party seeking immunity in Pennsylvania

2022In interpreting such clauses we listed as guiding standards that: 1) the contract language must be construed strictly, since exculpatory language is not favored by the law; 2) the contract must state the intention of the parties with the greatest particularity, beyond doubt by express stipulation, and no inference from words of general import can establish the intent of the parties; 3) the language of the contract must be construed, in cases of ambiguity, against the party seeking immunity from liability; and 4) the burden of establishing the immunity is upon the party invoking protection unde

2022In interpreting such clauses we listed as guiding standards that: 1) the contract language must be construed strictly, since exculpatory language is not favored by the law; 2) the contract must state the intention of the parties with the greatest particularity, beyond doubt by express stipulation, and no inference from words of general import can establish the intent of the parties; 3) the language of the contract must be construed, in cases of ambiguity, against the party seeking immunity from liability; and 4) the burden of establishing the immunity is upon the party invoking protection unde

2006A trial court must hear additional evidence only “where the party seeking the hearing demonstrates that the record is incomplete because the party was denied an opportunity to be heard fully, or because relevant testimony was offered and excluded.” In re Appeal of Little Britain Township, 651 A.2d 606, 613 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994).

2005Often, appellate opinions further clarify this general rule by noting that a trial court “faces compulsion to hear additional evidence in a zoning case only where the party seeking the hearing demonstrates that the record is incomplete because the party was denied an opportunity to be heard fully, or because relevant testimony was offered and excluded.” Eastern Consolidation, 701 A.2d at 624 (quoting In re Appeal of Little Britain Township, 651 A.2d 606, 613 (Pa. Commw. 1994)). (emphasis in original) Because the majority of appellate opinions on this issue consider challenges to the trial cour

2016In interpreting such clauses we listed as guiding standards that: 1) the contract language must be construed, strictly, since exculpatory language is not favored-by the. law; .2) the.contract must state the intention of the parties with the greatest particularity, beyond doubt, by express stipulation, and .no inference from words of general import -can establish the intent of the parties; 3) the language of contract must be construed, in cases of ambiguity, against the party seeking immunity from-liability; and 4) the burden of establishing the immunity is upon the party invoking protection un

2016In interpreting such clauses we listed as guiding standards that: 1) the contract language must be construed, strictly, since exculpatory language is not favored-by the. law; .2) the.contract must state the intention of the parties with the greatest particularity, beyond doubt, by express stipulation, and .no inference from words of general import -can establish the intent of the parties; 3) the language of contract must be construed, in cases of ambiguity, against the party seeking immunity from-liability; and 4) the burden of establishing the immunity is upon the party invoking protection un

2019A court is required to hear additional evidence pursuant to Section 1005-A only if “the party seeking the hearing demonstrates that the record is incomplete because the party was denied the opportunity to be heard fully, or because relevant testimony was offered and excluded.” Danwell Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Plymouth Twp., 540 A.2d 588, 590 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 554 A.2d 511 (Pa. 1988).

2008Section 1005-A of the MPC provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]f, upon motion, it is shown that proper consideration of the land use appeal requires the presentation of additional evidence, a judge of the court may hold a hearing to receive additional evidence.” 53 P.S. 11005-A. A trial court “faces compulsion to hear additional evidence in a zoning case only where the party seeking the hearing demonstrates that the record is incomplete because that party was denied the opportunity to be heard fully, or because relevant testimony was offered and excluded.” Danwell Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Boar

2021Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Ebaugh, 783 A.2d 846, 849 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).

2008Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Ebaugh, 783 A.2d 846, 849 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001).

2019"A [trial court] faces compulsion to hear additional evidence in a zoning case only where the party seeking the hearing demonstrates that the record is incomplete because the party was denied an opportunity to be heard fully, or because relevant testimony was offered and excluded." Eastern Consolidation & Distribution Services, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Hampden Township , 701 A.2d 621 , 624 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2005Often, appellate opinions further clarify this general rule by noting that a trial court “faces compulsion to hear additional evidence in a zoning case only where the party seeking the hearing demonstrates that the record is incomplete because the party was denied an opportunity to be heard fully, or because relevant testimony was offered and excluded.” Eastern Consolidation, 701 A.2d at 624 (quoting In re Appeal of Little Britain Township, 651 A.2d 606, 613 (Pa. Commw. 1994)). (emphasis in original) Because the majority of appellate opinions on this issue consider challenges to the trial cour

2019See, e.g., Topp Copy, 626 A.2d at 99 (1) the contract language must be construed strictly, since exculpatory language is not favored by the law; 2) the contract must state the intention of the parties with the greatest particularity, beyond doubt by express stipulation, and no inference from words of general import can establish the intent of the parties; 3) the language of the contract must be construed, in cases of ambiguity, against the party seeking immunity from liability; and 4) the burden of establishing the immunity is upon the party invoking protection under the clause). i. Ordinary N

2012In construing exculpatory clauses, we apply the standard set forth in Topp Copy Prods., Inc. v. Singletary, 583 Pa. 468 , 626 A.2d 98 (1993), which provides that, in order for exculpatory language to be enforceable: 1) the contract language must be construed strictly, since exculpatory language is not favored by the law; 2) the contract must state the intention of the parties with the greatest particularity, beyond doubt by express stipulation, and no inference from words of general import can establish the intent of the parties; 3) the language of the contract must be construed, in cases of a

2021Men’s Assoc., 224 A.2d 620, 623-24 (Pa. 1966) (exculpatory clauses construed against party seeking immunity; “If a party seeking immunity from liability for negligent conduct intends exculpation for past as well as future negligent conduct it is his obligation to express in the agreement such intent in an unequivocal manner; absent a clear expression of intent, the clause of exculpation will not be so construed.”).

1980In addition, even .if an exculpatory clause has general validity, the Supreme Court has established standards that must be met before it will relieve one from liability that the law would otherwise impose: (1) It must be strictly construed since it is not a favorite of the law. (2) It must spell out the contention of the parties with the greatest particularity so as to show an intent to release from liability beyond a reasonable doubt by express stipulation; no inference from words of general import can establish it. (3) It must be construed against the party seeking immunity. (4) The burden t

2025See Cintas Corp., 700 A.2d at 919 (“[I]f a party seeks to challenge the truth of factual averments in the record at the time judgment was entered, then the party should pursue a petition to open the judgment, not a petition to strike the judgment.”); Reaves v. Knauer, 979 A.2d 404, 409 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (“A party seeking to challenge the factual averments in the record at the time the judgment was entered should file a petition to open the judgment.”). 11 on appeal.”); Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 978 (Pa. 2013) (“It is a bedrock appellate principle that ‘issues not raised in the low

2019A party seeking to challenge the factual averments in the record at the time the judgment was entered should file a petition to open the judgment. -4- J-A28005-18 Cintas Corp. v. Lee's Cleaning Serv., Inc., 700 A.2d 915, 918 (Pa. 1997).

2025See Cintas Corp., 700 A.2d at 919 (“[I]f a party seeks to challenge the truth of factual averments in the record at the time judgment was entered, then the party should pursue a petition to open the judgment, not a petition to strike the judgment.”); Reaves v. Knauer, 979 A.2d 404, 409 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (“A party seeking to challenge the factual averments in the record at the time the judgment was entered should file a petition to open the judgment.”). 11 on appeal.”); Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 978 (Pa. 2013) (“It is a bedrock appellate principle that ‘issues not raised in the low

2025Reaves, 979 A.2d at 409 (internal citations omitted).

2020“A [trial] court faces compulsion to hear additional evidence in a zoning case only where the party seeking the hearing demonstrates that the record is incomplete because the party was denied an opportunity to be heard fully, or because relevant testimony was offered and excluded.” Caln Nether Co., L.P. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Thornbury Twp., 840 A.2d. 484, 498 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).

2005Caln Nether Company, LP v. Bd. of Supervisors of Thornbury Twp., 840 A.2d 484 (Pa.Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 579 Pa. 694 , 856 A.2d 835 (2004). .Where the trial court does not accept additional evidence our review is limited to determining whether the Board manifestly abused its discretion or committed an error of law.

2025See Cintas Corp., 700 A.2d at 919 (“[I]f a party seeks to challenge the truth of factual averments in the record at the time judgment was entered, then the party should pursue a petition to open the judgment, not a petition to strike the judgment.”); Reaves v. Knauer, 979 A.2d 404, 409 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (“A party seeking to challenge the factual averments in the record at the time the judgment was entered should file a petition to open the judgment.”). 11 on appeal.”); Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 978 (Pa. 2013) (“It is a bedrock appellate principle that ‘issues not raised in the low

2025See Cintas Corp., 700 A.2d at 919 (“[I]f a party seeks to challenge the truth of factual averments in the record at the time judgment was entered, then the party should pursue a petition to open the judgment, not a petition to strike the judgment.”); Reaves v. Knauer, 979 A.2d 404, 409 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (“A party seeking to challenge the factual averments in the record at the time the judgment was entered should file a petition to open the judgment.”). 11 on appeal.”); Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 978 (Pa. 2013) (“It is a bedrock appellate principle that ‘issues not raised in the low

2022Dist., 2 A.3d 712, 731 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (“A party seeking to bar re-litigation of a claim must show . . . (1) identity of the thing sued upon; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the persons or parties to the action; and, (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or sued.”) (emphasis added).

2021In Boron v. Pulaski Township Board of Supervisors, 960 A.2d 880, 886 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), this Court explained: Ordinances are presumed to be constitutional, and a heavy burden is placed on a party seeking to challenge the constitutionality of an ordinance.

2020Accord Papandrea v. Hartman, 507 A.2d 822 , 826 -7- J-A10014-20 (Pa.Super. 1986); Potenberg v. Varner, 424 A.2d 1370, 1372 (Pa.Super. 1981).

2020Accord Papandrea v. Hartman, 507 A.2d 822 , 826 -7- J-A10014-20 (Pa.Super. 1986); Potenberg v. Varner, 424 A.2d 1370, 1372 (Pa.Super. 1981).

2020See also Lockhart, supra at 1183 (holding that where the evidence does not conclusively establish that the party seeking the defense of the sudden emergency doctrine created the sudden emergency, the jury should be instructed on both the assured clear distance rule and the sudden emergency doctrine).

2017“The rule is well-established in Pennsylvania that the party seeking to challenge the competence of a witness has the burden of proving that the witness is not competent.” Commonwealth v. Stoner, 425 A.2d 1145, 1150 (Pa. Super. 1981) (citation omitted).

2015See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 603 Pa. 340 , 983 A.2d 1211, 1229 (2009) (noting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct must be preserved by contemporaneous objection); Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1) (providing that a party seeking to claim error in a ruling to admit evidence must make a “timely objection, motion to strike, or motion in limine ” and “states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context”). 8 C.

2015See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 603 Pa. 340 , 983 A.2d 1211, 1229 (2009) (noting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct must be preserved by contemporaneous objection); Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1) (providing that a party seeking to claim error in a ruling to admit evidence must make a “timely objection, motion to strike, or motion in limine ” and “states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context”). 8 C.

2015Cf. In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 892 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“In order to prevail, Father, as the party seeking recusal, must satisfy the burden ‘to produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist's ability to preside impartially.’”).