mirror image privilege in California

2025Legal Principles “A criminal defendant has the right to testify at trial, ‘a right that is the mirror image of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and accordingly is of equal dignity.’ (People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1223 ; see People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 717 .) ‘The defendant may exercise the right to testify over the objection of, and contrary to the advice of, defense counsel.’” (People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36 , 55, quoting People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1332 (Bradford).) “Absent an express conflict, ‘“a trial judge may safely assume

2024It necessarily follows that a trial judge may safely assume that a defendant, who is ably represented and who does not testify is merely exercising [his or her] Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is abiding by [defense] counsel’s trial strategy.” (People v. Mosqueda (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 540, 545 (Mosqueda); accord, People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735 , 762–763 (Enraca) [quoting Mosqueda].) Thus, our high court has repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to “obtain an affirmative waiver on the record whenever a defendant fails to testify at trial.” (People v.

2025Legal Principles “A criminal defendant has the right to testify at trial, ‘a right that is the mirror image of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and accordingly is of equal dignity.’ (People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1223 ; see People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 717 .) ‘The defendant may exercise the right to testify over the objection of, and contrary to the advice of, defense counsel.’” (People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36 , 55, quoting People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1332 (Bradford).) “Absent an express conflict, ‘“a trial judge may safely assume

2024It necessarily follows that a trial judge may safely assume that a defendant, who is ably represented and who does not testify is merely exercising [his or her] Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is abiding by [defense] counsel’s trial strategy.” (People v. Mosqueda (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 540, 545 (Mosqueda); accord, People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735 , 762–763 (Enraca) [quoting Mosqueda].) Thus, our high court has repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to “obtain an affirmative waiver on the record whenever a defendant fails to testify at trial.” (People v.

2025Legal Principles “A criminal defendant has the right to testify at trial, ‘a right that is the mirror image of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and accordingly is of equal dignity.’ (People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1223 ; see People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 717 .) ‘The defendant may exercise the right to testify over the objection of, and contrary to the advice of, defense counsel.’” (People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36 , 55, quoting People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1332 (Bradford).) “Absent an express conflict, ‘“a trial judge may safely assume

2025Legal Principles “A criminal defendant has the right to testify at trial, ‘a right that is the mirror image of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and accordingly is of equal dignity.’ (People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1223 ; see People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 717 .) ‘The defendant may exercise the right to testify over the objection of, and contrary to the advice of, defense counsel.’” (People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36 , 55, quoting People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1332 (Bradford).) “Absent an express conflict, ‘“a trial judge may safely assume

2025Legal Principles “A criminal defendant has the right to testify at trial, ‘a right that is the mirror image of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and accordingly is of equal dignity.’ (People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1223 ; see People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 717 .) ‘The defendant may exercise the right to testify over the objection of, and contrary to the advice of, defense counsel.’” (People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36 , 55, quoting People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1332 (Bradford).) “Absent an express conflict, ‘“a trial judge may safely assume

2024The choice of whether to testify in one’s own defense . . . is an exercise of the constitutional privilege.” ’ ” (Johnson, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 617 , quoting Rock, supra, at pp. 52-53 ; accord, People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 55 [“A criminal defendant has the right to testify at trial, ‘a right that is the mirror image of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and accordingly is of equal dignity.’ ”].) The Rock Court further found “the right to testify ‘in the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which grants [] defendant[s] the right to call “witnesses in [their

2025Legal Principles “A criminal defendant has the right to testify at trial, ‘a right that is the mirror image of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and accordingly is of equal dignity.’ (People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1223 ; see People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 717 .) ‘The defendant may exercise the right to testify over the objection of, and contrary to the advice of, defense counsel.’” (People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36 , 55, quoting People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1332 (Bradford).) “Absent an express conflict, ‘“a trial judge may safely assume

2020Defendant’s Decision Not To Testify Was Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary A criminal defendant has the right to testify at trial, “a right that is the mirror image of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and accordingly is of equal dignity.” (People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1223 ; see People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 717 .) “The defendant may exercise the right to testify over the objection of, and contrary to the advice of, defense counsel. [Citations.] ‘When the decision is whether to testify . . . at the guilt phase of a capital trial [citation] it is only

2017"Under traditional common law, no contract was reached if the term of the offer and the acceptance varied." ( Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 90 , 99, 141 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 569 P.2d 751 ( Steiner ).) An acceptance containing additional terms was viewed as "both a rejection of the offer and a counteroffer." ( 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Sales, § 38, p. 51.) The California Uniform Commercial Code rejects this mirror image rule in the commercial context, where its strict application would be "both unfair and unrealistic." ( Steiner, at p. 99, 141 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 569 P.

2017"Under traditional common law, no contract was reached if the term of the offer and the acceptance varied." ( Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 90 , 99, 141 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 569 P.2d 751 ( Steiner ).) An acceptance containing additional terms was viewed as "both a rejection of the offer and a counteroffer." ( 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Sales, § 38, p. 51.) The California Uniform Commercial Code rejects this mirror image rule in the commercial context, where its strict application would be "both unfair and unrealistic." ( Steiner, at p. 99, 141 Cal.Rptr. 157 , 569 P.

2024The choice of whether to testify in one’s own defense . . . is an exercise of the constitutional privilege.” ’ ” (Johnson, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 617 , quoting Rock, supra, at pp. 52-53 ; accord, People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 55 [“A criminal defendant has the right to testify at trial, ‘a right that is the mirror image of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and accordingly is of equal dignity.’ ”].) The Rock Court further found “the right to testify ‘in the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which grants [] defendant[s] the right to call “witnesses in [their

2024The choice of whether to testify in one’s own defense . . . is an exercise of the constitutional privilege.” ’ ” (Johnson, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 617 , quoting Rock, supra, at pp. 52-53 ; accord, People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 55 [“A criminal defendant has the right to testify at trial, ‘a right that is the mirror image of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and accordingly is of equal dignity.’ ”].) The Rock Court further found “the right to testify ‘in the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which grants [] defendant[s] the right to call “witnesses in [their

2024It necessarily follows that a trial judge may safely assume that a defendant, who is ably represented and who does not testify is merely exercising [his or her] Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is abiding by [defense] counsel’s trial strategy.” (People v. Mosqueda (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 540, 545 (Mosqueda); accord, People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735 , 762–763 (Enraca) [quoting Mosqueda].) Thus, our high court has repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to “obtain an affirmative waiver on the record whenever a defendant fails to testify at trial.” (People v.

2024It necessarily follows that a trial judge may safely assume that a defendant, who is ably represented and who does not testify is merely exercising [his or her] Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is abiding by [defense] counsel’s trial strategy.” (People v. Mosqueda (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 540, 545 (Mosqueda); accord, People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735 , 762–763 (Enraca) [quoting Mosqueda].) Thus, our high court has repeatedly held that a trial court is not required to “obtain an affirmative waiver on the record whenever a defendant fails to testify at trial.” (People v.

2023The California Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the claim that CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 “reduce or weaken the prosecution’s constitutionally mandated burden of proof or amount to an improper mandatory presumption of guilt.” (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 375 [CALJIC Nos. 2.01 & 2.02]; accord, People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735 , 792–794; People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 286 .) Given this settled law, defendant fails to explain how the mirror-image instruction, merely modified to address circumstantial evidence of intent or mental state as it concerned the defenses, c

2023The California Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the claim that CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 “reduce or weaken the prosecution’s constitutionally mandated burden of proof or amount to an improper mandatory presumption of guilt.” (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 375 [CALJIC Nos. 2.01 & 2.02]; accord, People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735 , 792–794; People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 286 .) Given this settled law, defendant fails to explain how the mirror-image instruction, merely modified to address circumstantial evidence of intent or mental state as it concerned the defenses, c

2002Indeed, Hoadley's holding that the statute of limitations does not bar the state’s recovery of public-use property against a claim of adverse possession is simply the mirror image of the rule that a private party cannot acquire prescriptive title to public-use property through adverse possession: “[S]o far as the title to real property is concerned,—prescription and limitation are convertible terms; and a plea of the proper statute of limitations is a good plea of a prescriptive right.” (Water Co. v. Richardson (1887) 72 Cal. 598, 601 [ 14 P. 379 ]; see People v. Shirokow, supra, 26 Cal.3d at

2002Indeed, Hoadley's holding that the statute of limitations does not bar the state’s recovery of public-use property against a claim of adverse possession is simply the mirror image of the rule that a private party cannot acquire prescriptive title to public-use property through adverse possession: “[S]o far as the title to real property is concerned,—prescription and limitation are convertible terms; and a plea of the proper statute of limitations is a good plea of a prescriptive right.” (Water Co. v. Richardson (1887) 72 Cal. 598, 601 [ 14 P. 379 ]; see People v. Shirokow, supra, 26 Cal.3d at

2002Indeed, Hoadley's holding that the statute of limitations does not bar the state’s recovery of public-use property against a claim of adverse possession is simply the mirror image of the rule that a private party cannot acquire prescriptive title to public-use property through adverse possession: “[S]o far as the title to real property is concerned,—prescription and limitation are convertible terms; and a plea of the proper statute of limitations is a good plea of a prescriptive right.” (Water Co. v. Richardson (1887) 72 Cal. 598, 601 [ 14 P. 379 ]; see People v. Shirokow, supra, 26 Cal.3d at