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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Marriage of Ackermangreen1 sentence2014(In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 204 [“‘resolution of conflicts in the evidence, assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given the opinions of experts were all matters within the exclusive province of the trier of fact.’”] Grasping onto testimony by Dr. Leifer on cross-examination that Webster had “a vulnerability” to neurocognitive deficits, which she claims is his “true opinion,” Webster argues that the deficits were “in fact causally related to [the] accident” because the “deficit’s actual symptoms were triggered by the effect of the accident o | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2009Here, “[b]y taking the stand, defendant put his own credibility in issue and was subject to impeachment in the same manner as any other witness.” (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1139 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 52 P.3d 572 ]; see Evid. 2009Here, “[b]y taking the stand, defendant put his own credibility in issue and was subject to impeachment in the same manner as any other witness.” (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1139 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 52 P.3d 572 ]; see Evid. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smitheygreen2 sentences2009(See, e.g., People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 965-966 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 ] [the rebuttal testimony of a prosecution expert critical of forensic psychiatry and of the opinions of the defense experts was relevant to the weight of those opinions, and its admission was neither improper nor prejudicial]; People v. Prince (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 848, 856-858 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 154 ] [the testimony of a prosecution expert was relevant to the weight and credibility of the defense expert opinions on the defendant’s competency to stand trial].) The testimony of the rebuttal witnesses 2009(See, e.g., People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 965-966 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 ] [the rebuttal testimony of a prosecution expert critical of forensic psychiatry and of the opinions of the defense experts was relevant to the weight of those opinions, and its admission was neither improper nor prejudicial]; People v. Prince (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 848, 856-858 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 154 ] [the testimony of a prosecution expert was relevant to the weight and credibility of the defense expert opinions on the defendant’s competency to stand trial].) The testimony of the rebuttal witnesses | 1 | 1 |
People v. Princegreen2 sentences2009(See, e.g., People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 965-966 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 ] [the rebuttal testimony of a prosecution expert critical of forensic psychiatry and of the opinions of the defense experts was relevant to the weight of those opinions, and its admission was neither improper nor prejudicial]; People v. Prince (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 848, 856-858 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 154 ] [the testimony of a prosecution expert was relevant to the weight and credibility of the defense expert opinions on the defendant’s competency to stand trial].) The testimony of the rebuttal witnesses 2009(See, e.g., People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 965-966 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 ] [the rebuttal testimony of a prosecution expert critical of forensic psychiatry and of the opinions of the defense experts was relevant to the weight of those opinions, and its admission was neither improper nor prejudicial]; People v. Prince (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 848, 856-858 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 154 ] [the testimony of a prosecution expert was relevant to the weight and credibility of the defense expert opinions on the defendant’s competency to stand trial].) The testimony of the rebuttal witnesses | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gionisgreen2 sentences2004(E.g., People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846-847 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 , 996 P.2d 1152 ]; People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1216-1218 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 , 892 P.2d 1199 ]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 305-306 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 821 P.2d 585 ].) We also find no misconduct in the prosecutor’s commonsense observation that the opinions of the defense experts were necessarily shaped by the information the defense chose to provide them. 2004(E.g., People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846-847 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 , 996 P.2d 1152 ]; People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1216-1218 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 , 892 P.2d 1199 ]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 305-306 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 821 P.2d 585 ].) We also find no misconduct in the prosecutor’s commonsense observation that the opinions of the defense experts were necessarily shaped by the information the defense chose to provide them. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Breauxgreen2 sentences2004(E.g., People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846-847 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 , 996 P.2d 1152 ]; People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1216-1218 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 , 892 P.2d 1199 ]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 305-306 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 821 P.2d 585 ].) We also find no misconduct in the prosecutor’s commonsense observation that the opinions of the defense experts were necessarily shaped by the information the defense chose to provide them. 2004(E.g., People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846-847 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 , 996 P.2d 1152 ]; People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1216-1218 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 , 892 P.2d 1199 ]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 305-306 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 821 P.2d 585 ].) We also find no misconduct in the prosecutor’s commonsense observation that the opinions of the defense experts were necessarily shaped by the information the defense chose to provide them. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bemoregreen2 sentences2004(E.g., People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846-847 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 , 996 P.2d 1152 ]; People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1216-1218 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 , 892 P.2d 1199 ]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 305-306 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 821 P.2d 585 ].) We also find no misconduct in the prosecutor’s commonsense observation that the opinions of the defense experts were necessarily shaped by the information the defense chose to provide them. 2004(E.g., People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846-847 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 , 996 P.2d 1152 ]; People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1216-1218 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456 , 892 P.2d 1199 ]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 305-306 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 821 P.2d 585 ].) We also find no misconduct in the prosecutor’s commonsense observation that the opinions of the defense experts were necessarily shaped by the information the defense chose to provide them. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Floodgreen2 sentences1999The Attorney General relies upon the principle that "[a] party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language. [Citation.]" ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024 , 264 Cal. Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 .) Defendant's claim, however, is that the instruction is not "correct in law," and that it violated his right to due process of law; the claim therefore is not of the type that must be preserved by objection. (§ 1259 ["The appellate court may 1999The Attorney General relies upon the principle that "[a] party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language. [Citation.]" ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024 , 264 Cal. Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 .) Defendant's claim, however, is that the instruction is not "correct in law," and that it violated his right to due process of law; the claim therefore is not of the type that must be preserved by objection. (§ 1259 ["The appellate court may | 1 | 1 |
People v. Huizengagreen2 sentences1969(People v. Treggs, 171 Cal.App.2d 537, 543 [ 341 P.2d 342 ], See also People v. Huizenga, 34 Cal.2d 669, 675 [ 213 P.2d 710 ].) It is apparent that the trial judge resolved the conflict between the opinions of the defense experts and the prosecution experts by accepting the latter and rejecting the former. 1969(People v. Treggs, 171 Cal.App.2d 537, 543 [ 341 P.2d 342 ], See also People v. Huizenga, 34 Cal.2d 669, 675 [ 213 P.2d 710 ].) It is apparent that the trial judge resolved the conflict between the opinions of the defense experts and the prosecution experts by accepting the latter and rejecting the former. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Treggsgreen2 sentences1969(People v. Treggs, 171 Cal.App.2d 537, 543 [ 341 P.2d 342 ], See also People v. Huizenga, 34 Cal.2d 669, 675 [ 213 P.2d 710 ].) It is apparent that the trial judge resolved the conflict between the opinions of the defense experts and the prosecution experts by accepting the latter and rejecting the former. 1969(People v. Treggs, 171 Cal.App.2d 537, 543 [ 341 P.2d 342 ], See also People v. Huizenga, 34 Cal.2d 669, 675 [ 213 P.2d 710 ].) It is apparent that the trial judge resolved the conflict between the opinions of the defense experts and the prosecution experts by accepting the latter and rejecting the former. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gonzales
green
1 sentence2022The weight to which this factor is entitled is a matter for you to decide.’ ” (Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 926 .) We held that erroneous instruction to be harmless and, in so concluding, relied in no small part on the existence of Evidence Code section 730. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. MEJIA-LENARES
green
1 sentence2014(Skinner, at p. 783.) In addition, people operating under a delusion could theoretically be considered insane “since, because of their delusion, they do not know or understand the nature of their act or, if they do, they do not know that it is wrong.” (Mejia-Lenares, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1456 .) In the present case, appellant argues in essence that the opinions of the defense experts who found her legally insane are more valid than those of the court-appointed experts who found her sane. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
James v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2012(James v. Illinois (1990) 493 U.S. 307 [ 107 L.Ed.2d 676 , 110 S.Ct. 648 ] (James) [precluding use of illegally obtained custodial statements to impeach “all” defense witnesses]; § 1538.5.) This is a question of first impression about the allowable scope of impeachment of a defense expert witness’s opinion that is based in part upon statements by the defendant, through the use of the defendant’s suppression hearing testimony. 2012(James v. Illinois (1990) 493 U.S. 307 [ 107 L.Ed.2d 676 , 110 S.Ct. 648 ] (James) [precluding use of illegally obtained custodial statements to impeach “all” defense witnesses]; § 1538.5.) This is a question of first impression about the allowable scope of impeachment of a defense expert witness’s opinion that is based in part upon statements by the defendant, through the use of the defendant’s suppression hearing testimony. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Hines v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1999(See Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1170 , 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 819 ; Mines v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1824 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 .) [8] "Section 1054.3 ... is perhaps one of `the most significant and controversial' parts of the new reciprocal discovery scheme. [Citation.] Requiring the defense to disclose witnesses other than the defendant that it intends to call at trial and produce statements, reports and real evidence, the statute opens up `avenues of discovery' previously closed to the prosecution in California. [Citations.]" ( Woods v. Superior Court ( 1999(See Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1170 , 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 819 ; Mines v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1824 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 .) [8] "Section 1054.3 ... is perhaps one of `the most significant and controversial' parts of the new reciprocal discovery scheme. [Citation.] Requiring the defense to disclose witnesses other than the defendant that it intends to call at trial and produce statements, reports and real evidence, the statute opens up `avenues of discovery' previously closed to the prosecution in California. [Citations.]" ( Woods v. Superior Court ( | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Lang
green
2 sentences1999The Attorney General relies upon the principle that "[a] party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language. [Citation.]" ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024 , 264 Cal. Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 .) Defendant's claim, however, is that the instruction is not "correct in law," and that it violated his right to due process of law; the claim therefore is not of the type that must be preserved by objection. (§ 1259 ["The appellate court may 1999The Attorney General relies upon the principle that "[a] party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language. [Citation.]" ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024 , 264 Cal. Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 .) Defendant's claim, however, is that the instruction is not "correct in law," and that it violated his right to due process of law; the claim therefore is not of the type that must be preserved by objection. (§ 1259 ["The appellate court may | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Sandeffer v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO CTY.
green
2 sentences1999(See Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1170 , 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 819 ; Mines v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1824 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 .) [8] "Section 1054.3 ... is perhaps one of `the most significant and controversial' parts of the new reciprocal discovery scheme. [Citation.] Requiring the defense to disclose witnesses other than the defendant that it intends to call at trial and produce statements, reports and real evidence, the statute opens up `avenues of discovery' previously closed to the prosecution in California. [Citations.]" ( Woods v. Superior Court ( 1999(See Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1170 , 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 819 ; Mines v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1824 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 .) [8] "Section 1054.3 ... is perhaps one of `the most significant and controversial' parts of the new reciprocal discovery scheme. [Citation.] Requiring the defense to disclose witnesses other than the defendant that it intends to call at trial and produce statements, reports and real evidence, the statute opens up `avenues of discovery' previously closed to the prosecution in California. [Citations.]" ( Woods v. Superior Court ( | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Danielson
green
2 sentences1999Thus, his criticism of forensic psychiatry and of the opinions of the defense experts went to the weight of those opinions rather than their admissibility. ( Id. at p. 730, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 838 P.2d 729 .) Moreover, because the trial court instructed the jury that an expert was entitled to state an opinion on a matter at issue in the trial, and that the jury was entitled to disregard an expert opinion if it was unreasonable, we have found such testimony by Dr. Coleman to be "`clearly nonprejudicial.'" ( Id. at p. 731, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 838 P.2d 729 , quoting People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal 1999Thus, his criticism of forensic psychiatry and of the opinions of the defense experts went to the weight of those opinions rather than their admissibility. ( Id. at p. 730, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 838 P.2d 729 .) Moreover, because the trial court instructed the jury that an expert was entitled to state an opinion on a matter at issue in the trial, and that the jury was entitled to disregard an expert opinion if it was unreasonable, we have found such testimony by Dr. Coleman to be "`clearly nonprejudicial.'" ( Id. at p. 731, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 838 P.2d 729 , quoting People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Hubbard v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1999(See Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1170 , 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 819 ; Mines v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1824 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 .) [8] "Section 1054.3 ... is perhaps one of `the most significant and controversial' parts of the new reciprocal discovery scheme. [Citation.] Requiring the defense to disclose witnesses other than the defendant that it intends to call at trial and produce statements, reports and real evidence, the statute opens up `avenues of discovery' previously closed to the prosecution in California. [Citations.]" ( Woods v. Superior Court ( 1999(See Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1170 , 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 819 ; Mines v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1824 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 .) [8] "Section 1054.3 ... is perhaps one of `the most significant and controversial' parts of the new reciprocal discovery scheme. [Citation.] Requiring the defense to disclose witnesses other than the defendant that it intends to call at trial and produce statements, reports and real evidence, the statute opens up `avenues of discovery' previously closed to the prosecution in California. [Citations.]" ( Woods v. Superior Court ( | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Babbitt
green
2 sentences1999Thus, his criticism of forensic psychiatry and of the opinions of the defense experts went to the weight of those opinions rather than their admissibility. ( Id. at p. 730, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 838 P.2d 729 .) Moreover, because the trial court instructed the jury that an expert was entitled to state an opinion on a matter at issue in the trial, and that the jury was entitled to disregard an expert opinion if it was unreasonable, we have found such testimony by Dr. Coleman to be "`clearly nonprejudicial.'" ( Id. at p. 731, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 838 P.2d 729 , quoting People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal 1999Thus, his criticism of forensic psychiatry and of the opinions of the defense experts went to the weight of those opinions rather than their admissibility. ( Id. at p. 730, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 838 P.2d 729 .) Moreover, because the trial court instructed the jury that an expert was entitled to state an opinion on a matter at issue in the trial, and that the jury was entitled to disregard an expert opinion if it was unreasonable, we have found such testimony by Dr. Coleman to be "`clearly nonprejudicial.'" ( Id. at p. 731, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 838 P.2d 729 , quoting People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Woods v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1999(See Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1170 , 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 819 ; Mines v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1824 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 .) [8] "Section 1054.3 ... is perhaps one of `the most significant and controversial' parts of the new reciprocal discovery scheme. [Citation.] Requiring the defense to disclose witnesses other than the defendant that it intends to call at trial and produce statements, reports and real evidence, the statute opens up `avenues of discovery' previously closed to the prosecution in California. [Citations.]" ( Woods v. Superior Court ( 1999(See Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1170 , 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 819 ; Mines v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1824 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 .) [8] "Section 1054.3 ... is perhaps one of `the most significant and controversial' parts of the new reciprocal discovery scheme. [Citation.] Requiring the defense to disclose witnesses other than the defendant that it intends to call at trial and produce statements, reports and real evidence, the statute opens up `avenues of discovery' previously closed to the prosecution in California. [Citations.]" ( Woods v. Superior Court ( | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1999The Attorney General relies upon the principle that "[a] party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language. [Citation.]" ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024 , 264 Cal. Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 .) Defendant's claim, however, is that the instruction is not "correct in law," and that it violated his right to due process of law; the claim therefore is not of the type that must be preserved by objection. (§ 1259 ["The appellate court may 1999The Attorney General relies upon the principle that "[a] party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language. [Citation.]" ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024 , 264 Cal. Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 .) Defendant's claim, however, is that the instruction is not "correct in law," and that it violated his right to due process of law; the claim therefore is not of the type that must be preserved by objection. (§ 1259 ["The appellate court may | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.