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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1939–1969 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
LaPorte v. Houstongreen2 sentences1969(In support thereof, Ford cites, inter alia, Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 442 [ 247 P.2d 344 ]; and La Porte v. Houston, 33 Cal.2d 167, 169-170 [ 199 P.2d 665 ].) Ford argues that there is no evidence that the automobile herein was in the possession or control of Ford after the date (April 4, 1962) when it was sold, and “no evidence that the car was not actually in Park Lock whenever the driver placed the selector in that position at any time between that date and the happening of the accident on September 28, 1962, nor at any time thereafter”; and therefore “It cannot be sa 1969(In support thereof, Ford cites, inter alia, Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 442 [ 247 P.2d 344 ]; and La Porte v. Houston, 33 Cal.2d 167, 169-170 [ 199 P.2d 665 ].) Ford argues that there is no evidence that the automobile herein was in the possession or control of Ford after the date (April 4, 1962) when it was sold, and “no evidence that the car was not actually in Park Lock whenever the driver placed the selector in that position at any time between that date and the happening of the accident on September 28, 1962, nor at any time thereafter”; and therefore “It cannot be sa | 1 | 1 |
Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.green2 sentences1969(In support thereof, Ford cites, inter alia, Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 442 [ 247 P.2d 344 ]; and La Porte v. Houston, 33 Cal.2d 167, 169-170 [ 199 P.2d 665 ].) Ford argues that there is no evidence that the automobile herein was in the possession or control of Ford after the date (April 4, 1962) when it was sold, and “no evidence that the car was not actually in Park Lock whenever the driver placed the selector in that position at any time between that date and the happening of the accident on September 28, 1962, nor at any time thereafter”; and therefore “It cannot be sa 1969(In support thereof, Ford cites, inter alia, Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 442 [ 247 P.2d 344 ]; and La Porte v. Houston, 33 Cal.2d 167, 169-170 [ 199 P.2d 665 ].) Ford argues that there is no evidence that the automobile herein was in the possession or control of Ford after the date (April 4, 1962) when it was sold, and “no evidence that the car was not actually in Park Lock whenever the driver placed the selector in that position at any time between that date and the happening of the accident on September 28, 1962, nor at any time thereafter”; and therefore “It cannot be sa | 1 | 1 |
Faulk v. Soberanesgreen1 sentence1965For this reason alone, its improper plural phraseology would justify its rejection as to both respondents. ( Williams v. Cole, supra, 181 Cal. App.2d 70 , 73 and cases cited; and see Faulk v. Soberanes, supra, 56 Cal.2d 466, 470, 471 ; and Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, supra, 50 Cal.2d 153 , 158 and cf. Keena v. Scales (1964) 61 Cal.2d 779, 783 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 65 , 394 P.2d 809 ] as to the adequacy of an instruction. [15] It is urged that the "mere fact" instruction was erroneously applied to him as his loss of control of his vehicle was a fact which gave rise to the doctrine of res ipsa lo | 1 | 1 |
Keena v. Scalesgreen2 sentences1965For this reason alone, its improper plural phraseology would justify its rejection as to both respondents. ( Williams v. Cole, supra, 181 Cal. App.2d 70 , 73 and cases cited; and see Faulk v. Soberanes, supra, 56 Cal.2d 466, 470, 471 ; and Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, supra, 50 Cal.2d 153 , 158 and cf. Keena v. Scales (1964) 61 Cal.2d 779, 783 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 65 , 394 P.2d 809 ] as to the adequacy of an instruction. [15] It is urged that the "mere fact" instruction was erroneously applied to him as his loss of control of his vehicle was a fact which gave rise to the doctrine of res ipsa lo 1965For this reason alone, its improper plural phraseology would justify its rejection as to both respondents. ( Williams v. Cole, supra, 181 Cal. App.2d 70 , 73 and cases cited; and see Faulk v. Soberanes, supra, 56 Cal.2d 466, 470, 471 ; and Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, supra, 50 Cal.2d 153 , 158 and cf. Keena v. Scales (1964) 61 Cal.2d 779, 783 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 65 , 394 P.2d 809 ] as to the adequacy of an instruction. [15] It is urged that the "mere fact" instruction was erroneously applied to him as his loss of control of his vehicle was a fact which gave rise to the doctrine of res ipsa lo | 1 | 1 |
Cho v. Kemplergreen1 sentence1962As said in Cho v. Kempler, supra, 177 Cal.App.2d at page 348, quoting from Wolfsmith v. Marsh, supra, 51 Cal.2d 832 , “ ‘ [t]he conclusion that negligence is the most likely explanation of an accident or injury is not for the trial court to draw or refuse to draw so long as plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to permit the jury to draw the inference of negligence, though the court itself would not draw that inference. ’ ” *597 Defendant hospital contends that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable because “The evidence showed that the specific cause of the paralyzed foot w | 1 | 1 |
Poovey v. International Sugar Feed No. Two Co.green2 sentences1958Since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable *223 and there was a total absence of any evidence of negligence upon the part of either defendant, the nonsuit was properly granted. [6] Second: Was there a breach of warranty upon the part of Arden? [1] No. There was no evidence that the bottle was defective when delivered by Arden to plaintiff, and therefore there is no basis for claiming any breach of warranty. [7] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty. ( Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Portland Corda 1958Since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable *223 and there was a total absence of any evidence of negligence upon the part of either defendant, the nonsuit was properly granted. [6] Second: Was there a breach of warranty upon the part of Arden? [1] No. There was no evidence that the bottle was defective when delivered by Arden to plaintiff, and therefore there is no basis for claiming any breach of warranty. [7] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty. ( Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Portland Corda | 1 | 1 |
Gerber v. Fabergreen2 sentences1958Since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable *223 and there was a total absence of any evidence of negligence upon the part of either defendant, the nonsuit was properly granted. [6] Second: Was there a breach of warranty upon the part of Arden? [1] No. There was no evidence that the bottle was defective when delivered by Arden to plaintiff, and therefore there is no basis for claiming any breach of warranty. [7] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty. ( Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Portland Corda 1958Since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable *223 and there was a total absence of any evidence of negligence upon the part of either defendant, the nonsuit was properly granted. [6] Second: Was there a breach of warranty upon the part of Arden? [1] No. There was no evidence that the bottle was defective when delivered by Arden to plaintiff, and therefore there is no basis for claiming any breach of warranty. [7] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty. ( Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Portland Corda | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1966The doctrine of strict liability in tort on the part of a manufacturer or retailer is set forth in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 ], and Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256 [ 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 , 391 P.2d 168 ]. 1966The doctrine of strict liability in tort on the part of a manufacturer or retailer is set forth in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 ], and Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256 [ 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 , 391 P.2d 168 ]. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences1966The doctrine of strict liability in tort on the part of a manufacturer or retailer is set forth in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 ], and Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256 [ 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 , 391 P.2d 168 ]. 1966The doctrine of strict liability in tort on the part of a manufacturer or retailer is set forth in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 ], and Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256 [ 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 , 391 P.2d 168 ]. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Di Mare v. Cresci
green
2 sentences1965The court relied, no doubt, on opinions containing general expressions to this effect, but these eases were specifically disapproved insofar as they differ from the rule expressed in Di Mare v. Cresci, 58 Cal.2d 292 , at page 299 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 373 P.2d 860 ], that: “The introduction of evidence of specific acts of negligence does not deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of the doctrine unless the facts as to the cause of the accident and the care exercised by the defendant are shown as a matter of law thus eliminating any justification for resort to the inference of negligence.’’ Had pl 1965The court relied, no doubt, on opinions containing general expressions to this effect, but these eases were specifically disapproved insofar as they differ from the rule expressed in Di Mare v. Cresci, 58 Cal.2d 292 , at page 299 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 373 P.2d 860 ], that: “The introduction of evidence of specific acts of negligence does not deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of the doctrine unless the facts as to the cause of the accident and the care exercised by the defendant are shown as a matter of law thus eliminating any justification for resort to the inference of negligence.’’ Had pl | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines
green
1 sentence1965For this reason alone, its improper plural phraseology would justify its rejection as to both respondents. ( Williams v. Cole, supra, 181 Cal. App.2d 70 , 73 and cases cited; and see Faulk v. Soberanes, supra, 56 Cal.2d 466, 470, 471 ; and Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, supra, 50 Cal.2d 153 , 158 and cf. Keena v. Scales (1964) 61 Cal.2d 779, 783 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 65 , 394 P.2d 809 ] as to the adequacy of an instruction. [15] It is urged that the "mere fact" instruction was erroneously applied to him as his loss of control of his vehicle was a fact which gave rise to the doctrine of res ipsa lo | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Williams v. Cole
green
1 sentence1965For this reason alone, its improper plural phraseology would justify its rejection as to both respondents. ( Williams v. Cole, supra, 181 Cal. App.2d 70 , 73 and cases cited; and see Faulk v. Soberanes, supra, 56 Cal.2d 466, 470, 471 ; and Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, supra, 50 Cal.2d 153 , 158 and cf. Keena v. Scales (1964) 61 Cal.2d 779, 783 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 65 , 394 P.2d 809 ] as to the adequacy of an instruction. [15] It is urged that the "mere fact" instruction was erroneously applied to him as his loss of control of his vehicle was a fact which gave rise to the doctrine of res ipsa lo | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Wolfsmith v. Marsh
green
1 sentence1962As said in Cho v. Kempler, supra, 177 Cal.App.2d at page 348, quoting from Wolfsmith v. Marsh, supra, 51 Cal.2d 832 , “ ‘ [t]he conclusion that negligence is the most likely explanation of an accident or injury is not for the trial court to draw or refuse to draw so long as plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to permit the jury to draw the inference of negligence, though the court itself would not draw that inference. ’ ” *597 Defendant hospital contends that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable because “The evidence showed that the specific cause of the paralyzed foot w | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Port. Cordage Co.
green
1 sentence1958Since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable *223 and there was a total absence of any evidence of negligence upon the part of either defendant, the nonsuit was properly granted. [6] Second: Was there a breach of warranty upon the part of Arden? [1] No. There was no evidence that the bottle was defective when delivered by Arden to plaintiff, and therefore there is no basis for claiming any breach of warranty. [7] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty. ( Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Portland Corda | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Stonebrink v. Highland Motors, Inc.
green
2 sentences1958Since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable *223 and there was a total absence of any evidence of negligence upon the part of either defendant, the nonsuit was properly granted. [6] Second: Was there a breach of warranty upon the part of Arden? [1] No. There was no evidence that the bottle was defective when delivered by Arden to plaintiff, and therefore there is no basis for claiming any breach of warranty. [7] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty. ( Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Portland Corda 1958Since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable *223 and there was a total absence of any evidence of negligence upon the part of either defendant, the nonsuit was properly granted. [6] Second: Was there a breach of warranty upon the part of Arden? [1] No. There was no evidence that the bottle was defective when delivered by Arden to plaintiff, and therefore there is no basis for claiming any breach of warranty. [7] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty. ( Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Portland Corda | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Engelking v. Carlson
green
1 sentence1955It quoted (p. 804) with approval from Engelking v. Carlson, supra, 13 Cal.2d 216 , 221: “ ‘Here what was done lies outside the realm of the layman’s experience. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Smith v. McClary
green
2 sentences1944(See Porter v. Rasmussen, 127 Cal.App. 405 [ 15 P.2d 888 ]; Jiamou v. Pickwick Stages System, 111 Cal.App. 754 [ 296 P. 108 ] ; Smith v. McClary, 28 Cal.App.2d 468 [ 82 P.2d 712 ] ; Queirolo v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 114 Cal.App. 610 [ 300 P. 487 ] ; Connor v. Atchison etc. Ry. 1944(See Porter v. Rasmussen, 127 Cal.App. 405 [ 15 P.2d 888 ]; Jiamou v. Pickwick Stages System, 111 Cal.App. 754 [ 296 P. 108 ] ; Smith v. McClary, 28 Cal.App.2d 468 [ 82 P.2d 712 ] ; Queirolo v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 114 Cal.App. 610 [ 300 P. 487 ] ; Connor v. Atchison etc. Ry. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Jianou v. Pickwick Stages System
green
2 sentences1944(See Porter v. Rasmussen, 127 Cal.App. 405 [ 15 P.2d 888 ]; Jiamou v. Pickwick Stages System, 111 Cal.App. 754 [ 296 P. 108 ] ; Smith v. McClary, 28 Cal.App.2d 468 [ 82 P.2d 712 ] ; Queirolo v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 114 Cal.App. 610 [ 300 P. 487 ] ; Connor v. Atchison etc. Ry. 1944(See Porter v. Rasmussen, 127 Cal.App. 405 [ 15 P.2d 888 ]; Jiamou v. Pickwick Stages System, 111 Cal.App. 754 [ 296 P. 108 ] ; Smith v. McClary, 28 Cal.App.2d 468 [ 82 P.2d 712 ] ; Queirolo v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 114 Cal.App. 610 [ 300 P. 487 ] ; Connor v. Atchison etc. Ry. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Queirolo v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
green
2 sentences1944(See Porter v. Rasmussen, 127 Cal.App. 405 [ 15 P.2d 888 ]; Jiamou v. Pickwick Stages System, 111 Cal.App. 754 [ 296 P. 108 ] ; Smith v. McClary, 28 Cal.App.2d 468 [ 82 P.2d 712 ] ; Queirolo v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 114 Cal.App. 610 [ 300 P. 487 ] ; Connor v. Atchison etc. Ry. 1944(See Porter v. Rasmussen, 127 Cal.App. 405 [ 15 P.2d 888 ]; Jiamou v. Pickwick Stages System, 111 Cal.App. 754 [ 296 P. 108 ] ; Smith v. McClary, 28 Cal.App.2d 468 [ 82 P.2d 712 ] ; Queirolo v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 114 Cal.App. 610 [ 300 P. 487 ] ; Connor v. Atchison etc. Ry. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Porter v. Rasmussen
neutral
2 sentences1944(See Porter v. Rasmussen, 127 Cal.App. 405 [ 15 P.2d 888 ]; Jiamou v. Pickwick Stages System, 111 Cal.App. 754 [ 296 P. 108 ] ; Smith v. McClary, 28 Cal.App.2d 468 [ 82 P.2d 712 ] ; Queirolo v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 114 Cal.App. 610 [ 300 P. 487 ] ; Connor v. Atchison etc. Ry. 1944(See Porter v. Rasmussen, 127 Cal.App. 405 [ 15 P.2d 888 ]; Jiamou v. Pickwick Stages System, 111 Cal.App. 754 [ 296 P. 108 ] ; Smith v. McClary, 28 Cal.App.2d 468 [ 82 P.2d 712 ] ; Queirolo v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 114 Cal.App. 610 [ 300 P. 487 ] ; Connor v. Atchison etc. Ry. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Hubbert v. Aztec Brewing Co.
green
1 sentence1939(Hubbert v. Aztec Brewing Co., 26 Cal. App. (2d) 664, 688-690 [ 80 Pac. (2d) 185, 1016 ].) We note that the plaintiffs contend the Hubbert case and the other authorities relied on by the defendant are not applicable because in the instant case the decedent, Manuel Peters, did not have the manual management and control of the tank. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.