Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pitregreen2 sentences2005Bishop, Criminal Procedure ch. 6, at 50-56 (2d ed. 1872); State v. Benenati, 203 Ariz. 235, ¶ 13 , 52 P.3d 804, 808 (App.2002) (“[W]e choose to follow Apprendi’s logic, and Ring’s [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002),] clear message, that a fact exposing a defendant to increased sentencing, not the actual sentence imposed, is the litmus test.”); see also State v. Pitre, 210 Ariz. 93, ¶ 17 , 107 P.3d 939, 944 (App.2005) (referring to “a defendant’s constitutional right to have the jury find all factors that expose him to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum”) ( 2005Bishop, Criminal Procedure ch. 6, at 50-56 (2d ed. 1872); State v. Benenati, 203 Ariz. 235, ¶ 13 , 52 P.3d 804, 808 (App.2002) (“[W]e choose to follow Apprendi’s logic, and Ring’s [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002),] clear message, that a fact exposing a defendant to increased sentencing, not the actual sentence imposed, is the litmus test.”); see also State v. Pitre, 210 Ariz. 93, ¶ 17 , 107 P.3d 939, 944 (App.2005) (referring to “a defendant’s constitutional right to have the jury find all factors that expose him to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum”) ( | 2 | 2 |
State v. Benenatigreen2 sentences2005Bishop, Criminal Procedure ch. 6, at 50-56 (2d ed. 1872); State v. Benenati, 203 Ariz. 235, ¶ 13 , 52 P.3d 804, 808 (App.2002) (“[W]e choose to follow Apprendi’s logic, and Ring’s [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002),] clear message, that a fact exposing a defendant to increased sentencing, not the actual sentence imposed, is the litmus test.”); see also State v. Pitre, 210 Ariz. 93, ¶ 17 , 107 P.3d 939, 944 (App.2005) (referring to “a defendant’s constitutional right to have the jury find all factors that expose him to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum”) ( 2005Bishop, Criminal Procedure ch. 6, at 50-56 (2d ed. 1872); State v. Benenati, 203 Ariz. 235, ¶ 13 , 52 P.3d 804, 808 (App.2002) (“[W]e choose to follow Apprendi’s logic, and Ring’s [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002),] clear message, that a fact exposing a defendant to increased sentencing, not the actual sentence imposed, is the litmus test.”); see also State v. Pitre, 210 Ariz. 93, ¶ 17 , 107 P.3d 939, 944 (App.2005) (referring to “a defendant’s constitutional right to have the jury find all factors that expose him to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum”) ( | 2 | 2 |
Readenour v. Marion Power Shovelgreen2 sentences2009See Readenour, 149 Ariz. at 446 , 719 P.2d at 1062 (noting that § 12-682(2) has “both procedural and substantive aspects”); cf. Legg, 286 F.3d at 290 (“[S]ome state evidentiary rules have substantive aspects, thereby defying the substance-procedure distinction.”). 4 The relevant inquiry therefore cannot end, as our concurring colleague suggests, see ¶ 52, infra, with the conclusion that there is some conflict between a validly enacted rule of evidence and a statute. 5 The ultimate question is whether the statute enacts, at least in relevant part, law that effectively “creates, defines, and reg 2009See Readenour, 149 Ariz. at 446 , 719 P.2d at 1062 (noting that § 12-682(2) has “both procedural and substantive aspects”); cf. Legg, 286 F.3d at 290 (“[S]ome state evidentiary rules have substantive aspects, thereby defying the substance-procedure distinction.”). 4 The relevant inquiry therefore cannot end, as our concurring colleague suggests, see ¶ 52, infra, with the conclusion that there is some conflict between a validly enacted rule of evidence and a statute. 5 The ultimate question is whether the statute enacts, at least in relevant part, law that effectively “creates, defines, and reg | 1 | 1 |
Annabelle Legg v. Dr. Ash Chopra, University Urology, P.C.green2 sentences2009See Readenour, 149 Ariz. at 446 , 719 P.2d at 1062 (noting that § 12-682(2) has "both procedural and substantive aspects"); cf. Legg, 286 F.3d at 290 ("[S]ome state evidentiary rules have substantive aspects, thereby defying the substance-procedure distinction."). [4] The relevant inquiry therefore cannot end, as our concurring colleague suggests, see ¶ 52, infra, with the conclusion that there is some conflict between a validly enacted rule of evidence and a statute. [5] The ultimate question is whether the statute enacts, at least in relevant part, law that effectively "creates, defines, and 2009See Readenour, 149 Ariz. at 446 , 719 P.2d at 1062 (noting that § 12-682(2) has “both procedural and substantive aspects”); cf. Legg, 286 F.3d at 290 (“[S]ome state evidentiary rules have substantive aspects, thereby defying the substance-procedure distinction.”). 4 The relevant inquiry therefore cannot end, as our concurring colleague suggests, see ¶ 52, infra, with the conclusion that there is some conflict between a validly enacted rule of evidence and a statute. 5 The ultimate question is whether the statute enacts, at least in relevant part, law that effectively “creates, defines, and reg | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fletchergreen2 sentences2009“Because the legislature is empowered to set burdens of proof as a matter of substantive law, a valid statute specifying the burden of proof prevails over common law or court rules adopting a different standard.” Valerie M., 219 Ariz. at 336 ¶ 21, 198 P.3d at 1208 ; see State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 191-93 , 717 P.2d 866, 870-72 (1986) (holding that burden of proof of insanity is substantive and may be altered by the legislature). 2009“Because the legislature is empowered to set burdens of proof as a matter of substantive law, a valid statute specifying the burden of proof prevails over common law or court rules adopting a different standard.” Valerie M., 219 Ariz. at 336 ¶ 21, 198 P.3d at 1208 ; see State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 191-93 , 717 P.2d 866, 870-72 (1986) (holding that burden of proof of insanity is substantive and may be altered by the legislature). | 1 | 1 |
Espinoza v. Martingreen2 sentences2004See Espinoza v. Martin, 182 Ariz. 145, 148 , 894 P.2d 688, 691 (1995) (“Even if the ... policy were consistent with the rules of procedure, the policy constituted a local rule that was invalid because [the lower court] adopted it without first obtaining the approval of this court.”); see also State v. City Court, 150 Ariz. 99, 101-03 , 722 P.2d 267, 269-71 (1986) (invalidating as an unauthorized local rule a court order not found to be inconsistent with the Rules of Criminal Procedure). 2004See Espinoza v. Martin, 182 Ariz. 145, 148 , 894 P.2d 688, 691 (1995) (“Even if the ... policy were consistent with the rules of procedure, the policy constituted a local rule that was invalid because [the lower court] adopted it without first obtaining the approval of this court.”); see also State v. City Court, 150 Ariz. 99, 101-03 , 722 P.2d 267, 269-71 (1986) (invalidating as an unauthorized local rule a court order not found to be inconsistent with the Rules of Criminal Procedure). | 1 | 1 |
State v. City Court of City of Tucsongreen2 sentences2004See Espinoza v. Martin, 182 Ariz. 145, 148 , 894 P.2d 688, 691 (1995) (“Even if the ... policy were consistent with the rules of procedure, the policy constituted a local rule that was invalid because [the lower court] adopted it without first obtaining the approval of this court.”); see also State v. City Court, 150 Ariz. 99, 101-03 , 722 P.2d 267, 269-71 (1986) (invalidating as an unauthorized local rule a court order not found to be inconsistent with the Rules of Criminal Procedure). 2004See Espinoza v. Martin, 182 Ariz. 145, 148 , 894 P.2d 688, 691 (1995) (“Even if the ... policy were consistent with the rules of procedure, the policy constituted a local rule that was invalid because [the lower court] adopted it without first obtaining the approval of this court.”); see also State v. City Court, 150 Ariz. 99, 101-03 , 722 P.2d 267, 269-71 (1986) (invalidating as an unauthorized local rule a court order not found to be inconsistent with the Rules of Criminal Procedure). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Randy Gean Ellisgreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 241 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir.2001) (Apprendi not implicated because defendant’s sentence less than maximum statutory sentence otherwise permissible); United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2001) (same). 4 But, we choose to follow Ap-prendi’s logic, and Ring’s clear message, that a fact exposing a defendant to increased sentencing, not the actual sentence imposed, is the litmus test. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Walk v. Ring
green
2 sentences2010Walk explains that “the core question” as to when a cause of action accrues is when a “reasonable person would have been on notice” to investigate whether negligent conduct may have caused her injury; it does not provide or suggest that a plaintiff first must receive an expert medical opinion stating that malpractice has occurred, which is the litmus test Little proposes. 202 Ariz. 310, ¶ 24 , 44 P.3d at 996 . 5 Although the Board complaint, notice of claim, and civil complaint all allege that other university employees also had contributed to Polk‟s death, because Little now contends that her 2010Walk explains that “the core question” as to when a cause of action accrues is when a “reasonable person would have been on notice” to investigate whether negligent conduct may have caused her injury; it does not provide or suggest that a plaintiff first must receive an expert medical opinion stating that malpractice has occurred, which is the litmus test Little proposes. 202 Ariz. 310, ¶ 24 , 44 P.3d at 996 . 5 Although the Board complaint, notice of claim, and civil complaint all allege that other university employees also had contributed to Polk‟s death, because Little now contends that her | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Lamb v. Arizona Country Club
green
2 sentences2020Id. ¶24 Second, the superior court could use the memoranda and evidence submitted with the Rule 60(b) motion as a litmus test to determine whether the judgment should be re-opened “on condition that the issue relating to the avoidance of the settlement agreement be alleged by way of supplemental pleadings and adjudicated before it in the normal course of trial procedure.” Id. 2020Id. ¶24 Second, the superior court could use the memoranda and evidence submitted with the Rule 60(b) motion as a litmus test to determine whether the judgment should be re-opened “on condition that the issue relating to the avoidance of the settlement agreement be alleged by way of supplemental pleadings and adjudicated before it in the normal course of trial procedure.” Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Valerie M. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
green
2 sentences2009“Because the legislature is empowered to set burdens of proof as a matter of substantive law, a valid statute specifying the burden of proof prevails over common law or court rules adopting a different standard.” Valerie M., 219 Ariz. at 336 ¶ 21, 198 P.3d at 1208 ; see State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 191-93 , 717 P.2d 866, 870-72 (1986) (holding that burden of proof of insanity is substantive and may be altered by the legislature). 2009“Because the legislature is empowered to set burdens of proof as a matter of substantive law, a valid statute specifying the burden of proof prevails over common law or court rules adopting a different standard.” Valerie M., 219 Ariz. at 336 ¶ 21, 198 P.3d at 1208 ; see State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 191-93 , 717 P.2d 866, 870-72 (1986) (holding that burden of proof of insanity is substantive and may be altered by the legislature). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2005Bishop, Criminal Procedure ch. 6, at 50-56 (2d ed. 1872); State v. Benenati, 203 Ariz. 235, ¶ 13 , 52 P.3d 804, 808 (App.2002) (“[W]e choose to follow Apprendi’s logic, and Ring’s [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002),] clear message, that a fact exposing a defendant to increased sentencing, not the actual sentence imposed, is the litmus test.”); see also State v. Pitre, 210 Ariz. 93, ¶ 17 , 107 P.3d 939, 944 (App.2005) (referring to “a defendant’s constitutional right to have the jury find all factors that expose him to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum”) ( 2005Bishop, Criminal Procedure ch. 6, at 50-56 (2d ed. 1872); State v. Benenati, 203 Ariz. 235, ¶ 13 , 52 P.3d 804, 808 (App.2002) (“[W]e choose to follow Apprendi’s logic, and Ring’s [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002),] clear message, that a fact exposing a defendant to increased sentencing, not the actual sentence imposed, is the litmus test.”); see also State v. Pitre, 210 Ariz. 93, ¶ 17 , 107 P.3d 939, 944 (App.2005) (referring to “a defendant’s constitutional right to have the jury find all factors that expose him to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum”) ( | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Tschilar
green
2 sentences2003In other situations, however, Arizona courts have found no constitutional problem when a judge’s post-trial factual finding may have affected the sentence but did not expose the defendant to a sentence exceeding the prescribed statutory maximum for purposes of Apprendi ¶ 14 For example, in State v. Tschilar, 200 Ariz. 427 , 27 P.3d 331 (App.2001), Division One of this court concluded that Apprendi does not require a jury to determine whether the defendant had safely released a kidnapping victim for purposes of A.R.S. § 13-1304(B), because “the fact of [the victim’s safe] release as found by th 2003In other situations, however, Arizona courts have found no constitutional problem when a judge’s post-trial factual finding may have affected the sentence but did not expose the defendant to a sentence exceeding the prescribed statutory maximum for purposes of Apprendi ¶ 14 For example, in State v. Tschilar, 200 Ariz. 427 , 27 P.3d 331 (App.2001), Division One of this court concluded that Apprendi does not require a jury to determine whether the defendant had safely released a kidnapping victim for purposes of A.R.S. § 13-1304(B), because “the fact of [the victim’s safe] release as found by th | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Nichols
green
2 sentences2003Noting in Benenati that “a fact exposing a defendant to increased sentencing, not the actual sentence imposed, is the litmus test,” we “strictly limit[ed] to the fact of a prior conviction the Apprendi exception permitting a court, and not a jury, to find sentence enhancers that expose a defendant to a sentence greater than otherwise permissible.” 203 Ariz. 235, ¶¶ 13, 22 , 52 P.3d 804, ¶¶ 13, 22 . ¶ 12 Similarly, in Nichols, 201 Ariz. 234, ¶ 7 , 33 P.3d 1172, ¶ 7 , we held that “the fact of drug-sale income greater than $25,000 [under A.R.S. § 13-3410(A) ] must be found by a jury beyond a rea 2003Noting in Benenati that “a fact exposing a defendant to increased sentencing, not the actual sentence imposed, is the litmus test,” we “strictly limit[ed] to the fact of a prior conviction the Apprendi exception permitting a court, and not a jury, to find sentence enhancers that expose a defendant to a sentence greater than otherwise permissible.” 203 Ariz. 235, ¶¶ 13, 22 , 52 P.3d 804, ¶¶ 13, 22 . ¶ 12 Similarly, in Nichols, 201 Ariz. 234, ¶ 7 , 33 P.3d 1172, ¶ 7 , we held that “the fact of drug-sale income greater than $25,000 [under A.R.S. § 13-3410(A) ] must be found by a jury beyond a rea | 1 | 2003–2003 |
United States v. Ignasio Maldenaldo Sanchez, United States of America v. Santiago Gilberto Sanchez
green
1 sentence2002See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 241 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir.2001) (Apprendi not implicated because defendant’s sentence less than maximum statutory sentence otherwise permissible); United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2001) (same). 4 But, we choose to follow Ap-prendi’s logic, and Ring’s clear message, that a fact exposing a defendant to increased sentencing, not the actual sentence imposed, is the litmus test. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.