matter of affirmative defense in California

1997The court rejected the claim: “it was a matter of affirmative defense[.]” ( 158 Cal. at p. 570 .) The court elaborated on this point.

1967Alaska Salmon Co. v. Standard Box Co. (1910) 158 Cal. 567, 570 [ 112 P. 454 ], in which the court states that "The corporate existence and general capacity of the plaintiff . . . being established by . . . the plead *371 mgs it was a matter of affirmative defense for [defendant] to have shown the extraneous fact that plaintiff had failed to comply with the corporation license-tax law and therefore should not be permitted to proceed further. ’ ’ California Sav. & Loan Soc. v. Harris (1896) 111 Cal. 133 [ 43 P. 525 ], holding that failure of a corporation to file a certified copy of its articles

2013They may also include the performance of general household work: Provided, however, [t]hat such work is incidental, i.e., does not exceed 20 percent of the total weekly hours worked. . . .” ( 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 , some italics added.) FLSA “exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” (Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. (1960) 361 U.S. 388, 392 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 393 , 80 S.Ct. 453 ]; accord, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974) 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 [ 41 L.Ed

2013They may also include the performance of general household work: Provided, however, [t]hat such work is incidental, i.e., does not exceed 20 percent of the total weekly hours worked. . . .” ( 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 , some italics added.) FLSA “exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” (Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. (1960) 361 U.S. 388, 392 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 393 , 80 S.Ct. 453 ]; accord, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974) 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 [ 41 L.Ed

2013They may also include the performance of general household work: Provided, however, [t]hat such work is incidental, i.e., does not exceed 20 percent of the total weekly hours worked. . . .” ( 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 , some italics added.) FLSA “exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” (Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. (1960) 361 U.S. 388, 392 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 393 , 80 S.Ct. 453 ]; accord, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974) 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 [ 41 L.Ed

2013They may also include the performance of general household work: Provided, however, [t]hat such work is incidental, i.e., does not exceed 20 percent of the total weekly hours worked. . . .” ( 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 , some italics added.) FLSA “exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” (Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. (1960) 361 U.S. 388, 392 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 393 , 80 S.Ct. 453 ]; accord, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974) 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 [ 41 L.Ed

2013They may also include the performance of general household work: Provided, however, [t]hat such work is incidental, i.e., does not exceed 20 percent of the total weekly hours worked. . . .” ( 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 , some italics added.) FLSA “exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” (Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. (1960) 361 U.S. 388, 392 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 393 , 80 S.Ct. 453 ]; accord, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974) 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 [ 41 L.Ed

2013They may also include the performance of general household work: Provided, however, [t]hat such work is incidental, i.e., does not exceed 20 percent of the total weekly hours worked. . . .” ( 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 , some italics added.) FLSA “exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” (Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. (1960) 361 U.S. 388, 392 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 393 , 80 S.Ct. 453 ]; accord, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974) 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 [ 41 L.Ed

2013They may also include the performance of general household work: Provided, however, [t]hat such work is incidental, i.e., does not exceed 20 percent of the total weekly hours worked. . . .” ( 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 , some italics added.) FLSA “exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” (Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. (1960) 361 U.S. 388, 392 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 393 , 80 S.Ct. 453 ]; accord, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974) 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 [ 41 L.Ed

2013They may also include the performance of general household work: Provided, however, [t]hat such work is incidental, i.e., does not exceed 20 percent of the total weekly hours worked. . . .” ( 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 , some italics added.) FLSA “exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” (Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc. (1960) 361 U.S. 388, 392 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 393 , 80 S.Ct. 453 ]; accord, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974) 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 [ 41 L.Ed

1979(Baruh v. Kuhl (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 266, 273 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 573 ].) They did not plead failure to mitigate, and they presented no evidence of employment opportunities for a man of Mayes’ age and skills.

1979(Baruh v. Kuhl (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 266, 273 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 573 ].) They did not plead failure to mitigate, and they presented no evidence of employment opportunities for a man of Mayes’ age and skills.

1971(Rest., Torts, § 766; Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33 [ 112 P.2d 631 ].) Whether an interference is justified “depends on a balancing of the importance, social and private, of the objective advanced by the interference against the importance of the interest interfered with, considering all circumstances, among which the methods and means used and the relation of the parties are important.” (Masoni v. Board of Trade of S.F., 119 Cal.App.2d 738, 742 [ 260 P.2d 205 ]; Rest., Torts, §§ 767-774.) Although justification is usually a matter of affirmative defense, the complaint may reveal j

1971(Rest., Torts, § 766; Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33 [ 112 P.2d 631 ].) Whether an interference is justified “depends on a balancing of the importance, social and private, of the objective advanced by the interference against the importance of the interest interfered with, considering all circumstances, among which the methods and means used and the relation of the parties are important.” (Masoni v. Board of Trade of S.F., 119 Cal.App.2d 738, 742 [ 260 P.2d 205 ]; Rest., Torts, §§ 767-774.) Although justification is usually a matter of affirmative defense, the complaint may reveal j

1970Co., 56 Cal.2d 202, 207 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 294 , 363 P.2d 310 ]; Collins v. Vickter Manor, Inc., 47 Cal.2d 875, 883 [ 306 P.2d 783 ]; Freed v. Manchester Service, Inc., supra, 165 Cal.App.2d 186, 190 ), the absence of an allegation that the two defendants acted capriciously should not be considered upon a general demurrer, at least where the complaint does not reveal such justification on its face.

1970Co., 56 Cal.2d 202, 207 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 294 , 363 P.2d 310 ]; Collins v. Vickter Manor, Inc., 47 Cal.2d 875, 883 [ 306 P.2d 783 ]; Freed v. Manchester Service, Inc., supra, 165 Cal.App.2d 186, 190 ), the absence of an allegation that the two defendants acted capriciously should not be considered upon a general demurrer, at least where the complaint does not reveal such justification on its face.

1970Co. v. California Mart, 2 Cal.App.3d 846, 853 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 830 ].) Justification for defendants’ exclusion of plaintiff being a matter of affirmative defense {Herron v. State Farm Mutual Ins.

1970Co. v. California Mart, 2 Cal.App.3d 846, 853 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 830 ].) Justification for defendants’ exclusion of plaintiff being a matter of affirmative defense {Herron v. State Farm Mutual Ins.

1970Co., 56 Cal.2d 202, 207 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 294 , 363 P.2d 310 ]; Collins v. Vickter Manor, Inc., 47 Cal.2d 875, 883 [ 306 P.2d 783 ]; Freed v. Manchester Service, Inc., supra, 165 Cal.App.2d 186, 190 ), the absence of an allegation that the two defendants acted capriciously should not be considered upon a general demurrer, at least where the complaint does not reveal such justification on its face.

1970Co., 56 Cal.2d 202, 207 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 294 , 363 P.2d 310 ]; Collins v. Vickter Manor, Inc., 47 Cal.2d 875, 883 [ 306 P.2d 783 ]; Freed v. Manchester Service, Inc., supra, 165 Cal.App.2d 186, 190 ), the absence of an allegation that the two defendants acted capriciously should not be considered upon a general demurrer, at least where the complaint does not reveal such justification on its face.

1969And in such ease the burden of proof is on the defendant. [Citations.]” (Eaton v. Brock (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 10, 13 [ 268 P.2d 58 ].) In Estate of Prieto, supra, the court quoted with approval from Lewis & Queen v. N. M.

1969And in such ease the burden of proof is on the defendant. [Citations.]” (Eaton v. Brock (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 10, 13 [ 268 P.2d 58 ].) In Estate of Prieto, supra, the court quoted with approval from Lewis & Queen v. N. M.

1969(Antioch College v. Barnhart (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 171, 173 [ 121 P.2d 521 ]; Elmore v. Tingley (1926) 78 Cal.App. 460, 465-466 [ 248 P. 706 ].) “Where the illegality of a contract does not appear from the face of the complaint it becomes a matter of affirmative defense that must be specially pleaded.

1969(Antioch College v. Barnhart (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 171, 173 [ 121 P.2d 521 ]; Elmore v. Tingley (1926) 78 Cal.App. 460, 465-466 [ 248 P. 706 ].) “Where the illegality of a contract does not appear from the face of the complaint it becomes a matter of affirmative defense that must be specially pleaded.

1969(Antioch College v. Barnhart (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 171, 173 [ 121 P.2d 521 ]; Elmore v. Tingley (1926) 78 Cal.App. 460, 465-466 [ 248 P. 706 ].) “Where the illegality of a contract does not appear from the face of the complaint it becomes a matter of affirmative defense that must be specially pleaded.

1969(Antioch College v. Barnhart (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 171, 173 [ 121 P.2d 521 ]; Elmore v. Tingley (1926) 78 Cal.App. 460, 465-466 [ 248 P. 706 ].) “Where the illegality of a contract does not appear from the face of the complaint it becomes a matter of affirmative defense that must be specially pleaded.

1964The general rule as to proof of a negative averment in an information is “that where the negative of an issue does not permit direct proof, or where the facts come more immediately within the knowledge of the defendant, the onus probandi rests upon him.” (People v. Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 177, 178 [ 286 P. 1025 ].) The rule is therein referred to as “the rule of convenience or necessity.” (P. 185.) The limited application of this rule is stated in People v. Quarez, 196 Cal. 404 at p. 412 [ 238 P. 363 ] as follows: “But this exception to the general rule has, in this state, been confined to that p

1964The general rule as to proof of a negative averment in an information is “that where the negative of an issue does not permit direct proof, or where the facts come more immediately within the knowledge of the defendant, the onus probandi rests upon him.” (People v. Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 177, 178 [ 286 P. 1025 ].) The rule is therein referred to as “the rule of convenience or necessity.” (P. 185.) The limited application of this rule is stated in People v. Quarez, 196 Cal. 404 at p. 412 [ 238 P. 363 ] as follows: “But this exception to the general rule has, in this state, been confined to that p

1964The general rule as to proof of a negative averment in an information is “that where the negative of an issue does not permit direct proof, or where the facts come more immediately within the knowledge of the defendant, the onus probandi rests upon him.” (People v. Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 177, 178 [ 286 P. 1025 ].) The rule is therein referred to as “the rule of convenience or necessity.” (P. 185.) The limited application of this rule is stated in People v. Quarez, 196 Cal. 404 at p. 412 [ 238 P. 363 ] as follows: “But this exception to the general rule has, in this state, been confined to that p

1964The general rule as to proof of a negative averment in an information is “that where the negative of an issue does not permit direct proof, or where the facts come more immediately within the knowledge of the defendant, the onus probandi rests upon him.” (People v. Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 177, 178 [ 286 P. 1025 ].) The rule is therein referred to as “the rule of convenience or necessity.” (P. 185.) The limited application of this rule is stated in People v. Quarez, 196 Cal. 404 at p. 412 [ 238 P. 363 ] as follows: “But this exception to the general rule has, in this state, been confined to that p

1922Generally the question is one for the jury (Roseberry v. Edward F. Niehaus & Co., 166 Cal. 481, 483 [ 137 Pac. 232 ]), and the present case comes well within the rule. [3] The alleged contributory negligence of the husband in not warning his wife of the dangers incident to the unsafe condition of the street was a matter of affirmative defense, and should have been pleaded.

1922Generally the question is one for the jury (Roseberry v. Edward F. Niehaus & Co., 166 Cal. 481, 483 [ 137 Pac. 232 ]), and the present case comes well within the rule. [3] The alleged contributory negligence of the husband in not warning his wife of the dangers incident to the unsafe condition of the street was a matter of affirmative defense, and should have been pleaded.