grantor privilege in Oklahoma

1947This important bearing of the subsequent acts and declarations of a grantor was overlooked by us in the case of Kay et al. v. Walling, supra, but it was carefully noted by the Court of Appeals of New York in the case of Saltzsieder 114 N.E. 856 .” The same rule may properly be applied where, as here, the evidence as to delivery does not clearly and unequivocally disclose the intent of the grantor unconditionally to deliver the deed for the purpose of vesting the grantee with title.

1937This important bearing of the subsequent acts and declarations of a grantor was overlooked by us in the case of Kay v. Walling, supra, but it was carefully noted by the Court of Appeals of New York in the ease of Saltzsieder v. Saltzsieder, 219 N. Y. 523 , 114 N. E. 856 .

1998DREW EDMONDSON ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA CANNON MILES TOLBERT ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 1 In Oklahoma Gas and Electric v. Total Energy, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the question of whether an individual could place a reservation in a dedication of real property for use as a public street that would exempt the grantor from a requirement to obtain a franchise from the municipality before offering electrical service. 499 P.2d 917 (Okla. 1972).

1998In finding that the municipality's power could not be so circumscribed, the Court noted, "[n]o individual can by contract reserve the right to control the use of a street once the dedication for that purpose is made." Id.

1984(Footnote omitted.) This statute was interpreted in the case of Ware v. Tyer, 199 Okl. 96 , 182 P.2d 519 (1947), in which the court stated the evident purpose of the statute is to protect those who purchase in reliance on a recorded instrument as against the claims of the grantor of that instrument based on secret, unpublished, and unrecorded claims of de-feasibility or right to reconveyance on condition.

1984(Footnote omitted.) This statute was interpreted in the case of Ware v. Tyer, 199 Okl. 96 , 182 P.2d 519 (1947), in which the court stated the evident purpose of the statute is to protect those who purchase in reliance on a recorded instrument as against the claims of the grantor of that instrument based on secret, unpublished, and unrecorded claims of de-feasibility or right to reconveyance on condition.

1916The statutory right of redemption inheres ' in a mortgage, and cannot be waived, whether the mortgage be in the usual form or in the form of an absolute deed; the rule being ‘once a mortgage,, always a mortgage.’ ” In the case of Gibson v. Morris State Bank, 49 Mont. 60 , 140 Pac. 77 , it is said: “Where a deed, absolute in form, is given by a debtor to his creditor, if the indebtedness remains unc.anceled, the conveyance is treated in equity as a mortgage, though the grantee may. not regard it as such.” In Voris v. Robbins, 52 Okla. 671 , 153 Pac. 120 , it is said : *94 “Whether a transaction

1916The rule is laid down in 4 Kent, Com. at page 144: “The test of the distinction is this: If the relation of debtor and creditor remains and a debt still subsists it is a mortgage, but if the debt is extinguished by the agreement of the parties. * * * and the grantor has the privilege of refunding if he pleases in a given time, and thereby entitle him to a reconveyance, it is a conditional sale.” The rule is also laid down in 27 Cyc. p. 974, as follows: “Once a mortgage always a mortgage. * * * For the same reason it is not competent for parties to make a conveyance of land, absolute in form, a

1916The rule is laid down in 4 Kent, Com. at page 144: “The test of the distinction is this: If the relation of debtor and creditor remains and a debt still subsists it is a mortgage, but if the debt is extinguished by the agreement of the parties. * * * and the grantor has the privilege of refunding if he pleases in a given time, and thereby entitle him to a reconveyance, it is a conditional sale.” The rule is also laid down in 27 Cyc. p. 974, as follows: “Once a mortgage always a mortgage. * * * For the same reason it is not competent for parties to make a conveyance of land, absolute in form, a

1916The statutory right of redemption inheres ' in a mortgage, and cannot be waived, whether the mortgage be in the usual form or in the form of an absolute deed; the rule being ‘once a mortgage,, always a mortgage.’ ” In the case of Gibson v. Morris State Bank, 49 Mont. 60 , 140 Pac. 77 , it is said: “Where a deed, absolute in form, is given by a debtor to his creditor, if the indebtedness remains unc.anceled, the conveyance is treated in equity as a mortgage, though the grantee may. not regard it as such.” In Voris v. Robbins, 52 Okla. 671 , 153 Pac. 120 , it is said : *94 “Whether a transaction

1916The statutory right of redemption inheres ' in a mortgage, and cannot be waived, whether the mortgage be in the usual form or in the form of an absolute deed; the rule being ‘once a mortgage,, always a mortgage.’ ” In the case of Gibson v. Morris State Bank, 49 Mont. 60 , 140 Pac. 77 , it is said: “Where a deed, absolute in form, is given by a debtor to his creditor, if the indebtedness remains unc.anceled, the conveyance is treated in equity as a mortgage, though the grantee may. not regard it as such.” In Voris v. Robbins, 52 Okla. 671 , 153 Pac. 120 , it is said : *94 “Whether a transaction

1910In Edwards et al. v. Montgomery et al., 26 Okla. 862 , it is held: “In the absence of any record title, where a grantee to a tract of land enters into the open, actual and exclusive possession, thereof, the same is sufficient to put a subsequent mortgagee of the grantor on inquiry as to his rights therein, and he takes his mortgage subject thereto.” Further, had the plaintiff, at the time she filed her lis pendens notice, had actual notice of the unrecorded deed of the defendant, likewise a different conclusion would be herein reached, for it could not then be said that plaintiff was a subsequ