extremely deferential standard in Ohio

2024“This is an extremely deferential standard of review.” State v. Venes, 2013-Ohio-1891 , 992 N.E.2d 453 , ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).

2024Id. {¶19} “It is ‘an extremely deferential standard of review.’” Id., quoting State v. Venes, 2013-Ohio-1891 , 992 N.E.2d 453 , ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).

2019Montgomery Nos. 25574, 25575, and 25576, 2013-Ohio-5759 , 5 N.E.3d 1049 , ¶31. {¶19} Appellant does not dispute that his prison term falls within the statutory range for a fourth-degree felony or that the trial court considered the general purposes 4 and principles of felony sentencing.

2018Montgomery Nos. 25574, 25575, and 25576, 2013-Ohio-5759, ¶31 . {¶53} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court “may” sentence the offender to consecutive prison terms if it finds: (1) such terms are “necessary to protect the public from future crimes or to punish the offender”; (2) such terms “are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the 13 public”; and (3) one of three enumerated alternatives exist.

1990Conversely, where a factfinder concludes that the materials in question are not obscene, appellate review of the finding is governed by the principles applicable to appeals of other factual issues. 4 In Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St. 3d 77 , 10 OBR 408, 461 N.E. 2d 1273 , this court emphasized that, under such circumstances, an extremely deferential standard of review must be applied: “While we agree with the proposition that in some instances an appellate court is duty-bound to exercise the limited prerogative of reversing a judgment as being against the manifest weight of

1990Conversely, where a factfinder concludes that the materials in question are not obscene, appellate review of the finding is governed by the principles applicable to appeals of other factual issues. 4 In Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St. 3d 77 , 10 OBR 408, 461 N.E. 2d 1273 , this court emphasized that, under such circumstances, an extremely deferential standard of review must be applied: “While we agree with the proposition that in some instances an appellate court is duty-bound to exercise the limited prerogative of reversing a judgment as being against the manifest weight of

2008Pizza v. Strope (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 41 , 45-46 (citing Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77 .

2005Pizza v. Strope (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 41 , 45-46 , 560 N.E.2d 765 (citing Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77 , 461 N.E.2d 1273 ).

2024This is an extremely deferential standard of review.’ ” State v. Spangler, 2023-Ohio-2003, ¶ 17 , (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Pierce, 2018- Ohio-4458, ¶ 8, in turn quoting State v. Venes, 8th Dist.

2024Athens No. 21CA17, 2023-Ohio-2003, ¶ 17 , quoting State v. Pierce, 4th Dist.

2023Pickaway No. 18CA4, 2018-Ohio-4458, ¶ 8 , quoting State v. Venes, 8th Dist.

2022Pickaway No. 18CA4, 2018-Ohio-4458, ¶ 8 , quoting State v. Venes, 8th Dist.

2003Relations Bd. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 257 , 260 , 533 N.E.2d 264 , 266 , this court described the extremely deferential standard of review applied to factual determinations of SERB pursuant to R.C. 4117.13 (D).

2003Relations Bd. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 257 , 260 , 533 N.E.2d 264 , 266 , this court described the extremely deferential standard of review applied to factual determinations of SERB pursuant to R.C. 4117.13 (D).

2014This is an extremely deferential standard of review.” Rodeffer at ¶ 29-31, discussing State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23 , 2008-Ohio-4912 , 896 N.E.2d 124 . {¶ 11} “Furthermore, ‘[a]lthough Kalish no longer provides the framework for reviewing felony sentences, it does provide * * * adequate guidance for determining whether a sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.’ * * * According to Kalish, a sentence is not contrary to law when the trial court imposes a sentence within the statutory range, after expressly stating that it had considered the purposes and principles of sentencing

2014This is an extremely deferential standard of review.” Rodeffer at ¶ 29-31, discussing State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23 , 2008-Ohio-4912 , 896 N.E.2d 124 . {¶ 11} “Furthermore, ‘[a]lthough Kalish no longer provides the framework for reviewing felony sentences, it does provide * * * adequate guidance for determining whether a sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.’ * * * According to Kalish, a sentence is not contrary to law when the trial court imposes a sentence within the statutory range, after expressly stating that it had considered the purposes and principles of sentencing

2024Prior to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4607 (“Gwynne IV”) our court applied an extremely deferential standard of review in considering the record pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

2021Id. {¶21} Mr. Long, however, failed to object to the trial court’s order of restitution.

2019Portage No. 2012-P-0144, 2013-Ohio-4301, ¶21 , quoting State v. Venes, 8th Dist.

2018Washington No. 16CA32, 2017-Ohio-7059 , ¶ 7 quoting State v. Venes, 2013–Ohio–1891, 992 N.E.2d 453 , ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). {¶ 25} In Childers I, we found by clear and convincing evidence that there was “no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s consecutive sentence findings.” Childers I at ¶ 22.

2017Civil plain error is an extremely deferential standard of review and its application is limited to "those extremely rare cases where exceptional circumstances require its application to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice, and where the error complained of, if left uncorrected, would have a material adverse effect on the character of, and public confidence in, judicial proceedings." Goldfuss v. Davidson , 79 Ohio St.3d 116 , 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997), citing Schade v. Carnegie Body Co. , 70 Ohio St.2d 207 , 209, 436 N.E.2d 1001 (1982).

2017Civil plain error is an extremely deferential standard of review and its application is limited to "those extremely rare cases where exceptional circumstances require its application to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice, and where the error complained of, if left uncorrected, would have a material adverse effect on the character of, and public confidence in, judicial proceedings." Goldfuss v. Davidson , 79 Ohio St.3d 116 , 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997), citing Schade v. Carnegie Body Co. , 70 Ohio St.2d 207 , 209, 436 N.E.2d 1001 (1982).

2017State v. Venes, 2013-Ohio-1891 , 992 N.E.2d 453 , ¶ 20-21. {¶ 23} "[A] sentence vindictively imposed on a defendant for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial is contrary to law." *9 State v. Rahab , 150 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2017-Ohio-1401 , 80 N.E.3d. 431 , ¶ 8, citing State v. O'Dell, 45 Ohio St.3d 140 , 147, 543 N.E.2d 1220 (1989), and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 , 363, 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (" '[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort * * *.' ").

2017State v. Venes, 2013-Ohio-1891 , 992 N.E.2d 453 , ¶ 20-21. {¶ 23} "[A] sentence vindictively imposed on a defendant for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial is contrary to law." *9 State v. Rahab , 150 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2017-Ohio-1401 , 80 N.E.3d. 431 , ¶ 8, citing State v. O'Dell, 45 Ohio St.3d 140 , 147, 543 N.E.2d 1220 (1989), and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 , 363, 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (" '[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort * * *.' ").

2017State v. Venes, 2013-Ohio-1891 , 992 N.E.2d 453 , ¶ 20-21. {¶ 23} "[A] sentence vindictively imposed on a defendant for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial is contrary to law." *9 State v. Rahab , 150 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2017-Ohio-1401 , 80 N.E.3d. 431 , ¶ 8, citing State v. O'Dell, 45 Ohio St.3d 140 , 147, 543 N.E.2d 1220 (1989), and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 , 363, 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (" '[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort * * *.' ").

2017State v. Venes, 2013-Ohio-1891 , 992 N.E.2d 453 , ¶ 20-21. {¶ 23} "[A] sentence vindictively imposed on a defendant for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial is contrary to law." *9 State v. Rahab , 150 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2017-Ohio-1401 , 80 N.E.3d. 431 , ¶ 8, citing State v. O'Dell, 45 Ohio St.3d 140 , 147, 543 N.E.2d 1220 (1989), and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 , 363, 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (" '[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort * * *.' ").

2016Cuyahoga No. 103683, 2016-Ohio-5326, ¶ 6 . {¶6} Despite this extremely deferential standard, Jones asks this court to determine “whether it was necessary to give a maximum and consecutive sentence, even where prison might have been the only option.” The scope of consecutive-sentencing review provided in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) — that the appellate court clearly and convincingly finds that the record does not support the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings — does not provide appellate courts the latitude to answer that question.

2013Cuyahoga No. 98622, 2013-Ohio-2525, ¶ 10 .

1979The author, beginning at page 249, outlines the judicial history of mistrials since the rendition of Perez, supra. Also, at page 249, the author indicates that Downum v. United States (1963), 372 U. S. 734 , and United States v. Jorn (1971), 400 U. S. 470 , which are cited in Judge Brown’s majority opinion, appear as “***a departure from this extremely deferential standard of review.” However, Illinois v. Somerville (1973), 410 U. S. 458 , and Arizona v. Washington (1978), 434 U. S. 497 , mark a return to what the author views as the casual treatment of the defendant’s “valued right.” See Note

1979The author, beginning at page 249, outlines the judicial history of mistrials since the rendition of Perez, supra. Also, at page 249, the author indicates that Downum v. United States (1963), 372 U. S. 734 , and United States v. Jorn (1971), 400 U. S. 470 , which are cited in Judge Brown’s majority opinion, appear as “***a departure from this extremely deferential standard of review.” However, Illinois v. Somerville (1973), 410 U. S. 458 , and Arizona v. Washington (1978), 434 U. S. 497 , mark a return to what the author views as the casual treatment of the defendant’s “valued right.” See Note

1979The author, beginning at page 249, outlines the judicial history of mistrials since the rendition of Perez, supra. Also, at page 249, the author indicates that Downum v. United States (1963), 372 U. S. 734 , and United States v. Jorn (1971), 400 U. S. 470 , which are cited in Judge Brown’s majority opinion, appear as “***a departure from this extremely deferential standard of review.” However, Illinois v. Somerville (1973), 410 U. S. 458 , and Arizona v. Washington (1978), 434 U. S. 497 , mark a return to what the author views as the casual treatment of the defendant’s “valued right.” See Note

1979The author, beginning at page 249, outlines the judicial history of mistrials since the rendition of Perez, supra. Also, at page 249, the author indicates that Downum v. United States (1963), 372 U. S. 734 , and United States v. Jorn (1971), 400 U. S. 470 , which are cited in Judge Brown’s majority opinion, appear as “***a departure from this extremely deferential standard of review.” However, Illinois v. Somerville (1973), 410 U. S. 458 , and Arizona v. Washington (1978), 434 U. S. 497 , mark a return to what the author views as the casual treatment of the defendant’s “valued right.” See Note

1979The author, beginning at page 249, outlines the judicial history of mistrials since the rendition of Perez, supra. Also, at page 249, the author indicates that Downum v. United States (1963), 372 U. S. 734 , and United States v. Jorn (1971), 400 U. S. 470 , which are cited in Judge Brown’s majority opinion, appear as “***a departure from this extremely deferential standard of review.” However, Illinois v. Somerville (1973), 410 U. S. 458 , and Arizona v. Washington (1978), 434 U. S. 497 , mark a return to what the author views as the casual treatment of the defendant’s “valued right.” See Note