litmus test in Texas

2025Evans, 6 202 SW.3d at 162 n.12 (factors “are not a litmus test.”).

2025While the factors are intended to help guide the court’s analysis, the ultimate inquiry is whether, “[b]ased on the combined and cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom,” the jury was “rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?” Tate, S.W.3d at 415 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). 8 The affirmative links are “simply some factors which may circumstantially establish the legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove a knowing ‘possession.’ They are not a litmus test.” Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158 , 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim.

2020Gregory v. State, 56 S.W.3d 164 , 179–80 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d) (“A medical license or degree is not the litmus test for qualification as an expert witness.”).

2015See Gregory v. State, 56 S.W.3d 164 , 179–80 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d) (nurses and other medical professionals may be qualified as experts in evaluating sexual assault cases, although a medical license or degree is not “the litmus test” for qualification as an expert); see also Moore v. State, No. 07-09-00363-CR, 2011 WL 3717058 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 23, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding trial court could have reasonably concluded SANE nurse was qualified to render opinion on potential cause of victim’s injuries given her con

2011Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2003, no pet.).

2011Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2003, no pet.).

2003Ultimate Concerns Ultimate concerns, as addressed by traditional religions, are characterized by their adherence to, and promotion of, certain "underlying theories of man's nature or his place in the Universe." Africa , 662 F.2d at 1033 (citing Founding Church of Scientology v. United States , 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C.

2003Ultimate Concerns Ultimate concerns, as addressed by traditional religions, are characterized by their adherence to, and promotion of, certain Aunderlying theories of man=s nature or his place in the Universe.@ Africa, 662 F.2d at 1033 (citing Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C.

2013However, “[t]hese are simply some factors which may circumstantially establish the legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove a knowing ‘possession.’ 15 They are not a litmus test.” Id.

2011These factors are “simply some factors which may circumstantially establish the legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove a knowing ‘possession.’ They are not a litmus test.” Id. (citing Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Tex. Crim.

2003Ultimate Concerns Ultimate concerns, as addressed by traditional religions, are characterized by their adherence to, and promotion of, certain "underlying theories of man's nature or his place in the Universe." Africa , 662 F.2d at 1033 (citing Founding Church of Scientology v. United States , 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C.

2003The Ethical Society's Status under the Tax Code Having determined that the Comptroller's test is invalid under the First Amendment, we are left with the question of whether, under an appropriate analysis, the Ethical Society constitutes a religious group. (11) Both parties refer us to the line of cases relying on the three-factor test laid out by Judge Adams in his concurrence in Malnak v. Yogi , 592 F.2d 197, 207-210 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring), and later applied by him in Pennsylvania v. Africa , 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981). (12) The Malnak test gives a court the basis on w

2025Id.; see also Allen v. State, 249 S.W.3d 680 , 692 n.13 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.).

2016Id.; see also Allen v. State, 249 S.W.3d 680 , 692 n.13 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (explaining that affirmative-link doctrine “is a judicially devised standard to aid appellate courts in determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence in knowing possession of contraband cases” but is not “a litmus test”).

2017See id. at 12 (explaining that the purpose of the stoppage was central to determining whether property remained in transit).

2017See id at 12, 54 S.Ct. 34 (explaining that the purpose of the stoppage was central to determining whether property remained in transit).

2016Cf. generally Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 113 (Okla.1962) (discussing relative economic benefits in breaeh-of-contract damages analysis, which is conceptually similar to concept of “efficient breach”) and Avery Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach, 45 Suffolk U. L.

2016Cf. generally Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 113 (Okla. 1962) (discussing relative economic benefits in breach-of-contract damages analysis, which is conceptually similar to concept of “efficient breach”) and Avery Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach, 45 SUFFOLK U. L.

2014See Murphy v. Russell, 167 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2005).

2014See Murphy v. Russell, 167 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex.2005).

2012See Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 686 .

2012See Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 686 .

2010Cf. Gregory v. State , 56 S.W.3d 164 , 179–80 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d) (stating that nurses and other medical professionals may be qualified as experts in evaluating child abuse cases, although a medical license or degree is not “the litmus test” for qualification as an expert); Perez v. State , 25 S.W.3d 830, 837 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (concluding the trial court abused its discretion in permitting non-medical witness to testify about findings made by pediatric psychiatrist regarding “child abuse accommodation syndrome”).

2010Cf Gregory v. State, 56 S.W.3d 164, 179-80 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d) (stating that nurses and other medical professionals may be qualified as experts in evaluating child abuse cases, although a medical license or degree is not “the litmus test” for qualification as an expert); Perez v. State, 25 S.W.3d 830, 837 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (concluding the trial court abused its discretion in permitting non-medical witness to testify about findings made by pediatric psychiatrist regarding “child abuse accommodation syndrome”).

2005Id. at 659 ; see Gregory v. State, 56 S.W.3d 164, 179-80 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d) (stating that a medical license or degree is not the litmus test for qualification as an expert witness), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 978 , 123 S.Ct. 1787 , 155 L.Ed.2d 667 (2003); see also Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 27-28 (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing witness to testify as an expert, even though she was not licensed). *259 Therefore, we hold that based on Pamela Kirby’s education and experience, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing her to test

2005Id . at 659; see Gregory v. State , 56 S.W.3d 164, 179-80 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d) (stating that a medical license or degree is not the litmus test for qualification as an expert witness), cert. denied , 538 U.S. 978 (2003); see also Wyatt , 23 S.W.3d at 27-28 (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing witness to testify as an expert, even though she was not licensed).

2005Id. at 659 ; see Gregory v. State, 56 S.W.3d 164, 179-80 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d) (stating that a medical license or degree is not the litmus test for qualification as an expert witness), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 978 , 123 S.Ct. 1787 , 155 L.Ed.2d 667 (2003); see also Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 27-28 (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing witness to testify as an expert, even though she was not licensed). *259 Therefore, we hold that based on Pamela Kirby’s education and experience, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing her to test

2005Id . at 659; see Gregory v. State , 56 S.W.3d 164, 179-80 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d) (stating that a medical license or degree is not the litmus test for qualification as an expert witness), cert. denied , 538 U.S. 978 (2003); see also Wyatt , 23 S.W.3d at 27-28 (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing witness to testify as an expert, even though she was not licensed).

2003The Ethical Society’s Status under the Tax Code Having determined that the Comptroller’s test is invalid under the First Amendment, we are left with the question of whether, under an appropriate analysis, the Ethical Society constitutes a religious group. 11 Both parties refer us to *469 the line of cases relying on the three-factor test laid out by Judge Adams in his concurrence in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207-210 (3d Cir.1979) (Adams, J., concurring), and later applied by him in Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir.1981). 12 The Malnak test gives a court the basis on whic

2003The Ethical Society's Status under the Tax Code Having determined that the Comptroller's test is invalid under the First Amendment, we are left with the question of whether, under an appropriate analysis, the Ethical Society constitutes a religious group. (11) Both parties refer us to the line of cases relying on the three-factor test laid out by Judge Adams in his concurrence in Malnak v. Yogi , 592 F.2d 197, 207-210 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring), and later applied by him in Pennsylvania v. Africa , 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981). (12) The Malnak test gives a court the basis on w

2017The court noted that this list was not intended to be dispositive, and that it should not be considered as a litmus test for determining a defendant’s guilt; instead, the list was intended to simply set forth some of the factors that a court may consider as circumstantially establishing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove a knowing “possession.” Id.

2008Finally, the court intimated that these are just “some factors which may circumstantially establish the legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove a knowing ‘possession.’ They are not a litmus test.” Id.

2023Id. at 182 ; see Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Crim.

2023Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 180, 182 (Tex. Crim.

2024See id. at 405-06 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).

2023Id. at 182 ; see Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Crim.

2019App. 2006) (“These are simply some factors which may circumstantially establish the legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove a knowing ‘possession.’ They are not a litmus test.”); see also Harris v. State, 173 S.W.3d 575, 580 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (“It is not the number of affirmative links present that is important, but rather the ‘logical force’ that they create to prove that the defendant committed the crime.”).

2018Importantly, we only “consider links (well) supported by the record.” Dominguez v. State, 474 S.W.3d 688, 695 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.) (citing Satchell v. State, 321 S.W.3d 127, 134 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (“The absence of various links does not constitute evidence of innocence to be weighed against the links present.”)).

2018Importantly, we only “consider links (well) supported by the record.” Dominguez v. State, 474 S.W.3d 688, 695 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.) (citing Satchell v. State, 321 S.W.3d 127, 134 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (“The absence of various links does not constitute evidence of innocence to be weighed against the links present.”)).