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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 2012–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Avenagreen2 sentences2025(In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 772, fn. 32 .) We have identified only one error, however, so the doctrine of cumulative prejudice does not apply. 2021(See In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694 , 20 772, fn. 32.) However, given that we have only found one error, and we did not find that error to be prejudicial, the doctrine of cumulative prejudice does not apply. | 1 | 3 |
In re Jonesgreen2 sentences2012(In re Jones (1996) 13 Cal.4th 552, 583 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 , 917 P.2d 1175 ], and cases cited.) As noted, claims previously rejected on their substantive merits—i.e., this court found no legal error—cannot logically be used to support a cumulative error claim because we have already found there was no error to cumulate. *484 But even admitting the possibility that a litigant could renew past claims previously rejected solely for lack of prejudice, our consideration of a cumulative error claim (or more precisely, a cumulative prejudice claim) does not require a petitioner to restate the entire 2012(In re Jones (1996) 13 Cal.4th 552, 583 , and cases cited.) As noted, claims previously rejected on their substantive merits—i.e., this court found no legal error—cannot logically be used to support a cumulative error claim because we have already found there was no error to cumulate. 58 But even admitting the possibility that a litigant could renew past claims previously rejected solely for lack of prejudice, our consideration of a cumulative error claim (or more precisely, a cumulative prejudice claim) does not require a petitioner to restate the entirety of his appellate briefing. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Wrestgreen1 sentence2022We have concluded that two were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (i.e., the alleged instructional 80 errors) (see, e.g., People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1111 [addressing cumulative prejudice]), and the remaining ones do not collectively undermine our confidence in the jury’s verdict by making it “reasonably probable that the jury would not have convicted appellant of the charged offenses” (People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 907 ), or even reasonably possible the jury would not have done so. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Beltran
green
2 sentences2021In making that evaluation, an appellate court may 62 consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956 .) The cumulative prejudice doctrine is based on an examination of the “entire record.” (Delzell v. Day (1950) 36 Cal.2d 349, 351 .) As we have discussed, the prosecution first tendered defendant’s mental condit 2021In making that evaluation, an appellate court may 62 consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956 .) The cumulative prejudice doctrine is based on an examination of the “entire record.” (Delzell v. Day (1950) 36 Cal.2d 349, 351 .) As we have discussed, the prosecution first tendered defendant’s mental condit | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Delzell v. Day
green
2 sentences2021In making that evaluation, an appellate court may 62 consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956 .) The cumulative prejudice doctrine is based on an examination of the “entire record.” (Delzell v. Day (1950) 36 Cal.2d 349, 351 .) As we have discussed, the prosecution first tendered defendant’s mental condit 2021In making that evaluation, an appellate court may 62 consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956 .) The cumulative prejudice doctrine is based on an examination of the “entire record.” (Delzell v. Day (1950) 36 Cal.2d 349, 351 .) As we have discussed, the prosecution first tendered defendant’s mental condit | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Mireles
green
1 sentence2023(People v. Mireles (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 237, 249 .) XI Modification of Matthew’s Assessments and Fines Matthew contends, and the People concede, that the trial court erred in imposing certain assessments and fines and his abstract of judgment should be amended to reflect the correct amounts. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Cardenas
green
1 sentence2022We have concluded that two were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (i.e., the alleged instructional 80 errors) (see, e.g., People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1111 [addressing cumulative prejudice]), and the remaining ones do not collectively undermine our confidence in the jury’s verdict by making it “reasonably probable that the jury would not have convicted appellant of the charged offenses” (People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 907 ), or even reasonably possible the jury would not have done so. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Duff
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 562 ; see also Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th 162 , 181 [“given that we have only found one error, and we did not find that error to be prejudicial, the doctrine of cumulative prejudice does not apply”].) Further, the cumulative impact of all of the alleged errors, even if we agreed with them all, did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or infringe on any of his state or federal constitutional rights. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.