entry violation in New York

2020The motion court correctly determined that although the police made an entry in violation of Payton v New York ( 445 US 573 [1980]), suppression of defendant's phone was not required, since the seizure of the phone from defendant's person occurred at the police station and had no connection with the police entry into defendant's residence ( see People v Padilla , 28 AD3d 236, 237 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 760 [2006]; People v Jackson , 17 AD3d 148 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 790 [2005]).

2006Even if the police made an entry in violation of Payton v New York ( 445 US 573 [1980]), suppression of the physical evidence seized was not required, since the seizure of the evidence from defendant’s person occurred at the police station and had no connection with the police entry into defendant’s residence (see People v Jackson, 17 AD3d 148 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 790 [2005]).

2020The motion court correctly determined that although the police made an entry in violation of Payton v New York ( 445 US 573 [1980]), suppression of defendant's phone was not required, since the seizure of the phone from defendant's person occurred at the police station and had no connection with the police entry into defendant's residence ( see People v Padilla , 28 AD3d 236, 237 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 760 [2006]; People v Jackson , 17 AD3d 148 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 790 [2005]).

2006Even if the police made an entry in violation of Payton v New York ( 445 US 573 [1980]), suppression of the physical evidence seized was not required, since the seizure of the evidence from defendant’s person occurred at the police station and had no connection with the police entry into defendant’s residence (see People v Jackson, 17 AD3d 148 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 790 [2005]).

2020The motion court correctly determined that although the police made an entry in violation of Payton v New York ( 445 US 573 [1980]), suppression of defendant's phone was not required, since the seizure of the phone from defendant's person occurred at the police station and had no connection with the police entry into defendant's residence ( see People v Padilla , 28 AD3d 236, 237 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 760 [2006]; People v Jackson , 17 AD3d 148 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 790 [2005]).

2006Even if the police made an entry in violation of Payton v New York ( 445 US 573 [1980]), suppression of the physical evidence seized was not required, since the seizure of the evidence from defendant’s person occurred at the police station and had no connection with the police entry into defendant’s residence (see People v Jackson, 17 AD3d 148 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 790 [2005]).

2006The record also supports the court’s determination that the written statement defendant made at the police station was attenuated from any illegality, since there was an interval of seven hours between defendant’s arrest and interrogation, and there was no flagrant government misconduct (see Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 602-604 [1975]; People v Harris, 77 NY2d 434 [1991]).

1995Thus, we are not called upon and do not determine what result would obtain, if, as often occurs in the hybrid Criminal Court/Supreme Court superior court waiver parts, defendant had first been re-arraigned and held on a new felony complaint that did not contain a class A felony charge (see generally, People v Selby, 148 Misc 2d 447 ).

1987Additionally, we note that the court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating the defendant a persistent felony offender and in imposing sentence accordingly, as the record reveals that the court was aware of the relevant factors and its determination. is amply supported by the evidence (see, People v Drummond, 104 AD2d 825 ; People v Oliver, 96 AD2d 1104 , affd 63 NY2d 973 ; People v Stewart, 96 AD2d 622 ).

1987Additionally, we note that the court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating the defendant a persistent felony offender and in imposing sentence accordingly, as the record reveals that the court was aware of the relevant factors and its determination. is amply supported by the evidence (see, People v Drummond, 104 AD2d 825 ; People v Oliver, 96 AD2d 1104 , affd 63 NY2d 973 ; People v Stewart, 96 AD2d 622 ).

1987Under these circumstances, the entry was not a violation of the prohibition against warrantless arrests set forth in Payton v New York ( 445 US 573 ) (see, People v Brown, supra; People v Pabon, 120 AD2d 685 , lv denied 68 NY2d 1003 ; People v Gordon, 110 AD2d 778 ; People v Green, 103 AD2d 362 ; see generally, People v Mealer, 57 NY2d 214 , cert denied 460 US 1024 ).

1987Additionally, we note that the court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating the defendant a persistent felony offender and in imposing sentence accordingly, as the record reveals that the court was aware of the relevant factors and its determination. is amply supported by the evidence (see, People v Drummond, 104 AD2d 825 ; People v Oliver, 96 AD2d 1104 , affd 63 NY2d 973 ; People v Stewart, 96 AD2d 622 ).

1987Under these circumstances, the entry was not a violation of the prohibition against warrantless arrests set forth in Payton v New York ( 445 US 573 ) (see, People v Brown, supra; People v Pabon, 120 AD2d 685 , lv denied 68 NY2d 1003 ; People v Gordon, 110 AD2d 778 ; People v Green, 103 AD2d 362 ; see generally, People v Mealer, 57 NY2d 214 , cert denied 460 US 1024 ).

1987Under these circumstances, the entry was not a violation of the prohibition against warrantless arrests set forth in Payton v New York ( 445 US 573 ) (see, People v Brown, supra; People v Pabon, 120 AD2d 685 , lv denied 68 NY2d 1003 ; People v Gordon, 110 AD2d 778 ; People v Green, 103 AD2d 362 ; see generally, People v Mealer, 57 NY2d 214 , cert denied 460 US 1024 ).

1987Additionally, we note that the court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating the defendant a persistent felony offender and in imposing sentence accordingly, as the record reveals that the court was aware of the relevant factors and its determination. is amply supported by the evidence (see, People v Drummond, 104 AD2d 825 ; People v Oliver, 96 AD2d 1104 , affd 63 NY2d 973 ; People v Stewart, 96 AD2d 622 ).

1987Under these circumstances, the entry was not a violation of the prohibition against warrantless arrests set forth in Payton v New York ( 445 US 573 ) (see, People v Brown, supra; People v Pabon, 120 AD2d 685 , lv denied 68 NY2d 1003 ; People v Gordon, 110 AD2d 778 ; People v Green, 103 AD2d 362 ; see generally, People v Mealer, 57 NY2d 214 , cert denied 460 US 1024 ).

1984Therefore, as there is no contrary indication from the Legislature, the entry requirement under the current Penal Law is met, at least when a person intrudes within a building, no matter how slightly, with any part of his or her body (see People v Tragni, 113 Misc 2d 852, 856 , supra; State v Pigques, 310 SW2d 942, 945 [Mo], supra).

1977It should be noted too that the opening of the storm door, after futilely knocking thereon, so that the police could knock on the inner door was not an entry in violation of the knock- and-announce rule (People v Harvey, 38 Mich App 39 ).

1925(Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, 321 ; Becker v. McCrea, 193 id. 423 .) The purpose of the entry clause in mortgages is probably to overcome the effect of the provision of the Revised Statutes above mentioned.

1925(Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, 321 ; Becker v. McCrea, 193 id. 423 .) The purpose of the entry clause in mortgages is probably to overcome the effect of the provision of the Revised Statutes above mentioned.

1885In the words of Shriver v. Shriver ( 86 N. Y. 575 ), the facts of the case make out a continuous, uninterrupted, actual possession, beginning with an entry under claim of exclusive title, founded on a written instrument and kept up for over twenty years {Code, § 369).

1852By the uniform practice of this court an action could not properly be discontinued without the entry of a rule for discontinuance, and the payment of the defendant’s costs. ( 10 John. 367 . 1 Wend. 13 . 7 Id. 511.) The rule was always indispensable; and formerly, although the defendant had only employed an attorney, and no notice of retainer had been given at the time the rule to discontinue was entered, there must have been an offer to pay, or payment of costs to the defendant; else he might the rule as' a nullity. ( 12 Wend. 191 . 4 Hill, 167) case however of White v. Smith, ( 4 Hill, 167 )

1852By the uniform practice of this court an action could not properly be discontinued without the entry of a rule for discontinuance, and the payment of the defendant’s costs. ( 10 John. 367 . 1 Wend. 13 . 7 Id. 511.) The rule was always indispensable; and formerly, although the defendant had only employed an attorney, and no notice of retainer had been given at the time the rule to discontinue was entered, there must have been an offer to pay, or payment of costs to the defendant; else he might the rule as' a nullity. ( 12 Wend. 191 . 4 Hill, 167) case however of White v. Smith, ( 4 Hill, 167 )

1852By the uniform practice of this court an action could not properly be discontinued without the entry of a rule for discontinuance, and the payment of the defendant’s costs. ( 10 John. 367 . 1 Wend. 13 . 7 Id. 511.) The rule was always indispensable; and formerly, although the defendant had only employed an attorney, and no notice of retainer had been given at the time the rule to discontinue was entered, there must have been an offer to pay, or payment of costs to the defendant; else he might the rule as' a nullity. ( 12 Wend. 191 . 4 Hill, 167) case however of White v. Smith, ( 4 Hill, 167 )

1829It was irregular to enter a rule for interlocutory judgment until four days in term had intervened after the entry of the default. (8th Rule of April term, 1796.) Besides, there could not have been notice of assessment in this ease, which, and notice of inquiry, cannot be given until after default, though it may be given previous to the entry of rule for interlocutory judgment. ( 2 Caines, 109 . 12 Johns.

1820It is not necessary, for this purpose, that the title under which such entry is made, should be a good and valid title.” ( 2 Caines, 183 .) 2.