Spinelli test in New Mexico

2011See State v. Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 12 , 146 N.M. 9 319, 210 P.3d 216 (“Our inquiry focuses on the issuing judge’s conclusion as to 10 probable cause.” (emphasis omitted)); State v. Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, ¶ 29 , 11 146 N.M. 488 , 212 P.3d 376 (overruling in part all previous case law to the extent that 12 the cases applied a de novo rather than substantial basis standard of review); In re 13 Shon Daniel K., 1998-NMCA-069, ¶ 9 , 125 N.M. 219 , 959 P.2d 553 (setting forth the 14 two-pronged Aguilar/Spinelli test).

2011See State v. Cordova, 109 13 N.M. 211 , 213 n.2, 784 P.2d 30 , 32 n.2 (1989) (adopting the two-prong “Aguilar- 14 Spinelli test” articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 15 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), which requires 16 the affidavit to include: (1) facts establishing an informant’s “basis of knowledge” and 17 (2) facts showing the informant’s “veracity”). 18 In its memorandum in opposition, the State relies on the inherent reliability of 19 a citizen informant. [MIO 4, 7] See In re Shon Daniel K., 1998-NMCA-069, ¶ 13 , 5 1

2011See State v. Cordova, 109 13 N.M. 211 , 213 n.2, 784 P.2d 30 , 32 n.2 (1989) (adopting the two-prong “Aguilar- 14 Spinelli test” articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 15 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), which requires 16 the affidavit to include: (1) facts establishing an informant’s “basis of knowledge” and 17 (2) facts showing the informant’s “veracity”). 18 In its memorandum in opposition, the State relies on the inherent reliability of 19 a citizen informant. [MIO 4, 7] See In re Shon Daniel K., 1998-NMCA-069, ¶ 13 , 5 1

2011See State v. Cordova, 109 13 N.M. 211 , 213 n.2, 784 P.2d 30 , 32 n.2 (1989) (adopting the two-prong “Aguilar- 14 Spinelli test” articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 15 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), which requires 16 the affidavit to include: (1) facts establishing an informant’s “basis of knowledge” and 17 (2) facts showing the informant’s “veracity”). 18 In its memorandum in opposition, the State relies on the inherent reliability of 19 a citizen informant. [MIO 4, 7] See In re Shon Daniel K., 1998-NMCA-069, ¶ 13 , 5 1

2023In adopting the Aguilar- 10 Spinelli test, we declined to follow the totality of the circumstances approach 11 adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 238- 12 39 (1983), to evaluate tips from confidential informants under the Fourth 13 Amendment.

2023Cordova, 1989-NMSC-083 , ¶ 17. 14 {22} Cordova and Aguilar-Spinelli require officers who rely “wholly or in part on 15 hearsay provided by an unnamed informant” in justifying a seizure to identify (1) 16 “some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the 17 facts were as he claimed they were,” and (2) “some of the underlying circumstances 18 from which the officer concluded that the informant was credible or his information 19 reliable.” Cordova, 1989-NMSC-083 , ¶ 6 (text only) (quoting Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 11 1 114); see also Rule 5-208(C) NMRA (“The showing of

2011“Our review is 14 limited to the four corners of the search warrant affidavit.” Id. ¶ 31. 15 “When facts provided by an informer are independently corroborated, we 16 accord greater weight to the informer’s credibility.” Dietrich, 2009-NMCA-031, ¶ 12 . 17 “Identifying an ‘informant’ by name is a significant factor in determining the veracity 18 or reliability of the information.” Id. “[A] named informant has greater incentive to 19 provide truthful information because he or she is subject to unfavorable consequences 1 for providing false or inaccurate information to a greater degree than an un

2011“Our review is 14 limited to the four corners of the search warrant affidavit.” Id. ¶ 31. 15 “When facts provided by an informer are independently corroborated, we 16 accord greater weight to the informer’s credibility.” Dietrich, 2009-NMCA-031, ¶ 12 . 17 “Identifying an ‘informant’ by name is a significant factor in determining the veracity 18 or reliability of the information.” Id. “[A] named informant has greater incentive to 19 provide truthful information because he or she is subject to unfavorable consequences 1 for providing false or inaccurate information to a greater degree than an un

2011See State v. Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, ¶ 12 , 146 N.M. 9 319, 210 P.3d 216 (“Our inquiry focuses on the issuing judge’s conclusion as to 10 probable cause.” (emphasis omitted)); State v. Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, ¶ 29 , 11 146 N.M. 488 , 212 P.3d 376 (overruling in part all previous case law to the extent that 12 the cases applied a de novo rather than substantial basis standard of review); In re 13 Shon Daniel K., 1998-NMCA-069, ¶ 9 , 125 N.M. 219 , 959 P.2d 553 (setting forth the 14 two-pronged Aguilar/Spinelli test).