extremely deferential standard in California

2016Although we exercise the same standard of review as did the superior court (Do v. Regents of University of California (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1489 [ 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 ] (Do)), in light of the superior court’s conclusion below, we believe it important to discuss this extremely deferential standard of review.

2016Although we exercise the same standard of review as did the superior court (Do v. Regents of University of California (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1489 [ 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 ] (Do)), in light of the superior court’s conclusion below, we believe it important to discuss this extremely deferential standard of review.

2016“On substantial evidence review, we do not ‘weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it.’ ” (Do, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492 .) “ ‘[The administrative agency’s] findings come before us “with a strong presumption as to their correctness and regularity.” [Citation.] We do not substitute our own judgment if the [agency’s] decision “ ‘ “is one which could have been made by reasonable people. . . .” [Citation.]’ ” ’ ” (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Bd. (2002) 104 Cal.A

2016“On substantial evidence review, we do not ‘weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it.’ ” (Do, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492 .) “ ‘[The administrative agency’s] findings come before us “with a strong presumption as to their correctness and regularity.” [Citation.] We do not substitute our own judgment if the [agency’s] decision “ ‘ “is one which could have been made by reasonable people. . . .” [Citation.]’ ” ’ ” (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Bd. (2002) 104 Cal.A

2016“On substantial evidence review, we do not ‘weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it.’ ” (Do, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492 .) “ ‘[The administrative agency’s] findings come before us “with a strong presumption as to their correctness and regularity.” [Citation.] We do not substitute our own judgment if the [agency’s] decision “ ‘ “is one which could have been made by reasonable people. . . .” [Citation.]’ ” ’ ” (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Bd. (2002) 104 Cal.A

2016“On substantial evidence review, we do not ‘weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it.’ ” (Do, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492 .) “ ‘[The administrative agency’s] findings come before us “with a strong presumption as to their correctness and regularity.” [Citation.] We do not substitute our own judgment if the [agency’s] decision “ ‘ “is one which could have been made by reasonable people. . . .” [Citation.]’ ” ’ ” (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Bd. (2002) 104 Cal.A

2015However, it will lie to correct abuses of discretion. [Citation.] In determining whether a public agency has abused its discretion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, and if reasonable minds may disagree as to the wisdom of the agency’s action, its determination must be upheld. [Citation.] A court must ask whether the public agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether the agency failed to follow the procedure and give the notices the law requires. [Citation.] [¶] In applying this extremely deferential test, a

2015However, it will lie to correct abuses of discretion. [Citation.] In determining whether a public agency has abused its discretion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, and if reasonable minds may disagree as to the wisdom of the agency’s action, its determination must be upheld. [Citation.] A court must ask whether the public agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether the agency failed to follow the procedure and give the notices the law requires. [Citation.] [¶] In applying this extremely deferential test, a

2015However, it will lie to correct abuses of discretion. [Citation.] In determining whether a public agency has abused its discretion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, and if reasonable minds may disagree as to the wisdom of the agency’s action, its determination must be upheld. [Citation.] A court must ask whether the public agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether the agency failed to follow the procedure and give the notices the law requires. [Citation.] [¶] In applying this extremely deferential test, a

2015However, it will lie to correct abuses of discretion. [Citation.] In determining whether a public agency has abused its discretion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, and if reasonable minds may disagree as to the wisdom of the agency’s action, its determination must be upheld. [Citation.] A court must ask whether the public agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether the agency failed to follow the procedure and give the notices the law requires. [Citation.] [¶] In applying this extremely deferential test, a

2014(See People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443 [review of trial court’s revocation of parolee is by the same standard as that applicable to probation, i.e., abuse of discretion]; compare with In re Caswell (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1027 [“In light of the [Board of Prison Terms’s] broad discretion in these matters, however, we review the sufficiency of 7 this factual underpinning using an extremely deferential standard, requiring merely ‘some evidence’ to justify the rescinding panel’s determination.”]; § 3010.10, subdivision (c) [“Upon a violation of this section, the parole authority sh

2014(See People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443 [review of trial court’s revocation of parolee is by the same standard as that applicable to probation, i.e., abuse of discretion]; compare with In re Caswell (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1027 [“In light of the [Board of Prison Terms’s] broad discretion in these matters, however, we review the sufficiency of 7 this factual underpinning using an extremely deferential standard, requiring merely ‘some evidence’ to justify the rescinding panel’s determination.”]; § 3010.10, subdivision (c) [“Upon a violation of this section, the parole authority sh

2014(See People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443 [review of trial court’s revocation of parolee is by the same standard as that applicable to probation, i.e., abuse of discretion]; compare with In re Caswell (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1027 [“In light of the [Board of Prison Terms’s] broad discretion in these matters, however, we review the sufficiency of 7 this factual underpinning using an extremely deferential standard, requiring merely ‘some evidence’ to justify the rescinding panel’s determination.”]; § 3010.10, subdivision (c) [“Upon a violation of this section, the parole authority sh

2014(See People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443 [review of trial court’s revocation of parolee is by the same standard as that applicable to probation, i.e., abuse of discretion]; compare with In re Caswell (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1027 [“In light of the [Board of Prison Terms’s] broad discretion in these matters, however, we review the sufficiency of 7 this factual underpinning using an extremely deferential standard, requiring merely ‘some evidence’ to justify the rescinding panel’s determination.”]; § 3010.10, subdivision (c) [“Upon a violation of this section, the parole authority sh

2013(Los Angeles Lincoln Place Investors, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 53, 59 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 600 ].) In applying this extremely deferential test, a court “ ‘must ensure that an agency has adequately considered all relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational connection between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of the enabling statute.’ ” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 577 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 , 888 P.2d 1268 ], quoting California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 212 [ 157 Cal.Rpt

2013(Los Angeles Lincoln Place Investors, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 53, 59 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 600 ].) In applying this extremely deferential test, a court “ ‘must ensure that an agency has adequately considered all relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational connection between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of the enabling statute.’ ” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 577 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 , 888 P.2d 1268 ], quoting California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 212 [ 157 Cal.Rpt

2013(Los Angeles Lincoln Place Investors, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 53, 59 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 600 ].) In applying this extremely deferential test, a court “ ‘must ensure that an agency has adequately considered all relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational connection between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of the enabling statute.’ ” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 577 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 , 888 P.2d 1268 ], quoting California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 212 [ 157 Cal.Rpt

2013(Los Angeles Lincoln Place Investors, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 53, 59 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 600 ].) In applying this extremely deferential test, a court “ ‘must ensure that an agency has adequately considered all relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational connection between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of the enabling statute.’ ” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 577 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 , 888 P.2d 1268 ], quoting California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 212 [ 157 Cal.Rpt

2013(Los Angeles Lincoln Place Investors, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 53, 59 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 600 ].) In applying this extremely deferential test, a court “ ‘must ensure that an agency has adequately considered all relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational connection between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of the enabling statute.’ ” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 577 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 , 888 P.2d 1268 ], quoting California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 212 [ 157 Cal.Rpt

2013(Los Angeles Lincoln Place Investors, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 53, 59 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 600 ].) In applying this extremely deferential test, a court “ ‘must ensure that an agency has adequately considered all relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational connection between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of the enabling statute.’ ” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 577 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 , 888 P.2d 1268 ], quoting California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 212 [ 157 Cal.Rpt

2010(See, e.g., Gueyffier, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1185 ; Moshonov v. Walsh, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 779; Advanced Micro Devices, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 381; Hawaii Teamsters, Local 996 v. United Parcel Serv. (9th Cir. 2001) 241 F.3d 1177 , 1182-1183 {Hawaii Teamsters).) “[T]he fact that an arbitrator arguably misinterpreted a contract does not mean that he did not engage in the act of interpreting it.

2010(See, e.g., Gueyffier, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1185 ; Moshonov v. Walsh, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 779; Advanced Micro Devices, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 381; Hawaii Teamsters, Local 996 v. United Parcel Serv. (9th Cir. 2001) 241 F.3d 1177 , 1182-1183 {Hawaii Teamsters).) “[T]he fact that an arbitrator arguably misinterpreted a contract does not mean that he did not engage in the act of interpreting it.

2003Further, we have stated that "a trial court ruling [on certification] supported by substantial evidence generally will not be disturbed `unless (1) improper criteria were used [citation]; or (2) erroneous legal assumptions were made [citation]'." ( Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 435-436, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 179 , 2 P.3d 27 .) For example, in Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 927 , 103 Cal. *19 Rptr.2d 320, 15 P.3d 1071 ( Washington Mutual ), we reversed a Court of Appeal decision upholding the trial court's certification order because the order was "premised upon [a]

2003Further, we have stated that "a trial court ruling [on certification] supported by substantial evidence generally will not be disturbed `unless (1) improper criteria were used [citation]; or (2) erroneous legal assumptions were made [citation]'." ( Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 435-436, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 179 , 2 P.3d 27 .) For example, in Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 927 , 103 Cal. *19 Rptr.2d 320, 15 P.3d 1071 ( Washington Mutual ), we reversed a Court of Appeal decision upholding the trial court's certification order because the order was "premised upon [a]