entry claim in Washington

1909In the case of Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342 , 41 Pac. 49 , this court in speaking of “color of title” in this connection, says: “All that is necessary to be shown is that there was a proof of colorable title under which the entry or claim has been made in good faith.” There can be no question but that the entry and claim of , Nelson was made in good faith.

1909In the case of Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342 , 41 Pac. 49 , this court in speaking of “color of title” in this connection, says: “All that is necessary to be shown is that there was a proof of colorable title under which the entry or claim has been made in good faith.” There can be no question but that the entry and claim of , Nelson was made in good faith.

1905This court has said in Bellingham Bay Land Co. v. Dibble, 4 Wash. 764 , 31 Pac. 30 , that the entry must be under claim or color of title, or it would not ripen into title’.” Under the rule of these cases, a mere naked possession is not sufficient to constitute adverse possession under the statute.

1905This court has said in Bellingham Bay Land Co. v. Dibble, 4 Wash. 764 , 31 Pac. 30 , that the entry must be under claim or color of title, or it would not ripen into title’.” Under the rule of these cases, a mere naked possession is not sufficient to constitute adverse possession under the statute.

1911St. 303; Riggs v. Fuller, 54 Ala. 141 ; Jackson v. Pittsburgh etc. R.

1911Such is the general rule; but where one tenant in common attempts to convey the whole estate in fee, by warranty deed, and his grantee records his deed, and by virtue thereof enters upon the estate, and claims and holds exclusive possession of the whole thereof, the entry and claim must be deemed adverse to the title and possession of his cotenant, and amount to a disseizin.”' See, also, Brigham v. Beau, 139 Mich. 256 , 102 N. W. 845 ; King v. Carmichael, 136 Ind. 20 , 35 N. E. 509 , 43 Am.

1911Such is the general rule; but where one tenant in common attempts to convey the whole estate in fee, by warranty deed, and his grantee records his deed, and by virtue thereof enters upon the estate, and claims and holds exclusive possession of the whole thereof, the entry and claim must be deemed adverse to the title and possession of his cotenant, and amount to a disseizin.”' See, also, Brigham v. Beau, 139 Mich. 256 , 102 N. W. 845 ; King v. Carmichael, 136 Ind. 20 , 35 N. E. 509 , 43 Am.

1911Such is the general rule; but where one tenant in common attempts to convey the whole estate in fee, by warranty deed, and his grantee records his deed, and by virtue thereof enters upon the estate, and claims and holds exclusive possession of the whole thereof, the entry and claim must be deemed adverse to the title and possession of his cotenant, and amount to a disseizin.”' See, also, Brigham v. Beau, 139 Mich. 256 , 102 N. W. 845 ; King v. Carmichael, 136 Ind. 20 , 35 N. E. 509 , 43 Am.

1911Such is the general rule; but where one tenant in common attempts to convey the whole estate in fee, by warranty deed, and his grantee records his deed, and by virtue thereof enters upon the estate, and claims and holds exclusive possession of the whole thereof, the entry and claim must be deemed adverse to the title and possession of his cotenant, and amount to a disseizin.”' See, also, Brigham v. Beau, 139 Mich. 256 , 102 N. W. 845 ; King v. Carmichael, 136 Ind. 20 , 35 N. E. 509 , 43 Am.

1909While in Yesler Estate v. Holmes, 39 Wash. 34 , 80 Pac. 851 , the opposite doctrine is announced, the court saying: “On this subject .the court, in substance, instructed the jury that, under our statute, the rightful owner of real property is seized of the same, whether he is in possession of it or not, and that, disseizin can only occur where there is an adverse, and hostile entry; that an entry, to constitute an adverse or hostile entry, must be under a claim of right, made for the purpose of dispossessing the owner; and that an entry on the lands of another, under a mistaken, though honest,

1909While in Yesler Estate v. Holmes, 39 Wash. 34 , 80 Pac. 851 , the opposite doctrine is announced, the court saying: “On this subject .the court, in substance, instructed the jury that, under our statute, the rightful owner of real property is seized of the same, whether he is in possession of it or not, and that, disseizin can only occur where there is an adverse, and hostile entry; that an entry, to constitute an adverse or hostile entry, must be under a claim of right, made for the purpose of dispossessing the owner; and that an entry on the lands of another, under a mistaken, though honest,

1909The case of Johnson v. Conner, 48 Wash. 431 , 93 Pac. 914 , announces the rule as follows: “While an entry upon the land of another, under the supposition and belief that it is government land and that the party entering may hold the same as such, may not of itself constitute an entry under claim of right, yet where such an entry is made in good faith, and the entryman upon discovering his mistake proceeds to openly and notoriously hold the same adversely and in hostility to the title of the actual owner or claimant, we think this constitutes an adverse holding and disseizin under a claim of r

1909The case of Johnson v. Conner, 48 Wash. 431 , 93 Pac. 914 , announces the rule as follows: “While an entry upon the land of another, under the supposition and belief that it is government land and that the party entering may hold the same as such, may not of itself constitute an entry under claim of right, yet where such an entry is made in good faith, and the entryman upon discovering his mistake proceeds to openly and notoriously hold the same adversely and in hostility to the title of the actual owner or claimant, we think this constitutes an adverse holding and disseizin under a claim of r

1908Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342 , 41 Pac. 49 ; Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14 , 64 Pac. 936 ; Messer v. Siepmann, 35 Wash. 14 , 76 Pac. 295 ; Mather v. Walsh, 107 Mo. 121 , 17 S. W. 755 ; Francoeur v. Newhouse, 43 Fed. 236 ; 1 Cyc. 1028.

1908Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342 , 41 Pac. 49 ; Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14 , 64 Pac. 936 ; Messer v. Siepmann, 35 Wash. 14 , 76 Pac. 295 ; Mather v. Walsh, 107 Mo. 121 , 17 S. W. 755 ; Francoeur v. Newhouse, 43 Fed. 236 ; 1 Cyc. 1028.

1908Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342 , 41 Pac. 49 ; Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14 , 64 Pac. 936 ; Messer v. Siepmann, 35 Wash. 14 , 76 Pac. 295 ; Mather v. Walsh, 107 Mo. 121 , 17 S. W. 755 ; Francoeur v. Newhouse, 43 Fed. 236 ; 1 Cyc. 1028.

1908Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342 , 41 Pac. 49 ; Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14 , 64 Pac. 936 ; Messer v. Siepmann, 35 Wash. 14 , 76 Pac. 295 ; Mather v. Walsh, 107 Mo. 121 , 17 S. W. 755 ; Francoeur v. Newhouse, 43 Fed. 236 ; 1 Cyc. 1028.

1908Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342 , 41 Pac. 49 ; Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14 , 64 Pac. 936 ; Messer v. Siepmann, 35 Wash. 14 , 76 Pac. 295 ; Mather v. Walsh, 107 Mo. 121 , 17 S. W. 755 ; Francoeur v. Newhouse, 43 Fed. 236 ; 1 Cyc. 1028.

1908Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342 , 41 Pac. 49 ; Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14 , 64 Pac. 936 ; Messer v. Siepmann, 35 Wash. 14 , 76 Pac. 295 ; Mather v. Walsh, 107 Mo. 121 , 17 S. W. 755 ; Francoeur v. Newhouse, 43 Fed. 236 ; 1 Cyc. 1028.

1908Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342 , 41 Pac. 49 ; Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14 , 64 Pac. 936 ; Messer v. Siepmann, 35 Wash. 14 , 76 Pac. 295 ; Mather v. Walsh, 107 Mo. 121 , 17 S. W. 755 ; Francoeur v. Newhouse, 43 Fed. 236 ; 1 Cyc. 1028.

1908Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23 , 34 Pac. 199 ; Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342 , 41 Pac. 49 ; Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14 , 64 Pac. 936 ; Messer v. Siepmann, 35 Wash. 14 , 76 Pac. 295 ; Mather v. Walsh, 107 Mo. 121 , 17 S. W. 755 ; Francoeur v. Newhouse, 43 Fed. 236 ; 1 Cyc. 1028.

1902And it was also said in Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497 ( 30 Pac. 648 ): “In our opinion our statute of limitations is like that of most other states, one of adverse possession, and under it the rightful owner of real estate is seized of the same, whether or not he is in actual possession thereof, unless the same is in the actual adverse possession of some other person.

1902And it was also said in Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497 ( 30 Pac. 648 ): “In our opinion our statute of limitations is like that of most other states, one of adverse possession, and under it the rightful owner of real estate is seized of the same, whether or not he is in actual possession thereof, unless the same is in the actual adverse possession of some other person.

1892Again, the same court in Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41 , lays dowm the rule: “It suffices for this purpose, that visible and notorious acts of ownership are exercised over the premises in controversy, for twenty-one years, after an entry under claim and color of title.