origins rule in California

2012The origins of the rule may be traced at least as far back as 1945, where in In re Byrnes (1945) 26 Cal.2d 824 [ 161 P.2d 376 ] we *477 suggested that a criminal defendant could not properly file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in lieu of directly appealing a conviction, noting that “[i]t is well settled that a writ of habeas corpus ordinarily may not be employed as a substitute for an appeal” (id. at p. 827, italics added).

2012The origins of the rule may be traced at least as far back as 1945, where in In re Byrnes (1945) 26 Cal.2d 824 we suggested that a criminal defendant could not properly file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in lieu of directly appealing a conviction, noting that ―[i]t is well settled that a writ of habeas corpus ordinarily may not be employed as a substitute for an appeal‖ (id. at p. 827, italics added).

2015Co. (1977) 18 Cal.3d 932 .

2015Barrington first recognized the origins of the doctrine in Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596 and its later development in Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg.

2013Proc., § 904.1.) [Fn. omitted.] In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 433 P.2d 732 ] (Daar), however, concerned that orders dismissing all class action claims might in some instances escape review, we adopted a ‘death knell’ doctrine that allowed a party to appeal such orders immediately.” (Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 754 .) The Supreme Court reviewed the origins of the doctrine, explaining, “In Daar , the plaintiff filed a putative class action.

2013Proc., § 904.1.) [Fn. omitted.] In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 433 P.2d 732 ] (Daar), however, concerned that orders dismissing all class action claims might in some instances escape review, we adopted a ‘death knell’ doctrine that allowed a party to appeal such orders immediately.” (Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 754 .) The Supreme Court reviewed the origins of the doctrine, explaining, “In Daar , the plaintiff filed a putative class action.

2013Proc., § 904.1.) [Fn. omitted.] In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 724 , 433 P.2d 732 ] (Daar), however, concerned that orders dismissing all class action claims might in some instances escape review, we adopted a ‘death knell’ doctrine that allowed a party to appeal such orders immediately.” (Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 754 .) The Supreme Court reviewed the origins of the doctrine, explaining, “In Daar , the plaintiff filed a putative class action.

2006Indemnity provisions are to be strictly construed against the indemnitee, and had the parties intended to include an indemnity provision that would apply regardless of the subcontractor's negligence, they would have had to use specific, unequivocal contractual language to that effect." ( Ibid. ) The Heppler court then restated the rule after citations: "As this court has pointed out in Smoketree-Lake Murray, Ltd. v. Mills Concrete Construction Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1724, 1737 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 435 , the specificity of the language used is a key factor in construction of an indemnity agreemen

2006Indemnity provisions are to be strictly construed against the indemnitee, and had the parties intended to include an indemnity provision that would apply regardless of the subcontractor's negligence, they would have had to use specific, unequivocal contractual language to that effect." ( Ibid. ) The Heppler court then restated the rule after citations: "As this court has pointed out in Smoketree-Lake Murray, Ltd. v. Mills Concrete Construction Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1724, 1737 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 435 , the specificity of the language used is a key factor in construction of an indemnity agreemen

2006Indemnity provisions are to be strictly construed against the indemnitee, and had the parties intended to include an indemnity provision that would apply regardless of the subcontractor's negligence, they would have had to use specific, unequivocal contractual language to that effect." ( Ibid. ) The Heppler court then restated the rule after citations: "As this court has pointed out in Smoketree-Lake Murray, Ltd. v. Mills Concrete Construction Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1724, 1737 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 435 , the specificity of the language used is a key factor in construction of an indemnity agreemen

2006Indemnity provisions are to be strictly construed against the indemnitee, and had the parties intended to include an indemnity provision that would apply regardless of the subcontractor's negligence, they would have had to use specific, unequivocal contractual language to that effect." ( Ibid. ) The Heppler court then restated the rule after citations: "As this court has pointed out in Smoketree-Lake Murray, Ltd. v. Mills Concrete Construction Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1724, 1737 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 435 , the specificity of the language used is a key factor in construction of an indemnity agreemen

1985On an appeal from the granting of a peremptory writ of prohibition in Bowles v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574 [ 283 P.2d 704 ], this court deferred to the Court of Appeal's earlier determination of the inadequacy of legal remedy upon its issuance of an alternative writ and reached the merits of the controversy before it.

1985On an appeal from the granting of a peremptory writ of prohibition in Bowles v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574 [ 283 P.2d 704 ], this court deferred to the Court of Appeal's earlier determination of the inadequacy of legal remedy upon its issuance of an alternative writ and reached the merits of the controversy before it.

1983In fact, it specifically stated: “Informal procedures will suffice; in this context due process does not require a particular order of proof or mode of offering evidence.” (397 U.S., supra, at p. 269 [ 25 L.Ed.2d at p. 300 ].) We have found no case where the attorney-client privilege has been associated with a constitutionally based opportunity to be heard when civil interests such as the one here are involved. [Fn. omitted.] As we have discussed, the origins of the privilege are in the common law (see 8 Wigmore, supra, § 3390, pp. 542-545), and its current status is purely statutory, existing

1983In fact, it specifically stated: "Informal procedures will suffice; in this context due process does not require a particular order of proof or mode of offering evidence." (397 U.S., supra, at p. 269 [ 25 L.Ed.2d at p. 300 ].) We have found no case where the attorney-client privilege has been associated with a constitutionally based opportunity to be heard when civil interests such as the one here are involved. [Fn. omitted.] As we have discussed, the origins of the privilege are in the common law (see 8 Wigmore, supra, § 3390, pp. 542-545), and its current status is purely statutory, existing

1976The inception of the Crosby rule can be traced through People v. Hess (1951) 104 Cal. App.2d 642, 678 [ 234 P.2d 65 ], and People v. Ware (1924) 67 Cal. App. 81, 85 [ 226 P. 956 ], to Hyde v. United States (1912) 225 U.S. 347 [ 56 L.Ed. 1114 , 32 S.Ct. 793 ].

1976The inception of the Crosby rule can be traced through People v. Hess (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 642, 678 [ 234 P.2d 65 ], and People v. Ware (1924) 67 Cal.App. 81, 85 [ 226 P. 956 ], to Hyde v. United States (1912) 225 U.S. 347 [ 56 L.Ed. 1114 , 32 S.Ct. 793 ], In Hyde the defendants conspired to fraudulently secure title to numerous tracts of federal land in Oregon and California by way of a scheme involving separate transactions over a period of years.

1976The inception of the Crosby rule can be traced through People v. Hess (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 642, 678 [ 234 P.2d 65 ], and People v. Ware (1924) 67 Cal.App. 81, 85 [ 226 P. 956 ], to Hyde v. United States (1912) 225 U.S. 347 [ 56 L.Ed. 1114 , 32 S.Ct. 793 ], In Hyde the defendants conspired to fraudulently secure title to numerous tracts of federal land in Oregon and California by way of a scheme involving separate transactions over a period of years.

1976The inception of the Crosby rule can be traced through People v. Hess (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 642, 678 [ 234 P.2d 65 ], and People v. Ware (1924) 67 Cal.App. 81, 85 [ 226 P. 956 ], to Hyde v. United States (1912) 225 U.S. 347 [ 56 L.Ed. 1114 , 32 S.Ct. 793 ], In Hyde the defendants conspired to fraudulently secure title to numerous tracts of federal land in Oregon and California by way of a scheme involving separate transactions over a period of years.