party seeking challenge in Texas

2013Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 106 S.W.3d at 722 .

2009Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. 2003).

2002See id.; Brook, 881 S.W.2d at 298 (“Before a nonparent may be appointed as sole managing conservator or two nonpar-ents as joint managing conservators, however, a higher standard must be satisfied, requiring proof that appointment of the parent or parents would significantly impair the child’s health or development.”) (quoting In re W.G.W., 812 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (“The party seeking to bar the natural parent from appointment as managing conservator! ] .... must prove that the appointment of the parent ... would significantly impair the child’s health o

2002See id.; Brook, 881 S.W.2d at 298 ("Before a nonparent may be appointed as sole managing conservator or two nonparents as joint managing conservators, however, a higher standard must be satisfied, requiring proof that appointment of the parent or parents would significantly impair the child's health or development.") (quoting In re W.G.W., 812 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) ("The party seeking to bar the natural parent from appointment as managing conservator[] .... must prove that the appointment of the parent ... would significantly impair the child's health or

2001Delc *85 ourt, 919 S.W.2d at 782 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)).

1998See Delcourt, 919 S.W.2d at 782 (court-appointed psychiatrist in child custody case who performed court-ordered custody evaluation and guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to section 11.10 of the Texas Family Code were entitled to absolute derived judicial immunity); Byrd, 891 S.W.2d at 708 (court refused to extend immunity to guardian ad litem since court held that ad litem was not an agent of the court).

1991Herrera v. Herrera, 409 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex.1966).

1991Herrera v. Herrera, 409 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex.1966).

2025Rylander v. Caldwell, 23 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.); see also L.L.C., Inc. v. Hegar, No. 13-21-00011-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 3927 , at *12 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 8, 2023, pet. denied).

2025Rylander v. Caldwell, 23 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.); see also L.L.C., Inc. v. Hegar, No. 13-21-00011-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 3927 , at *12 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 8, 2023, pet. denied).

2010See, e.g. , Williams v. State , 273 S.W.3d 200, 230 (Tex. Crim.

2010See, e.g., Williams v. State, 273 S.W.3d 200, 230 (Tex. Crim.

2002See id.; Brook, 881 S.W.2d at 298 (“Before a nonparent may be appointed as sole managing conservator or two nonpar-ents as joint managing conservators, however, a higher standard must be satisfied, requiring proof that appointment of the parent or parents would significantly impair the child’s health or development.”) (quoting In re W.G.W., 812 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (“The party seeking to bar the natural parent from appointment as managing conservator! ] .... must prove that the appointment of the parent ... would significantly impair the child’s health o

2002See id.; Brook, 881 S.W.2d at 298 ("Before a nonparent may be appointed as sole managing conservator or two nonparents as joint managing conservators, however, a higher standard must be satisfied, requiring proof that appointment of the parent or parents would significantly impair the child's health or development.") (quoting In re W.G.W., 812 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) ("The party seeking to bar the natural parent from appointment as managing conservator[] .... must prove that the appointment of the parent ... would significantly impair the child's health or

1998See Delcourt, 919 S.W.2d at 782 (court-appointed psychiatrist in child custody case who performed court-ordered custody evaluation and guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to section 11.10 of the Texas Family Code were entitled to absolute derived judicial immunity); Byrd, 891 S.W.2d at 708 (court refused to extend immunity to guardian ad litem since court held that ad litem was not an agent of the court).

1998See Delcourt , 919 S.W.2d at 782 (court-appointed psychiatrist in child custody case who performed court-ordered custody evaluation and guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to section 11.10 of the Texas Family Code were entitled to absolute derived judicial immunity); Byrd , 891 S.W.2d at 708 (court refused to extend immunity to guardian ad litem since court held that ad litem was not an agent of the court).

1995Moore, 882 S.W.2d at 848 ; Kelley v. State, 817 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex.App. — Austin 1991, pet. ref'd).

1994See Kelley v. State, 817 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex.App. — Austin 1991, pet. ref'd.).

2021State v. Rosseau, 396 S.W.3d 550, 557 (Tex. Crim.

2019Rosseau, 396 S.W.3d at 557 .

1994Connors v. Connors, 796 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1990, writ denied); see also Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d at 167 ; In re W.G.W., 812 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (“The party seeking to bar the natural parent from appointment as managing eonservator[ ]_must prove that the appointment of the parent ... would significantly impair the child’s health or emotional development.”).

1991Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d at 166 ; Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 14.01(b)(1).

2011Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 806-07 (Tex. 1968).

1983Englander Co., Inc. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.1968); Campbell v. Skidmore, 1 Tex. 475 (1846).

2025Pipgras v. Hart, 832 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).

2022See In re E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 289 S.W.3d 861, 861-62 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding).

2022See id. (a municipality’s order becomes final upon the expiration of the thirty-calendar-day period); City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 579 (Tex. 2012) (noting that a party seeking to challenge a municipality’s nuisance determination on constitutional grounds “must first exhaust its administrative remedies and comply with jurisdictional prerequisites for suit”); Fox v. Wardy, 318 S.W.3d 449, 453 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied) (the filing of a petition under Section 214.0012 is a prerequisite to invoking the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the proceeding).

2022See id. (a municipality’s order becomes final upon the expiration of the thirty-calendar-day period); City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 579 (Tex. 2012) (noting that a party seeking to challenge a municipality’s nuisance determination on constitutional grounds “must first exhaust its administrative remedies and comply with jurisdictional prerequisites for suit”); Fox v. Wardy, 318 S.W.3d 449, 453 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied) (the filing of a petition under Section 214.0012 is a prerequisite to invoking the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the proceeding).

2019Prior use easements A party seeking to claim a prior use easement must prove: “(1) unity of ownership of the alleged dominant and servient estates prior to severance; (2) the use of the claimed easement was open and apparent at the time of severance; (3) the use was continuous, so the parties must have intended that its use pass by 7 grant; and (4) the use must be necessary to the use of the dominant estate.” Hamrick v. Ward, 446 S.W.3d 377, 383 (Tex. 2014) (citing Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, 364 S.W.2d 196 , 207–08 (Tex. 1962)) 3.

2018See In re Laibe, 307 S.W.3d at 318 .

2016In Weingarten Realty Management Company v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, this court created a "very narrow exception to the eight-corners rule” that applies ‘‘only when an insurer establishes by extrinsic evidence that a party seeking a defense is a stranger to the policy and could not be entitled to a defense under any set of facts.” 343 S.W.3d 859, 86-5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (emphasis added).

2013See id.

2011Orsborn , 267 S.W.2d at 787 (“No matter how exclusive and hostile to the true owner the possession may be in appearance, it cannot be adverse unless accompanied by the intent on the part of the occupant to make it so.”) It is true that a party seeking to claim land by adverse possession must demonstrate an intent to claim the land; however, the requisite “intent” is not to take title to another’s property but an intent to claim the land, as demonstrated by “external circumstances.” Id . “[A]dverse possession is not dependent on the possessor’s intent to assert title hostile to a known true own