entry defense in California

2022Code, §§ 459, 460.) “ ‘[A] burglary is complete upon the slightest partial entry of any kind, with the requisite intent.’ ” (People v. Valencia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1, 8 , disapproved on other grounds by People v. Yarbrough (2012) 54 Cal.4th 889, 894 .) In this case Hendrix concedes he committed an entry — albeit a very slight one — when he briefly extended his hand past the open screen door; he notes that People v. McEntire (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 484 , 491– 493, found the entry requirement satisfied based on a similar breach of screen-door space.

2022Code, §§ 459, 460.) “ ‘[A] burglary is complete upon the slightest partial entry of any kind, with the requisite intent.’ ” (People v. Valencia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1, 8 , disapproved on other grounds by People v. Yarbrough (2012) 54 Cal.4th 889, 894 .) In this case Hendrix concedes he committed an entry — albeit a very slight one — when he briefly extended his hand past the open screen door; he notes that People v. McEntire (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 484 , 491– 493, found the entry requirement satisfied based on a similar breach of screen-door space.

2022Code, §§ 459, 460.) “ ‘[A] burglary is complete upon the slightest partial entry of any kind, with the requisite intent.’ ” (People v. Valencia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1, 8 , disapproved on other grounds by People v. Yarbrough (2012) 54 Cal.4th 889, 894 .) In this case Hendrix concedes he committed an entry — albeit a very slight one — when he briefly extended his hand past the open screen door; he notes that People v. McEntire (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 484 , 491– 493, found the entry requirement satisfied based on a similar breach of screen-door space.

2014(People v. Pendleton (1979) 25 Cal.3d 371, 382 (Pendleton).) Thus, “[t]he law after Gauze is that one may be convicted of burglary even if he enters with consent, provided he does not have an unconditional possessory right to enter.” (Ibid., italics added.) The basis for excluding consent as a defense to burglary was explained in People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691 (Talbot):2 “The underlying theory of the cases holding that consent to the entry is not a defense to a charge of burglary in this state is that since burglary is defined as an entry with the specified evil intent, it is an integra

2014(People v. Pendleton (1979) 25 Cal.3d 371, 382 (Pendleton).) Thus, “[t]he law after Gauze is that one may be convicted of burglary even if he enters with consent, provided he does not have an unconditional possessory right to enter.” (Ibid., italics added.) The basis for excluding consent as a defense to burglary was explained in People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691 (Talbot):2 “The underlying theory of the cases holding that consent to the entry is not a defense to a charge of burglary in this state is that since burglary is defined as an entry with the specified evil intent, it is an integra

2014(People v. Pendleton (1979) 25 Cal.3d 371, 382 (Pendleton).) Thus, “[t]he law after Gauze is that one may be convicted of burglary even if he enters with consent, provided he does not have an unconditional possessory right to enter.” (Ibid., italics added.) The basis for excluding consent as a defense to burglary was explained in People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691 (Talbot):2 “The underlying theory of the cases holding that consent to the entry is not a defense to a charge of burglary in this state is that since burglary is defined as an entry with the specified evil intent, it is an integra

2014The defendant in Talbot asserted a consent defense to burglary based on the fact his accomplices had invited him into their house for the purpose of robbing and murdering their houseguest. ( Talbot, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 697–698, 699–702.) The court reframed the asserted defense as follows: “[I]f the one in possession of the property gives consent to the entry with knowledge that the person entering intends to commit a felony therein, the consent relates to all the ingredients and therefore constitutes a defense.” (Id. at p. 700.) The Supreme Court noted the novelty of this defense, but did

2002Moreover, courts in other states have reached results contrary to those decisions, which reflect the views of the majority in this case. ( State v. McCall (1843) 4 Ala. 643 [no entry when the defendant broke open the shutters of a window and put his hand inside them, but outside the glass]; Minter v. State (1903) 71 Ark. 178 , 71 S.W. 944 [same]; State v. Carter (Mo.Ct.App. 1976) 541 S.W.2d 692 [no entry when the defendant opened a latched screen door but was unable to get within an inner door]; accord, State v. Pigques (Mo.1958) 310 S.W.2d 942 .) Finally, the majority cites People v. Nible (1

2002Moreover, courts in other states have reached results contrary to those decisions, which reflect the views of the majority in this case. ( State v. McCall (1843) 4 Ala. 643 [no entry when the defendant broke open the shutters of a window and put his hand inside them, but outside the glass]; Minter v. State (1903) 71 Ark. 178 , 71 S.W. 944 [same]; State v. Carter (Mo.Ct.App. 1976) 541 S.W.2d 692 [no entry when the defendant opened a latched screen door but was unable to get within an inner door]; accord, State v. Pigques (Mo.1958) 310 S.W.2d 942 .) Finally, the majority cites People v. Nible (1

2002Moreover, courts in other states have reached results contrary to those decisions, which reflect the views of the majority in this case. ( State v. McCall (1843) 4 Ala. 643 [no entry when the defendant broke open the shutters of a window and put his hand inside them, but outside the glass]; Minter v. State (1903) 71 Ark. 178 , 71 S.W. 944 [same]; State v. Carter (Mo.Ct.App. 1976) 541 S.W.2d 692 [no entry when the defendant opened a latched screen door but was unable to get within an inner door]; accord, State v. Pigques (Mo.1958) 310 S.W.2d 942 .) Finally, the majority cites People v. Nible (1

2002Moreover, courts in other states have reached results contrary to those decisions, which reflect the views of the majority in this case. ( State v. McCall (1843) 4 Ala. 643 [no entry when the defendant broke open the shutters of a window and put his hand inside them, but outside the glass]; Minter v. State (1903) 71 Ark. 178 , 71 S.W. 944 [same]; State v. Carter (Mo.Ct.App. 1976) 541 S.W.2d 692 [no entry when the defendant opened a latched screen door but was unable to get within an inner door]; accord, State v. Pigques (Mo.1958) 310 S.W.2d 942 .) Finally, the majority cites People v. Nible (1

2000The Yeap court stated that “We conclude that where the plaintiff loses the opportunity to participate in the arbitration due to negligence of counsel, and the award becomes final also due to attorney misfeasance, the mandatory provision does apply.” (Yeap, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 594 .) Although plaintiff contends that a judicial arbitration hearing does not constitute a “day in court,” citing Parker v. Babcock (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1682 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 602 ], we conclude, for purposes of determining whether the mandatory provisions of section 473 apply, participation in such a hearing do

2000The Yeap court stated that “We conclude that where the plaintiff loses the opportunity to participate in the arbitration due to negligence of counsel, and the award becomes final also due to attorney misfeasance, the mandatory provision does apply.” (Yeap, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 594 .) Although plaintiff contends that a judicial arbitration hearing does not constitute a “day in court,” citing Parker v. Babcock (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1682 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 602 ], we conclude, for purposes of determining whether the mandatory provisions of section 473 apply, participation in such a hearing do

2000The Yeap court stated that “We conclude that where the plaintiff loses the opportunity to participate in the arbitration due to negligence of counsel, and the award becomes final also due to attorney misfeasance, the mandatory provision does apply.” (Yeap, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 594 .) Although plaintiff contends that a judicial arbitration hearing does not constitute a “day in court,” citing Parker v. Babcock (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1682 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 602 ], we conclude, for purposes of determining whether the mandatory provisions of section 473 apply, participation in such a hearing do

1969The burden is on the People, once an entry in violation of section 844 of the Penal Code appears, to show facts sufficient to meet the *417 test laid down by the Supreme Court in People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Cal.2d 586 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 432 P.2d 706 ] and re-emphasized in De Scmtiago, as follows: “. . . where officers have obtained particular information which leads them to reasonably conclude that the occupants of an apartment or residence have specifically resolved to effect disposal in the event of police intrusion or have made specific preparations in that regard ... an unannounced entry

1969The burden is on the People, once an entry in violation of section 844 of the Penal Code appears, to show facts sufficient to meet the *417 test laid down by the Supreme Court in People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Cal.2d 586 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 432 P.2d 706 ] and re-emphasized in De Scmtiago, as follows: “. . . where officers have obtained particular information which leads them to reasonably conclude that the occupants of an apartment or residence have specifically resolved to effect disposal in the event of police intrusion or have made specific preparations in that regard ... an unannounced entry

1969The burden is on the People, once an entry in violation of section 844 of the Penal Code appears, to show facts sufficient to meet the *417 test laid down by the Supreme Court in People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Cal.2d 586 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 432 P.2d 706 ] and re-emphasized in De Scmtiago, as follows: “. . . where officers have obtained particular information which leads them to reasonably conclude that the occupants of an apartment or residence have specifically resolved to effect disposal in the event of police intrusion or have made specific preparations in that regard ... an unannounced entry

1959The entry and claim of the plaintiffs rest on color of title, being made under deeds which implied full ownership (Akley v. Bassett, supra, 189 Cal. 625, 640 ) ; the estate purporting to be conveyed, not the estate actually conveyed, characterized their entry.

1959(Akley v. Bassett, supra, 189 Cal. 625, 642 .) Although each deed reserved to the grantors the oil and gas rights appurtenant to the particular lot described therein, the combined deeds, together with the decrees of distribution in the estates of the grantors, in turn conveyed to the grantees all such rights in all of these lots.