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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2021 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Superior Court (Jones)green1 sentence2021While steroids were not found in his system, Dr. Bronner believed steroids would have been in his cells from his prior 8The transcript of the juvenile fitness hearing is part of the appellate record in People v. Chamberlin, F041358, of which this court has taken judicial notice at appellant’s request. 9 Under former Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, appellant was presumptively unfit for juvenile proceedings since he was charged with murder but could overcome the presumption based on the evaluation of five criteria: (A) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor; (B) | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chi Ko Wonggreen1 sentence2020Code, § 707) to find that appellant was ineligible for resentencing. 3Our Supreme Court granted review in People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128 , review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260598 on the issue of whether superior courts may consider the record of conviction in determining the stage one issue of whether defendant has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief under section 1170.95. 3 (People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 716-717 [the sole question at a fitness hearing is whether the minor would be amenable to treatment if adjudged a ward of the court]; People v. Superi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Superior Court (Zaharias M.)green1 sentence2020Code, § 707) to find that appellant was ineligible for resentencing. 3Our Supreme Court granted review in People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128 , review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260598 on the issue of whether superior courts may consider the record of conviction in determining the stage one issue of whether defendant has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief under section 1170.95. 3 (People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 716-717 [the sole question at a fitness hearing is whether the minor would be amenable to treatment if adjudged a ward of the court]; People v. Superi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bradfordgreen1 sentence2020The trial judge “may safely assume that [an accused], who is ably represented” and who waives the right to a juvenile fitness hearing is doing so “with the advice and under the direction of competent trial counsel.” (People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1053 [constitutional right to testify does not require a personal waiver].) “If that assumption is incorrect, defendant’s 11 remedy is not a personal waiver in open court, but a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Ibid.) The statutory right to a juvenile fitness hearing does not qualify as the type of right that cannot be waive | 1 | 1 |
Rucker v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2020Johnson relies on Rucker v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 197, 200-201 (Rucker) as support for his claim that such a waiver is required by an accused who has reached adulthood. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2019There, the Court of Appeal rejected the juvenile offender's request to remand the case under Franklin , reasoning that " '[i]nformation from the probation reports prepared for both defendants, the juvenile fitness hearing reports, their pretrial statements to officers, as well as what was provided at the sentencing hearings, would all be available for consideration **919 at the youth offender parole hearing.' " ( Id. , at p. 1131, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 , 417 P.3d 185 .) We concluded that, without prior notice of Senate Bill No. 260 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) and the Franklin process, "any opportunit 2019There, the Court of Appeal rejected the juvenile offender's request to remand the case under Franklin , reasoning that " '[i]nformation from the probation reports prepared for both defendants, the juvenile fitness hearing reports, their pretrial statements to officers, as well as what was provided at the sentencing hearings, would all be available for consideration **919 at the youth offender parole hearing.' " ( Id. , at p. 1131, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 , 417 P.3d 185 .) We concluded that, without prior notice of Senate Bill No. 260 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) and the Franklin process, "any opportunit | 1 | 1 |
Minnesota v. Murphygreen2 sentences2006But we do not believe Portash prohibits the limited use of statements made to a probation officer in preparation for a juvenile fitness hearing to impeach the same minor defendant's voluntary inconsistent trial statements." ( Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 754 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias plurality went on to note that the high court itself "has recognized that Portash was a unique and limited case" involving coerced testimony, because there the witness was ordered to testify or face contempt sanctions. ( Id. at pp. 754-755, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias 2006But we do not believe Portash prohibits the limited use of statements made to a probation officer in preparation for a juvenile fitness hearing to impeach the same minor defendant's voluntary inconsistent trial statements." ( Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 754 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias plurality went on to note that the high court itself "has recognized that Portash was a unique and limited case" involving coerced testimony, because there the witness was ordered to testify or face contempt sanctions. ( Id. at pp. 754-755, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias | 1 | 1 |
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences2006But we do not believe Portash prohibits the limited use of statements made to a probation officer in preparation for a juvenile fitness hearing to impeach the same minor defendant's voluntary inconsistent trial statements." ( Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 754 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias plurality went on to note that the high court itself "has recognized that Portash was a unique and limited case" involving coerced testimony, because there the witness was ordered to testify or face contempt sanctions. ( Id. at pp. 754-755, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias 2006But we do not believe Portash prohibits the limited use of statements made to a probation officer in preparation for a juvenile fitness hearing to impeach the same minor defendant's voluntary inconsistent trial statements." ( Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 754 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias plurality went on to note that the high court itself "has recognized that Portash was a unique and limited case" involving coerced testimony, because there the witness was ordered to testify or face contempt sanctions. ( Id. at pp. 754-755, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty.
green
2 sentences2021Only if the juvenile court transfers the matter to adult court can the juvenile be tried and sentenced as an adult. [Citation.]” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 303 , fn. omitted.) However, Proposition 57’s provisions for a juvenile fitness hearing are only retroactive to those “charged directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the time [the initiative] was enacted.” (Id. at p. 304.) Senate Bill No. 620, effective January 1, 2018, amended section 12022.5, subdivision (c) to give the trial court discretion to dismiss the firearm enhancement found true under that statute. 2020There is no 9 question that “[t]he possibility of being treated as a juvenile in juvenile court—where rehabilitation is the goal—rather than being tried and sentenced as an adult can result in dramatically different and more lenient treatment.” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 303 .) However, the gravity of the potential consequences that might result from the waiver of a right is not determinative of whether the waiver must be personal. ( Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 873-874 [counsel can waive a capital defendant’s right to a separate hearing on the truth of a prior-murder special-circumstan | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Vang
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Vang (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554 , 556–557 (Vang).)1 In 2020, after his case was final, defendant Vang filed a motion in the trial court and argued he was entitled to a juvenile fitness hearing based on subsequent statutory enactments because he was 16 years old at the time of the offenses. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Arredondo
green
1 sentence2021In People v. Arredondo (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 493 , [the court] held that [Senate Bill No.] 620 applies to all criminal cases that are not yet final on appeal. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Fuimaono
green
1 sentence2021(Stats. 2017–2018, ch. 682, §§ 1, 2; People v. Fuimaono (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132, 134 .) As noted by the trial court, however, the provisions of Senate Bill No. 620 are only retroactive to cases not yet final. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Gallardo
green
1 sentence2020A preliminary hearing transcript may not be used to resolve conflicting facts without an evidentiary hearing.3 “By relying on the preliminary hearing transcript to determine the ‘nature or basis’ of defendant’s prior conviction, the sentencing court engaged in an impermissible inquiry to determine ‘“what the defendant and state judge must have understood as the factual basis of the prior plea.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 137 .) Nor could the trial court rely on the juvenile fitness hearing transcript (Welf. & Inst. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Serrano
green
1 sentence2020His appellate counsel filed a brief asking this court to proceed under People v. Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Masterson
green
2 sentences2020Unlike the fundamental matters for which counsel cannot waive on behalf of his or her client, this right is “merely statutory, not constitutional.” (Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 874 ; People v. Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 969, 972.) The decision to waive the right to a juvenile fitness hearing for an accused who has reached adulthood is a tactical decision that counsel can make on behalf of his or her client. 2020Unlike the fundamental matters for which counsel cannot waive on behalf of his or her client, this right is “merely statutory, not constitutional.” (Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 874 ; People v. Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 969, 972.) The decision to waive the right to a juvenile fitness hearing for an accused who has reached adulthood is a tactical decision that counsel can make on behalf of his or her client. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2020Johnson infers from the knowing and intelligent waiver requirement in Johnson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at page 1055 , that a defendant’s waiver to a significant statutory right— such as to a juvenile fitness hearing, he contends—should be personal. 2020Johnson infers from the knowing and intelligent waiver requirement in Johnson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at page 1055 , that a defendant’s waiver to a significant statutory right— such as to a juvenile fitness hearing, he contends—should be personal. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Hinton
green
2 sentences2020There is no 9 question that “[t]he possibility of being treated as a juvenile in juvenile court—where rehabilitation is the goal—rather than being tried and sentenced as an adult can result in dramatically different and more lenient treatment.” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 303 .) However, the gravity of the potential consequences that might result from the waiver of a right is not determinative of whether the waiver must be personal. ( Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 873-874 [counsel can waive a capital defendant’s right to a separate hearing on the truth of a prior-murder special-circumstan 2020Unlike the fundamental matters for which counsel cannot waive on behalf of his or her client, this right is “merely statutory, not constitutional.” (Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 874 ; People v. Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 969, 972.) The decision to waive the right to a juvenile fitness hearing for an accused who has reached adulthood is a tactical decision that counsel can make on behalf of his or her client. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Coleman
green
1 sentence2019Admission of Keo’s statements to the dependency investigator did not violate his due process rights Keo urges us to expand the immunity provided for testimony under section 355.1, subdivision (f), to out-of-court statements made to a dependency investigator, relying on Jessica B., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at page 521 , which expanded immunity to cover statements made in court-ordered therapy, People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 (Coleman), which conferred immunity for an individual’s statements made in a probation revocation hearing, and Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 (Ramona | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ramona R. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2019Admission of Keo’s statements to the dependency investigator did not violate his due process rights Keo urges us to expand the immunity provided for testimony under section 355.1, subdivision (f), to out-of-court statements made to a dependency investigator, relying on Jessica B., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at page 521 , which expanded immunity to cover statements made in court-ordered therapy, People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 (Coleman), which conferred immunity for an individual’s statements made in a probation revocation hearing, and Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 (Ramona | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Jessica B.
green
1 sentence2019Admission of Keo’s statements to the dependency investigator did not violate his due process rights Keo urges us to expand the immunity provided for testimony under section 355.1, subdivision (f), to out-of-court statements made to a dependency investigator, relying on Jessica B., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at page 521 , which expanded immunity to cover statements made in court-ordered therapy, People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 (Coleman), which conferred immunity for an individual’s statements made in a probation revocation hearing, and Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 (Ramona | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. MacIas
green
2 sentences2006But we do not believe Portash prohibits the limited use of statements made to a probation officer in preparation for a juvenile fitness hearing to impeach the same minor defendant's voluntary inconsistent trial statements." ( Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 754 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias plurality went on to note that the high court itself "has recognized that Portash was a unique and limited case" involving coerced testimony, because there the witness was ordered to testify or face contempt sanctions. ( Id. at pp. 754-755, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias 2006But we do not believe Portash prohibits the limited use of statements made to a probation officer in preparation for a juvenile fitness hearing to impeach the same minor defendant's voluntary inconsistent trial statements." ( Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 754 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias plurality went on to note that the high court itself "has recognized that Portash was a unique and limited case" involving coerced testimony, because there the witness was ordered to testify or face contempt sanctions. ( Id. at pp. 754-755, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias | 1 | 2006–2006 |
New Jersey v. Portash
green
2 sentences2006But we do not believe Portash prohibits the limited use of statements made to a probation officer in preparation for a juvenile fitness hearing to impeach the same minor defendant's voluntary inconsistent trial statements." ( Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 754 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias plurality went on to note that the high court itself "has recognized that Portash was a unique and limited case" involving coerced testimony, because there the witness was ordered to testify or face contempt sanctions. ( Id. at pp. 754-755, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias 2006But we do not believe Portash prohibits the limited use of statements made to a probation officer in preparation for a juvenile fitness hearing to impeach the same minor defendant's voluntary inconsistent trial statements." ( Macias, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 754 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias plurality went on to note that the high court itself "has recognized that Portash was a unique and limited case" involving coerced testimony, because there the witness was ordered to testify or face contempt sanctions. ( Id. at pp. 754-755, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 941 P.2d 838 .) The Macias | 1 | 2006–2006 |