9 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barcott v. State, Department of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Barcott, 741 P.2d at 228-30 (discussing whether due process requires consideration of the "inherent inaccuracy" of a breath alcohol test when the result is within the margin of error). 2007See, e.g., Barcoit, 741 P.2d at 228-30 (discussing whether due process requires consideration of the "inherent inaccuracy" of a breath alcohol test when the result is within the margin of error). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Camposgreen2 sentences1993Thus, it would have been premature to address the issue at that time. [9] Although the margin of error inherent to the Intoximeter 3000 is .01, the margin of error inherent to another type of testing device may be more or less than .01, See, e.g., People v. Campos, 138 Cal. App.3d Supp. 1, 188 Cal. Rptr. 366 (Cal. App.Dep't Super.Ct. 1982) (.005 margin of error); People v. Cansel, 137 Misc.2d 260 , 520 N.Y.S.2d 509, 510 (N.Y. 1987People v. Pritchard, 162 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13 , 209 Cal.Rptr. 314, 315 (1984) (holding that machine margin of error must be applied to breath test results before determining whether alcohol level exceeds legal limit); People v. Campos, 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 366, 368 (1982) (holding it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the statutory presumption that a person with blood alcohol test results of .10% or more was under the influence of alcohol because the margin of error on the test administered to the defendant showed that it was “as likely that the amount of al | 2 | 2 |
Haynes v. State, Department of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2020In such circumstances, the test result is considered tolerably inaccurate, and, therefore, the Department may revoke a 36 865 P.2d 753 (Alaska 1993). 37 Id. at 754 . 38 Id. at 756 . 39 Id. at 755 (emphasis in original). 40 Id. at 755-56 . -11- 7438 license on the basis of the test result without regard to the test’s margin of error.[41] In 1996, in the wake of Haynes, the Alaska legislature enacted AS 28.40.060. 2020In such circumstances, the test result is considered tolerably inaccurate, and, therefore, the Department may revoke a 36 865 P.2d 753 (Alaska 1993). 37 Id. at 754 . 38 Id. at 756 . 39 Id. at 755 (emphasis in original). 40 Id. at 755-56 . -11- 7438 license on the basis of the test result without regard to the test’s margin of error.[41] In 1996, in the wake of Haynes, the Alaska legislature enacted AS 28.40.060. | 1 | 2 |
Mangiapane v. Municipality of Anchoragegreen2 sentences2000A greater margin of error could not be conveniently ignored, without inviting a constitutional challenge"). [14] See Mangiapane, 974 P.2d at 430 . [15] Id. [1] See Alaska Directory of State Officials (February 2000 edition). [2] Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Police Dept. 2000A greater margin of error could not be conveniently ignored, without inviting a constitutional challenge"). [14] See Mangiapane, 974 P.2d at 430 . [15] Id. [1] See Alaska Directory of State Officials (February 2000 edition). [2] Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Police Dept. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Kellergreen2 sentences1987It is not unreasonable to require that the test, designed to show that percent, do so outside of any error or tolerance inherent in the testing process.”); State v. Prestier, 7 Ohio Misc.2d 36 , 455 N.E.2d 24, 27 (1982) (“Every margin of error in a chemical test utilized for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the defendant’s blood as it addresses his guilt or lack of guilt in operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol must be strictly construed against the state and liberally construed in favor of the defendant.”); State v. Keller, 36 Wash.App. 110 , 672 P. 1987It is not unreasonable to require that the test, designed to show that percent, do so outside of any error or tolerance inherent in the testing process.”); State v. Prestier, 7 Ohio Misc.2d 36 , 455 N.E.2d 24, 27 (1982) (“Every margin of error in a chemical test utilized for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the defendant’s blood as it addresses his guilt or lack of guilt in operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol must be strictly construed against the state and liberally construed in favor of the defendant.”); State v. Keller, 36 Wash.App. 110 , 672 P. | 1 | 2 |
Bushnell v. Stategreen2 sentences2020The statute, since renumbered as AS 28.90.020, provides that “if an offense described under [Title 28] requires that a chemical test of a person’s breath produce a particular result, and the chemical test is administered by a properly calibrated instrument approved by the Department of Public Safety, the result described by statute is not affected by the instrument’s working tolerance.”42 The court of appeals acknowledged the effect of this statutory change in Mangiapane v. Municipality of Anchorage.43 The court noted that the legislature had decided to reject our interpretation of the DUI off 2020The statute, since renumbered as AS 28.90.020, provides that “if an offense described under [Title 28] requires that a chemical test of a person’s breath produce a particular result, and the chemical test is administered by a properly calibrated instrument approved by the Department of Public Safety, the result described by statute is not affected by the instrument’s working tolerance.”42 The court of appeals acknowledged the effect of this statutory change in Mangiapane v. Municipality of Anchorage.43 The court noted that the legislature had decided to reject our interpretation of the DUI off | 1 | 1 |
Morris v. State, Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehiclesgreen1 sentence2020Safety, 865 P.2d 753, 755-56 (Alaska 1993) (noting that the legislature had the power to expressly consider margin-of-error evidence and “deem[] it sufficiently negligible such that it may be disregarded”); Valentine v. State, 215 P.3d 319, 326 (Alaska 2009) (holding that “[t]he legislative amendment to subsection (a)(2) . . . . rendered a defendant’s blood alcohol at the time of driving irrelevant and thus inadmissible”); Bushnell v. State, 5 P.3d 889, 891-92 (Alaska App. 2000) (holding that the legislature “implicitly found that a working tolerance of .01 percent of a properly calibrated ins | 1 | 1 |
Keel v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Safety, 865 P.2d 753, 755-56 (Alaska 1993) (noting that the legislature had the power to expressly consider margin-of-error evidence and “deem[] it sufficiently negligible such that it may be disregarded”); Valentine v. State, 215 P.3d 319, 326 (Alaska 2009) (holding that “[t]he legislative amendment to subsection (a)(2) . . . . rendered a defendant’s blood alcohol at the time of driving irrelevant and thus inadmissible”); Bushnell v. State, 5 P.3d 889, 891-92 (Alaska App. 2000) (holding that the legislature “implicitly found that a working tolerance of .01 percent of a properly calibrated ins 2020Safety, 865 P.2d 753, 755-56 (Alaska 1993) (noting that the legislature had the power to expressly consider margin-of-error evidence and “deem[] it sufficiently negligible such that it may be disregarded”); Valentine v. State, 215 P.3d 319, 326 (Alaska 2009) (holding that “[t]he legislative amendment to subsection (a)(2) . . . . rendered a defendant’s blood alcohol at the time of driving irrelevant and thus inadmissible”); Bushnell v. State, 5 P.3d 889, 891-92 (Alaska App. 2000) (holding that the legislature “implicitly found that a working tolerance of .01 percent of a properly calibrated ins | 1 | 1 |
Valentine v. Stategreen2 sentences2020The statute, since renumbered as AS 28.90.020, provides that “if an offense described under [Title 28] requires that a chemical test of a person’s breath produce a particular result, and the chemical test is administered by a properly calibrated instrument approved by the Department of Public Safety, the result described by statute is not affected by the instrument’s working tolerance.”42 The court of appeals acknowledged the effect of this statutory change in Mangiapane v. Municipality of Anchorage.43 The court noted that the legislature had decided to reject our interpretation of the DUI off 2020The statute, since renumbered as AS 28.90.020, provides that “if an offense described under [Title 28] requires that a chemical test of a person’s breath produce a particular result, and the chemical test is administered by a properly calibrated instrument approved by the Department of Public Safety, the result described by statute is not affected by the instrument’s working tolerance.”42 The court of appeals acknowledged the effect of this statutory change in Mangiapane v. Municipality of Anchorage.43 The court noted that the legislature had decided to reject our interpretation of the DUI off | 1 | 1 |
Conrad v. Stategreen1 sentence2020The statute, since renumbered as AS 28.90.020, provides that “if an offense described under [Title 28] requires that a chemical test of a person’s breath produce a particular result, and the chemical test is administered by a properly calibrated instrument approved by the Department of Public Safety, the result described by statute is not affected by the instrument’s working tolerance.”42 The court of appeals acknowledged the effect of this statutory change in Mangiapane v. Municipality of Anchorage.43 The court noted that the legislature had decided to reject our interpretation of the DUI off | 1 | 1 |
Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Police Department Employees Ass'ngreen1 sentence2000Employees Assn., 839 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Alaska 1992). [3] See AS 28.35.031-032; but see AS 28.35.035. [4] See former 7 AAC 30.005-190. [5] See AS 28.35.033(d) and 13 AAC 63.010-100. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cancelgreen2 sentences1993Thus, it would have been premature to address the issue at that time. [9] Although the margin of error inherent to the Intoximeter 3000 is .01, the margin of error inherent to another type of testing device may be more or less than .01, See, e.g., People v. Campos, 138 Cal. App.3d Supp. 1, 188 Cal. Rptr. 366 (Cal. App.Dep't Super.Ct. 1982) (.005 margin of error); People v. Cansel, 137 Misc.2d 260 , 520 N.Y.S.2d 509, 510 (N.Y. 1993Thus, it would have been premature to address the issue at that time. [9] Although the margin of error inherent to the Intoximeter 3000 is .01, the margin of error inherent to another type of testing device may be more or less than .01, See, e.g., People v. Campos, 138 Cal. App.3d Supp. 1, 188 Cal. Rptr. 366 (Cal. App.Dep't Super.Ct. 1982) (.005 margin of error); People v. Cansel, 137 Misc.2d 260 , 520 N.Y.S.2d 509, 510 (N.Y. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Prestiergreen2 sentences1987It is not unreasonable to require that the test, designed to show that percent, do so outside of any error or tolerance inherent in the testing process.”); State v. Prestier, 7 Ohio Misc.2d 36 , 455 N.E.2d 24, 27 (1982) (“Every margin of error in a chemical test utilized for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the defendant’s blood as it addresses his guilt or lack of guilt in operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol must be strictly construed against the state and liberally construed in favor of the defendant.”); State v. Keller, 36 Wash.App. 110 , 672 P. 1987It is not unreasonable to require that the test, designed to show that percent, do so outside of any error or tolerance inherent in the testing process.”); State v. Prestier, 7 Ohio Misc.2d 36 , 455 N.E.2d 24, 27 (1982) (“Every margin of error in a chemical test utilized for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the defendant’s blood as it addresses his guilt or lack of guilt in operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol must be strictly construed against the state and liberally construed in favor of the defendant.”); State v. Keller, 36 Wash.App. 110 , 672 P. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boehmergreen2 sentences1987People v. Pritchard, 162 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13 , 209 Cal.Rptr. 314, 315 (1984) (holding that machine margin of error must be applied to breath test results before determining whether alcohol level exceeds legal limit); People v. Campos, 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 366, 368 (1982) (holding it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the statutory presumption that a person with blood alcohol test results of .10% or more was under the influence of alcohol because the margin of error on the test administered to the defendant showed that it was “as likely that the amount of al 1987People v. Pritchard, 162 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13 , 209 Cal.Rptr. 314, 315 (1984) (holding that machine margin of error must be applied to breath test results before determining whether alcohol level exceeds legal limit); People v. Campos, 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 366, 368 (1982) (holding it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the statutory presumption that a person with blood alcohol test results of .10% or more was under the influence of alcohol because the margin of error on the test administered to the defendant showed that it was “as likely that the amount of al | 1 | 1 |
Holstein v. Commissioner of Public Safetygreen1 sentence1987See also Holstein v. Commissioner, 392 N.W.2d 577, 580-31 (Minn.App.1986) (following Hmcir). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pritchardgreen2 sentences1987People v. Pritchard, 162 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13 , 209 Cal.Rptr. 314, 315 (1984) (holding that machine margin of error must be applied to breath test results before determining whether alcohol level exceeds legal limit); People v. Campos, 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 366, 368 (1982) (holding it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the statutory presumption that a person with blood alcohol test results of .10% or more was under the influence of alcohol because the margin of error on the test administered to the defendant showed that it was “as likely that the amount of al 1987People v. Pritchard, 162 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13 , 209 Cal.Rptr. 314, 315 (1984) (holding that machine margin of error must be applied to breath test results before determining whether alcohol level exceeds legal limit); People v. Campos, 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 366, 368 (1982) (holding it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the statutory presumption that a person with blood alcohol test results of .10% or more was under the influence of alcohol because the margin of error on the test administered to the defendant showed that it was “as likely that the amount of al | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bjornsengreen2 sentences1987People v. Pritchard, 162 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13 , 209 Cal.Rptr. 314, 315 (1984) (holding that machine margin of error must be applied to breath test results before determining whether alcohol level exceeds legal limit); People v. Campos, 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 366, 368 (1982) (holding it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the statutory presumption that a person with blood alcohol test results of .10% or more was under the influence of alcohol because the margin of error on the test administered to the defendant showed that it was “as likely that the amount of al 1987People v. Pritchard, 162 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13 , 209 Cal.Rptr. 314, 315 (1984) (holding that machine margin of error must be applied to breath test results before determining whether alcohol level exceeds legal limit); People v. Campos, 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 366, 368 (1982) (holding it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the statutory presumption that a person with blood alcohol test results of .10% or more was under the influence of alcohol because the margin of error on the test administered to the defendant showed that it was “as likely that the amount of al | 1 | 1 |
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Boardgreen2 sentences1985But we see no evidence demonstrating that the margin of error (systematic or not) inherent in the three-factor formula is greater than the margin of error (systematic or not) inherent in ... separate accounting.... 463 U.S. at 182, 183-84 , 103 S.Ct. at 2949, 2949-2950 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 564, 565 . 1985But we see no evidence demonstrating that the margin of error (systematic or not) inherent in the three-factor formula is greater than the margin of error (systematic or not) inherent in ... separate accounting.... 463 U.S. at 182, 183-84 , 103 S.Ct. at 2949, 2949-2950 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 564, 565 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James J. Browngreen2 sentences1979See United States v. Brown, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 402, 405 , 478 F.2d 606, 609 (1973). 1979See United States v. Brown, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 402, 405 , 478 F.2d 606, 609 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ruckergreen2 sentences1987It is not unreasonable to require that the test, designed to show that percent, do so outside of any error or tolerance inherent in the testing process.”); State v. Prestier, 7 Ohio Misc.2d 36 , 455 N.E.2d 24, 27 (1982) (“Every margin of error in a chemical test utilized for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the defendant’s blood as it addresses his guilt or lack of guilt in operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol must be strictly construed against the state and liberally construed in favor of the defendant.”); State v. Keller, 36 Wash.App. 110 , 672 P. 1987It is not unreasonable to require that the test, designed to show that percent, do so outside of any error or tolerance inherent in the testing process.”); State v. Prestier, 7 Ohio Misc.2d 36 , 455 N.E.2d 24, 27 (1982) (“Every margin of error in a chemical test utilized for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the defendant’s blood as it addresses his guilt or lack of guilt in operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol must be strictly construed against the state and liberally construed in favor of the defendant.”); State v. Keller, 36 Wash.App. 110 , 672 P. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Speiser v. Randall
green
2 sentences1992In a somewhat different context, the United States Supreme Court has observed: “There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 , 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1341 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958). [This] possibility of mistaken factfind-ing — inherent in all litigation — will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized.... 1992In a somewhat different context, the United States Supreme Court has observed: “There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 , 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1341 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958). [This] possibility of mistaken factfind-ing — inherent in all litigation — will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized.... | 2 | 1979–1992 |
Application of Obermeyer
green
2 sentences1992Obermeyer maintained that this cut-off is arbitrary because "the statistical variance between 139.00 and 139.99 is only 0.7%, which is considerably smaller than the margin of error permitted by averaging scores assigned by different graders when they differ by only one point." Obermeyer, 717 P.2d at 388 . 1992We stated that "[i]t certainly seems that the Bar should be willing to allow a reread for at least as large a variance as the margin of error its examiners are allowed in averaging scores." Id. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Pritchard
green
2 sentences1987People v. Pritchard, 162 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13 , 209 Cal.Rptr. 314, 315 (1984) (holding that machine margin of error must be applied to breath test results before determining whether alcohol level exceeds legal limit); People v. Campos, 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 366, 368 (1982) (holding it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the statutory presumption that a person with blood alcohol test results of .10% or more was under the influence of alcohol because the margin of error on the test administered to the defendant showed that it was “as likely that the amount of al 1987People v. Pritchard, 162 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13 , 209 Cal.Rptr. 314, 315 (1984) (holding that machine margin of error must be applied to breath test results before determining whether alcohol level exceeds legal limit); People v. Campos, 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 366, 368 (1982) (holding it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the statutory presumption that a person with blood alcohol test results of .10% or more was under the influence of alcohol because the margin of error on the test administered to the defendant showed that it was “as likely that the amount of al | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Hrncir v. Commissioner of Public Safety
green
2 sentences1987Hrncir v. Commissioner, 370 N.W.2d 444 (Minn.App.1985), relied on by the state, is likewise distinguishable. 1987In Hmcir, the court refused to require consideration of test margin of error because "[t]he statute refers to test results showing a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or more, not .10 plus or minus a margin of error." Id. at 445 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
1 sentence1979Id. at 370-2, 90 S.Ct. at 1076-1077 , 25 L.Ed. at 379-80 (footnotes omitted). 17 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.