margin error (New Jersey) · Go Syfert
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margin error in New Jersey

9 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1961–2011 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Speiser v. Randallgreen
scotus · 1958 · cited in 3 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1975–2005
2 sentences

2005He stated: As Mr. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526 , 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1341-1342 , 2 L.Ed. 2d 1460 (1958): `There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account.

2005He stated: As Mr. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526 , 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1341-1342 , 2 L.Ed. 2d 1460 (1958): `There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account.

23
In Re WINSHIPgreen
scotus · 1970 · cited in 3 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1975–2005
2 sentences

2005Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value—as a criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden * * * of persuading the fact-finder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' In this context, I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free. [ 397 U.S. at 372 , 90 S.Ct. at 1076-77 , 25 L.Ed. 2d a

2005Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value—as a criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden * * * of persuading the fact-finder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' In this context, I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free. [ 397 U.S. at 372 , 90 S.Ct. at 1076-77 , 25 L.Ed. 2d a

13
State v. Des Maretsgreen
nj · 1983 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
2 sentences

1986However, the principles of strict construction should be applied so that in cases where there exists “a margin of error ... affecting the breadth of [a penal statute’s] coverage, that margin should be narrowed as much as language reasonably permits to assure fairness and justice in the law’s individual applications.” State v. Des Marets, supra, 92 N.J. at 105 (dissenting and concurring opinion).

1986However, the principles of strict construction should be applied so that in cases where there exists "a margin of error ... affecting the breadth of [a penal statute's] coverage, that margin should be narrowed as much as language reasonably permits to assure fairness and justice in the law's individual applications." State v. Des Marets, supra, 92 N.J. at 105 (dissenting and concurring opinion).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Smith v. Hudson County Register green
njsuperctappdiv · 2010
2 sentences

2011The costs may be averaged for the copy equipment used in all county offices." Smith, supra, 411 N.J.Super. at 571 , 988 A. 2d 114 .

2011The costs may be averaged for the copy equipment used in all county offices." Smith, supra, 411 N.J.Super. at 571 , 988 A. 2d 114 .

12011–2011
Duncan v. Louisiana green
scotus · 1968
2 sentences

1999Although virtually unanimous *500 adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a requirement of due process, such adherence does "reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 491, 499 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 (1968). [ Id. at 361-62, 90 S.Ct. at 1071 , 25 L.Ed. 2d at 373-74 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).] The Court also emphasized the practical and moral justifications for the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable do

1999Although virtually unanimous *500 adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a requirement of due process, such adherence does "reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 , 20 L.Ed. 2d 491, 499 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 (1968). [ Id. at 361-62, 90 S.Ct. at 1071 , 25 L.Ed. 2d at 373-74 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).] The Court also emphasized the practical and moral justifications for the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable do

11999–1999
Brody v. Overlook Hospital green
njsuperctappdiv · 1974
1 sentence

1990In Brody v. Overlook Hospital, 127 N.J.

11990–1990
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board green
scotus · 1983
2 sentences

1988Id., 463 U.S. at 184 , 103 S.Ct. at 2950 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 565 .

1988Id., 463 U.S. at 184 , 103 S.Ct. at 2950 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 565 .

11988–1988
State v. Maguire green
nj · 1980
2 sentences

1983A failure to accord a strict interpretation of the Act increases intolerably the risk of injustice and "arbitrary enforcement." State v. Maguire , 84 N.J. at 514 n. 6.

1983A failure to accord a strict interpretation of the Act increases intolerably the risk of injustice and “arbitrary enforcement.” State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. at 514 n. 6.

11983–1983
Frye v. United States red
cadc · 1923
2 sentences

1961The first reported case repudiating the use of the polygraph as evidence in a criminal trial is Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 , 34 A.L.R. 145 ( D.C.

1961The first reported case repudiating the use of the polygraph as evidence in a criminal trial is Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 , 34 A.L.R. 145 ( D.C.

11961–1961

Where else courts name it

CA 35 (1972–2026) IL 18 (1927–2025) TX 17 (1969–2024) NY 14 (1968–2018) OH 14 (1999–2026) MD 13 (1979–2023) ID 11 (2004–2019) LA 11 (1977–2015) AZ 9 (1978–2017) AK 9 (1979–2020) NJ 9 (1961–2011) IA 8 (1986–2018) HI 8 (1976–2016) GA 8 (1877–2021) TN 8 (1977–2025) IN 8 (1908–2019) OR 7 (1993–2025) NE 7 (1943–2025) WA 7 (1979–2023) PA 6 (1971–2021) VA 6 (1991–2002) KS 6 (1997–2024) FL 5 (1980–2020) CO 5 (1982–2010) MO 5 (1999–2009) DC 5 (2003–2026) AL 5 (1992–2016) MA 4 (1975–2017) ME 4 (1975–2019) MN 4 (1986–1993) SC 4 (1982–2018) RI 4 (1985–2021) NC 4 (1991–2005) MI 4 (1968–2023) MS 3 (2015–2019) NM 3 (2001–2017) MT 3 (1992–2016) WV 2 (1982–2002) DE 2 (1997–2018) AR 2 (2013–2015) CT 2 (1963–1998) NH 2 (2005–2015) OK 2 (1981–1981) KY 2 (1984–2000)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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