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9 Alaska opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2021In response to King’s motion, the court reviewed its prior findings and found that the acts underlying King’s convictions occurred on “separate occasions” — that is, they were all “independent events that . . . occurred at different times.” On appeal, King argues that the trial court’s factual findings were not sufficiently specific to rule out the possibility that some of his convictions should have 9 See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 325 (Alaska 1985). 10 See Smith v. State, 1998 WL 426553 , at *4 (Alaska App. July 29, 1998) (unpublished) (discussing in dicta how “Alaska law is a little uncl 1991In State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 324 (Alaska 1985), the Alaska Supreme Court elected to follow the Aguilar/Spinelli test in determining whether hearsay information establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant. 2 Under this two-pronged test, hearsay may be relied on to support a finding of probable cause when sufficient evidence is presented to enable the issuing magistrate to determine the veracity and reliability of the hearsay; the magistrate must be able to find that the hearsay declarants’ statements were truthful and based on personal knowledge. | 6 | 6 |
Spinelli v. United Statesred2 sentences1997Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 324-25 (Alaska 1985). 1997Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 324-25 (Alaska 1985). | 2 | 3 |
Schmid v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416-17 , 89 S.Ct. at 589 , 21 L.Ed.2d at 643-44 ; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-13 , 79 S.Ct. 329, 333 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327, 331-32 (1959); Schmid v. State, 615 P.2d 565, 574-75 (Alaska 1980). 1995Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 , 79 S.Ct. 329, 333 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Schmid v. State, 615 P.2d 565, 574 (Alaska 1980). | 2 | 2 |
Hodsdon v. Stategreen2 sentences1991See Hodsdon v. State, 698 P.2d 1224, 1226-27 (Alaska App.1985). 1989Hodsdon v. State, 698 P.2d 1224, 1226-27 (Alaska App.1985); Belt v. State, 668 P.2d 829, 836 (Alaska App.1983). 2 . | 2 | 2 |
Draper v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1997Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416-17 , 89 S.Ct. at 589 , 21 L.Ed.2d at 643-44 ; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-13 , 79 S.Ct. 329, 333 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327, 331-32 (1959); Schmid v. State, 615 P.2d 565, 574-75 (Alaska 1980). 1997Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416-17 , 89 S.Ct. at 589 , 21 L.Ed.2d at 643-44 ; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-13 , 79 S.Ct. 329, 333 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327, 331-32 (1959); Schmid v. State, 615 P.2d 565, 574-75 (Alaska 1980). | 1 | 2 |
Goulden v. Stategreen1 sentence2021In response to King’s motion, the court reviewed its prior findings and found that the acts underlying King’s convictions occurred on “separate occasions” — that is, they were all “independent events that . . . occurred at different times.” On appeal, King argues that the trial court’s factual findings were not sufficiently specific to rule out the possibility that some of his convictions should have 9 See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 325 (Alaska 1985). 10 See Smith v. State, 1998 WL 426553 , at *4 (Alaska App. July 29, 1998) (unpublished) (discussing in dicta how “Alaska law is a little uncl | 1 | 1 |
Hugo v. Stategreen1 sentence1996Hugo v. State, 900 P.2d 1199, 1202 (Alaska App.1995); Lewis v. State, 862 P.2d 181 , 186 n. 5 (Alaska App.1993) (“For purposes of the Aguilar /Spinelli doctrine, *672 the veracity of a statement given by a police informant whose reliability is unknown may be established by a corroborating statement from another informant: Cross-corroboration among informants is a well-accepted method of demonstrating the validity of the information given.”). | 1 | 1 |
Kvasnikoff v. Stategreen1 sentence1995In Hugo’s case, the search warrant application relied on Dunbar’s personal observations (which are not subject to Aguilar/Spinelli analysis; see Kvasnikoff v. State, 804 P.2d 1302 , 1306 n. 3 (Alaska App.1991)) and on the information Dunbar received from the two anonymous informants. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bianchigreen2 sentences1991Jones, 706 P.2d at 324-25 ; State v. Bianchi, 761 P.2d 127, 136 (Alaska App.1987). 1991Jones, 706 P.2d at 324 ; Bianchi, 761 P.2d at 130 . | 1 | 1 |
Resek v. Stategreen1 sentence1991Resek v. State, 644 P.2d 877, 878-79 (Alaska App.1982). | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Stategreen1 sentence1989Hodsdon v. State, 698 P.2d 1224, 1226-27 (Alaska App.1985); Belt v. State, 668 P.2d 829, 836 (Alaska App.1983). 2 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Aguilar v. Texas
red
2 sentences1997Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 324-25 (Alaska 1985). 1997Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 324-25 (Alaska 1985). | 3 | 1988–1997 |
Lewis v. State
green
1 sentence1996Hugo v. State, 900 P.2d 1199, 1202 (Alaska App.1995); Lewis v. State, 862 P.2d 181 , 186 n. 5 (Alaska App.1993) (“For purposes of the Aguilar /Spinelli doctrine, *672 the veracity of a statement given by a police informant whose reliability is unknown may be established by a corroborating statement from another informant: Cross-corroboration among informants is a well-accepted method of demonstrating the validity of the information given.”). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Effenbeck v. State
green
1 sentence1995In both Goodlataw and Effenbeck v. State, 700 P.2d 811 (Alaska App.1985), we found reasonable suspicion for a stop where the officer conducting the stop observed no bad driving, but relied solely on an anonymous report of DWI. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Goodlataw v. State
green
2 sentences1995Goodlataw, 847 P.2d at 591 . 1995Although the Aguilar/Spinelli test need not be met in order to establish reasonable suspicion, the test “provides a useful framework for evaluating the trustworthiness of hearsay reports[.]”' Id. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences1991The Aguilar/Spinelli test was abandoned as a matter of federal constitutional law by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). 1991The Aguilar/Spinelli test was abandoned as a matter of federal constitutional law by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.