Torres inquiry in Arizona

2025Torres, 208 Ariz. at 344, ¶ 15 . 6 STATE v. LUCKETT Decision of the Court ¶19 Luckett argues “[t]he trial court’s handling of [his] motion for new counsel was legally insufficient,” contending the court abdicated its “duty to conduct a meaningful inquiry.” Contrary to this contention, the record reflects that the court conducted a Torres inquiry, inviting Luckett to fully explain, uninterrupted, the basis for his change of counsel request. ¶20 Prompted by the trial court, Luckett complained that his appointed attorney failed to follow his instructions, solicit his advice, and interview the wit

2014Id.

2022See Paris-Sheldon, 214 Ariz. at 505, ¶ 13 (explaining a superior court must resolve any factual dispute that arises during a Torres inquiry, and a reviewing court defers “to that resolution so long as the record supports it”). 15 STATE v. DANN Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶55 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

2022See Paris-Sheldon, 214 Ariz. at 505, ¶ 13 (explaining a superior court must resolve any factual dispute that arises during a Torres inquiry, and a reviewing court defers “to that resolution so long as the record supports it”). 15 STATE v. DANN Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶55 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

2019See State v. Fell, 242 Ariz. 134, 136, ¶ 6 (App. 2017); George, 206 Ariz. at 446, ¶ 31 . ¶10 Accordingly, the record supports the superior court’s determination that a jury could reasonably conclude the letters were authentic, see Lavers, 168 Ariz. at 386 , and the court did not abuse its 3 STATE v. ROGEL TORRES Decision of the Court discretion by overruling Torres’s objection and admitting the letters into evidence.

2019See State v. Fell, 242 Ariz. 134, 136, ¶ 6 (App. 2017); George, 206 Ariz. at 446, ¶ 31 . ¶10 Accordingly, the record supports the superior court’s determination that a jury could reasonably conclude the letters were authentic, see Lavers, 168 Ariz. at 386 , and the court did not abuse its 3 STATE v. ROGEL TORRES Decision of the Court discretion by overruling Torres’s objection and admitting the letters into evidence.

2014Torres was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, one count of resisting arrest and one count of threatening or intimidating. ¶3 As relevant here, during jury selection, the State exercised a peremptory strike of Juror 4, who Torres argued was Hispanic.2 Torres 1 The court views the facts “in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and resolve[s] all reasonable inferences against the defendant.” State v. Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 588-89 , 951 P.2d 454, 463-64 (1997) (citation omitted). 2 Although originally challenging the State’s peremptory strike of Juror 5 (the other p

2014Torres was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, one count of resisting arrest and one count of threatening or intimidating. ¶3 As relevant here, during jury selection, the State exercised a peremptory strike of Juror 4, who Torres argued was Hispanic.2 Torres 1 The court views the facts “in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and resolve[s] all reasonable inferences against the defendant.” State v. Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 588-89 , 951 P.2d 454, 463-64 (1997) (citation omitted). 2 Although originally challenging the State’s peremptory strike of Juror 5 (the other p

2013“In order to exercise its discretion properly the court must elicit from the defendant the reasons for his objection to counsel.” Torres, 208 Ariz. at 343 ¶ 9, 93 P.3d at 1059 (quoting United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir.1983)).

2013“In order to exercise its discretion properly the court must elicit from the defendant the reasons for his objection to counsel.” Torres, 208 Ariz. at 343 ¶ 9, 93 P.3d at 1059 (quoting United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir.1983)).

2004See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 , 39 P.3d 525, 527 (2002) (“[Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are to be brought in Rule 32 proceedings.”). *345 ¶ 16 In applying these factors to Torres’ motion on remand, the trial judge should not consider itself limited to the facts as they existed at the time it denied the motion.

2004See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 , 39 P.3d 525, 527 (2002) (“[Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are to be brought in Rule 32 proceedings.”). *345 ¶ 16 In applying these factors to Torres’ motion on remand, the trial judge should not consider itself limited to the facts as they existed at the time it denied the motion.

2004Nevertheless, the court held that the trial judge’s “summary denial” of Torres’ motion “violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it may have subjected him to ‘representation by a lawyer with whom he had a completely fractured relationship.’ ” Id. at 57, ¶ 17 , 75 P.3d at 147 (quoting State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, 509, ¶ 23 , 968 P.2d 578, 582 (1998)) (emphasis added).

2004E.g., Bass v. United States, 580 A.2d 669, 671 (D.C.1990) (“[We] agree with the government that it would be unreasonable to ignore any relevant preparation that counsel might have conducted in the three months between the date of [defendant’s complaint about the ineffectiveness of his counsel] and the beginning of the trial.”).

2004Nevertheless, the court held that the trial judge’s “summary denial” of Torres’ motion “violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it may have subjected him to ‘representation by a lawyer with whom he had a completely fractured relationship.’ ” Id. at 57, ¶ 17 , 75 P.3d at 147 (quoting State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, 509, ¶ 23 , 968 P.2d 578, 582 (1998)) (emphasis added).

2004Concluding that the “[fjailure to hold a hearing on an allegation of a fundamental constitutional violation is reversible error,” id., the court of appeals reversed Torres’ convictions and ordered a new trial, id. at 58, ¶ 22, 75 P.3d at 148 . ¶ 4 The State petitioned for review, arguing that a trial court’s failure to inquire into a defendant’s request for appointment of new counsel should not require automatic reversal.