margin error in California

2026(See id. at pp. 33, 42.) Therefore, any trial plan that relies on statistical sampling “must be developed with expert input and must afford the defendant an opportunity to impeach the model or otherwise show its liability is reduced.” (Id. at p. 13.) “With input from the parties’ experts, the court must determine that a chosen sample size is statistically appropriate and capable of producing valid results within a reasonable margin of error.” (Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 42 .) The margin of error “is a statistical measurement of the reliability of an estimate produced by sampling.

2025The survey’s low response rate was ostensibly why it was still “in the field.” But, as the trial court stated, Steiner failed to explain “how she [would] re-do the study to get whatever sample size she [thought was] suitable.” The trial court was right to be skeptical whether Steiner could identify an appropriate sample size because Steiner did not “say anything about variability [among participants’ answers] based on the pilot.” (Duran I, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 42 [“It is impossible to determine an appropriate sample size without first learning about the variability in the population”].) 23

2016As we said in Speiser v. Randall [(1958) 357 U.S. 513 ,] 525-526 [ 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 , 78 S.Ct. 1332 ]: There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account.

2016As we said in Speiser v. Randall [(1958) 357 U.S. 513 ,] 525-526 [ 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 , 78 S.Ct. 1332 ]: There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account.

2016Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt.’ ” (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 363-364 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ].) This rationale for the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies equally to the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding in which a juvenile is charged with the commission of a crime.

2016Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt.’ ” (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 363-364 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ].) This rationale for the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies equally to the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding in which a juvenile is charged with the commission of a crime.

2017The appellate court stated: “While some defense critics have been distrustful of any unilateral determination of materiality reached without participation by defense counsel, and have been critical of placing an additional burden of judicial investigation upon the trial judge, the United States Supreme Court in Taglianetti v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 316, 317-318 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 302, 305 , 89 S.Ct. 1099 ] held: ‘[W]e cannot hold that “the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court.” ’ ” (People v. Levine, supra, 152 Ca

2017The appellate court stated: “While some defense critics have been distrustful of any unilateral determination of materiality reached without participation by defense counsel, and have been critical of placing an additional burden of judicial investigation upon the trial judge, the United States Supreme Court in Taglianetti v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 316, 317-318 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 302, 305 , 89 S.Ct. 1099 ] held: ‘[W]e cannot hold that “the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court.” ’ ” (People v. Levine, supra, 152 Ca

2021(See In re Nordin (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 538, 546 [“ ‘Prediction of the likelihood of certain conduct necessarily involves a margin of error, but is an established component of our pretrial release system’ ”].) In choosing between pretrial release and detention, we recognize that absolute certainty — particularly at the pretrial stage, when the trial meant to adjudicate guilt or innocence is yet to occur — will prove all but impossible.

2017The appellate court stated: “While some defense critics have been distrustful of any unilateral determination of materiality reached without participation by defense counsel, and have been critical of placing an additional burden of judicial investigation upon the trial judge, the United States Supreme Court in Taglianetti v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 316, 317-318 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 302, 305 , 89 S.Ct. 1099 ] held: ‘[W]e cannot hold that “the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court.” ’ ” (People v. Levine, supra, 152 Ca

2017The appellate court stated: “While some defense critics have been distrustful of any unilateral determination of materiality reached without participation by defense counsel, and have been critical of placing an additional burden of judicial investigation upon the trial judge, the United States Supreme Court in Taglianetti v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 316, 317-318 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 302, 305 , 89 S.Ct. 1099 ] held: ‘[W]e cannot hold that “the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court.” ’ ” (People v. Levine, supra, 152 Ca

2017In People v. Pacheco (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 70, 81-82 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 583 ], the First Appellate District, Division Four, observed: “It is the invocation of the basic privilege [of a public entity to decline disclosure of an informant’s identity] that denies the informer’s name to the defendant, not the in camera hearing, which is only the method by which the court determines the applicability of the privilege.

2017In People v. Pacheco (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 70, 81-82 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 583 ], the First Appellate District, Division Four, observed: “It is the invocation of the basic privilege [of a public entity to decline disclosure of an informant’s identity] that denies the informer’s name to the defendant, not the in camera hearing, which is only the method by which the court determines the applicability of the privilege.

2014Code § 17200; see Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 .) “After the 2004 amendment of the UCL by Proposition 64, a private person has standing to sue only if he or she ‘“has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of [such] unfair competition.”’ [Citation.]” (Nelson, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 .) “In the context of a class action, only the class representatives must meet Proposition 64’s standing requirements of actual injury and causation. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Assuming that at least some members of Cl

2014Plaintiffs’ notion, adopted from Nelson, is that any finance charge accruing with respect to a second or subsequent contract prior to the consummation date of that contract constitutes an “illegal finance charge” in the form of “preconsummation interest.” (See Nelson, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003 .) While we typically follow the decisions of other appellate districts or divisions, those decisions are not binding on us, and we follow them only if we lack good reason to disagree.

2014Code § 17200; see Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 .) “After the 2004 amendment of the UCL by Proposition 64, a private person has standing to sue only if he or she ‘“has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of [such] unfair competition.”’ [Citation.]” (Nelson, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 .) “In the context of a class action, only the class representatives must meet Proposition 64’s standing requirements of actual injury and causation. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Assuming that at least some members of Cl

2011This presumption applies in administrative license suspension proceedings. [Citations.]” (Corrigan v. Zolin (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 230, 236 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 634 ].) The trial court acknowledged that “these recorded test results are presumptively valid” but credited Williams’s margin-of-error testimony: “[T]here is nothing in the record to dispute Mr. Williams’ conclusion that the margin of error would make it impossible to determine the petitioner’s blood alcohol level at the time of the stop.

2011This presumption applies in administrative license suspension proceedings. [Citations.]” (Corrigan v. Zolin (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 230, 236 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 634 ].) The trial court acknowledged that “these recorded test results are presumptively valid” but credited Williams’s margin-of-error testimony: “[T]here is nothing in the record to dispute Mr. Williams’ conclusion that the margin of error would make it impossible to determine the petitioner’s blood alcohol level at the time of the stop.

2002(See People v. Randolph (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 5-8 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 378 ] (such evidence was available to refute idea that a test reading of .10, when that was the limit, did not show actual .10 blood alcohol given a margin of error of 0.010 percent).)

2002(See People v. Randolph (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 5-8 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 378 ] (such evidence was available to refute idea that a test reading of .10, when that was the limit, did not show actual .10 blood alcohol given a margin of error of 0.010 percent).)

1998The resolution of requests for instructions on lesser related offenses thus involves nuanced “ ‘questions of degree and judgment.’ ” ( Schmuck, supra, 489 U.S. 705, 721 [ 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1453 ].) Yet because a right to instructions such as that articulated in Geiger is absolute where it exists at all, the margin of error in ruling on a demand for lesser related offense instructions is small.

1998The resolution of requests for instructions on lesser related offenses thus involves nuanced “ ‘questions of degree and judgment.’ ” ( Schmuck, supra, 489 U.S. 705, 721 [ 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1453 ].) Yet because a right to instructions such as that articulated in Geiger is absolute where it exists at all, the margin of error in ruling on a demand for lesser related offense instructions is small.

1992Respect for fellow specialists, understanding of the complexities of the specialty and the margin for error, and fear of retaliation are motivations which could lead any professional to refuse to take the stand against a colleague.” (Jeffer, Mangels & Butler v. Glickman (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1432, 1439 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 243 ].) These considerations would apply as much to blood bankers as other professionals, and an overly strict standard of qualification could make it inordinately difficult to secure a qualified expert.

1992Respect for fellow specialists, understanding of the complexities of the specialty and the margin for error, and fear of retaliation are motivations which could lead any professional to refuse to take the stand against a colleague.” (Jeffer, Mangels & Butler v. Glickman (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1432, 1439 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 243 ].) These considerations would apply as much to blood bankers as other professionals, and an overly strict standard of qualification could make it inordinately difficult to secure a qualified expert.

1992(See Brown v. Colm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 639, 646 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 128 , 522 P.2d 688 ].) *275 Irwin notes that Asher was not a medical doctor, but again that is not conclusive. “‘ “The unmistakable general trend in recent years has been toward liberalizing the rules relating to the testimonial qualifications of medical experts.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[I]t cannot be said as a matter of law that an individual is not qualified to give a medical opinion just because that person is not a licensed physician. [Citation.] Because of the dramatic growth of diverse interdisciplinary studies in recent times, often i

1992(See Brown v. Colm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 639, 646 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 128 , 522 P.2d 688 ].) *275 Irwin notes that Asher was not a medical doctor, but again that is not conclusive. “‘ “The unmistakable general trend in recent years has been toward liberalizing the rules relating to the testimonial qualifications of medical experts.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[I]t cannot be said as a matter of law that an individual is not qualified to give a medical opinion just because that person is not a licensed physician. [Citation.] Because of the dramatic growth of diverse interdisciplinary studies in recent times, often i