantor to challenge the sale price of foreclosed real property at a deficiency judgment proceeding is a legislative matter.” Lilly, 199 W.Va. at 358 , 484 S.E.2d at 241 (emphasis added). 2014A key factor in the Court’s decision in Lilly was the Court’s express recognition that “[t]he issue of permitting a grantor to challenge the sale price of foreclosed real property at a deficiency judgment proceeding is a legislative matter.” Lilly, 199 W.Va. at 358 , 484 S.E.2d at 241 (emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
Hoffman v. Shoemakergreen2 sentences2010The term “necessary” has been used loosely in our prior cases concerning easements by implication, and varies between “necessary,” “reasonable necessity,” and “strictly necessary.” For instance, syllabus point 1 of Miller v. Skaggs, 79 W.Va. 645 , 91 S.E. 536 (1917) says: To raise an implied reservation or grant of an easement the existing servitude must at the time of the deed be apparent, continuous and strictly necessary, (emphasis added) See also, syllabus point 2, Hoffman v. Shoemaker, 69 W.Va. 233 , 71 S.E. 198 (1911) (“A grantor may claim a way over the granted premises, as reserved by 2010The term “necessary” has been used loosely in our prior cases concerning easements by implication, and varies between “necessary,” “reasonable necessity,” and “strictly necessary.” For instance, syllabus point 1 of Miller v. Skaggs, 79 W.Va. 645 , 91 S.E. 536 (1917) says: To raise an implied reservation or grant of an easement the existing servitude must at the time of the deed be apparent, continuous and strictly necessary, (emphasis added) See also, syllabus point 2, Hoffman v. Shoemaker, 69 W.Va. 233 , 71 S.E. 198 (1911) (“A grantor may claim a way over the granted premises, as reserved by | 1 | 3 |
Hillary Corp. v. United States Cold Storage, Inc.green2 sentences2010The weight of authority and better view sustain the rale that the requisite degree of necessity is “reasonable necessity,” that is, the easement is “necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property as it existed when the severance was made[.]” Hillary Corp. v. U.S. Cold Storage, Inc., 250 Neb. 397 , 550 N.W.2d 889, 897 (1996). 2010The weight of authority and better view sustain the rale that the requisite degree of necessity is “reasonable necessity,” that is, the easement is “necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property as it existed when the severance was made[.]” Hillary Corp. v. U.S. Cold Storage, Inc., 250 Neb. 397 , 550 N.W.2d 889, 897 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Downs v. Downsgreen2 sentences2001In order to entitle such person to the relief he seeks, the proof must be certain or reasonably conclusive.” Downs v. Downs, 89 W.Va. 155, 162 , 108 S.E. 875, 877 (1921). 2001In order to entitle such person to the relief he seeks, the proof must be certain or reasonably conclusive.” Downs v. Downs, 89 W.Va. 155, 162 , 108 S.E. 875, 877 (1921). | 1 | 1 |
Rohrer v. Stricklandgreen2 sentences1997See Rohrer v. Strickland, 116 Va. 755 , 82 S.E. 711 (1914). 18 Rohrer is distinguishable from the instant proceeding. 1997See Rohrer v. Strickland, 116 Va. 755 , 82 S.E. 711 (1914). 18 Rohrer is distinguishable from the instant proceeding. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blake v. O'Neal
green
2 sentences1960Plaintiffs in error contend that no question of adverse possession should have been submitted to the jury, for the reason that the deed to them was less than ten years old, and that to permit the tacking of possession would permit a grantor to claim adversely against his grantee, against the rule followed in Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W.Va. 483 , 61 S.E. 410 , 16 L.R.A.,N.S., 1147. 1960Plaintiffs in error contend that no question of adverse possession should have been submitted to the jury, for the reason that the deed to them was less than ten years old, and that to permit the tacking of possession would permit a grantor to claim adversely against his grantee, against the rule followed in Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W.Va. 483 , 61 S.E. 410 , 16 L.R.A.,N.S., 1147. | 2 | 1960–1960 |
Bennett v. Booth
green
2 sentences1950In Hoffman v. Shoemaker, 69 W.Va. 233 , 71 S.E. 198 , 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 632, we held: "A grantor may claim a way over the granted premises, as reserved by implication, if it is shown to be strictly necessary to the use and enjoyment of adjacent land retained by him, and the intent to reserve it is not negatived by any express terms of the deed." Bennett v. Booth, 70 W.Va. 264 , 73 S.E. 909 , 39 L.R.A.,N.S., 618, was a case where the owner of a tract of land had erected a mill dam for the purpose of operating a grist mill, and the pond thus created extended to a part of his land which he afterwar 1950In Hoffman v. Shoemaker, 69 W.Va. 233 , 71 S.E. 198 , 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 632, we held: "A grantor may claim a way over the granted premises, as reserved by implication, if it is shown to be strictly necessary to the use and enjoyment of adjacent land retained by him, and the intent to reserve it is not negatived by any express terms of the deed." Bennett v. Booth, 70 W.Va. 264 , 73 S.E. 909 , 39 L.R.A.,N.S., 618, was a case where the owner of a tract of land had erected a mill dam for the purpose of operating a grist mill, and the pond thus created extended to a part of his land which he afterwar | 2 | 1950–1950 |
Miller v. Skaggs
green
2 sentences2010The term “necessary” has been used loosely in our prior cases concerning easements by implication, and varies between “necessary,” “reasonable necessity,” and “strictly necessary.” For instance, syllabus point 1 of Miller v. Skaggs, 79 W.Va. 645 , 91 S.E. 536 (1917) says: To raise an implied reservation or grant of an easement the existing servitude must at the time of the deed be apparent, continuous and strictly necessary, (emphasis added) See also, syllabus point 2, Hoffman v. Shoemaker, 69 W.Va. 233 , 71 S.E. 198 (1911) (“A grantor may claim a way over the granted premises, as reserved by 2010The term “necessary” has been used loosely in our prior cases concerning easements by implication, and varies between “necessary,” “reasonable necessity,” and “strictly necessary.” For instance, syllabus point 1 of Miller v. Skaggs, 79 W.Va. 645 , 91 S.E. 536 (1917) says: To raise an implied reservation or grant of an easement the existing servitude must at the time of the deed be apparent, continuous and strictly necessary, (emphasis added) See also, syllabus point 2, Hoffman v. Shoemaker, 69 W.Va. 233 , 71 S.E. 198 (1911) (“A grantor may claim a way over the granted premises, as reserved by | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hill
neutral
2 sentences1982The situation is analogous to United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hill, 112 W.Va. 10 , 163 S.E. 613 (1932), where we permitted assignees of the original grantor to challenge a church's right to hold property under a reverter clause. 1982The situation is analogous to United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hill, 112 W.Va. 10 , 163 S.E. 613 (1932), where we permitted assignees of the original grantor to challenge a church's right to hold property under a reverter clause. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.