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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coleman v. Gulf Insurance Groupgreen2 sentences1990Group, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 793-794; Bertero v. National General Corp., supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 52-53.) Courts “have long ‘refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense’ ” (Coleman, supra, at p. 794, fn. 9 , quoting Bertero, supra, at p. 52 ) because creation of such a tort would jeopardize the “right of a defendant, involuntarily haled into court, to conduct a vigorous defense.” (Bertero, supra, at p. 52 , citing Eastin v. Bank of Stockton (1884) 66 Cal. 123 [ 4 P. 1106 ] and Ritter v. Ritter (1943) 381 I11. 549 [ 46 N.E.2d 41 ].) However, when as in Bertero a defendant goes beyond pure 1990Group, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 793-794; Bertero v. National General Corp., supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 52-53.) Courts “have long ‘refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense’ ” (Coleman, supra, at p. 794, fn. 9 , quoting Bertero, supra, at p. 52 ) because creation of such a tort would jeopardize the “right of a defendant, involuntarily haled into court, to conduct a vigorous defense.” (Bertero, supra, at p. 52 , citing Eastin v. Bank of Stockton (1884) 66 Cal. 123 [ 4 P. 1106 ] and Ritter v. Ritter (1943) 381 I11. 549 [ 46 N.E.2d 41 ].) However, when as in Bertero a defendant goes beyond pure | 3 | 3 |
Zamos v. Stroudgreen2 sentences2017(See Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 960, 965-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ] [malicious prosecution action can *920 be based on continuing, as well as initiating, an action]; Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 580-582 [ 311 P.2d 494 ] [malicious prosecution action can be based on an administrative proceeding]; but see Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 52 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 ] [“[C]ourts have refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense.”].) Nevertheless, an arrest does not fit within this definition. 2017(See Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 960, 965-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ] [malicious prosecution action can *920 be based on continuing, as well as initiating, an action]; Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 580-582 [ 311 P.2d 494 ] [malicious prosecution action can be based on an administrative proceeding]; but see Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 52 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 ] [“[C]ourts have refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense.”].) Nevertheless, an arrest does not fit within this definition. | 2 | 2 |
Bertero v. National General Corp.green2 sentences2017(See Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 960, 965-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ] [malicious prosecution action can *920 be based on continuing, as well as initiating, an action]; Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 580-582 [ 311 P.2d 494 ] [malicious prosecution action can be based on an administrative proceeding]; but see Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 52 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 ] [“[C]ourts have refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense.”].) Nevertheless, an arrest does not fit within this definition. 2017(See Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 960, 965-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ] [malicious prosecution action can *920 be based on continuing, as well as initiating, an action]; Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 580-582 [ 311 P.2d 494 ] [malicious prosecution action can be based on an administrative proceeding]; but see Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 52 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 ] [“[C]ourts have refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense.”].) Nevertheless, an arrest does not fit within this definition. | 1 | 6 |
Hardy v. Vialgreen2 sentences2017(See Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 960, 965-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ] [malicious prosecution action can *920 be based on continuing, as well as initiating, an action]; Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 580-582 [ 311 P.2d 494 ] [malicious prosecution action can be based on an administrative proceeding]; but see Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 52 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 ] [“[C]ourts have refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense.”].) Nevertheless, an arrest does not fit within this definition. 2017(See Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 960, 965-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ] [malicious prosecution action can *920 be based on continuing, as well as initiating, an action]; Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 580-582 [ 311 P.2d 494 ] [malicious prosecution action can be based on an administrative proceeding]; but see Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 52 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 ] [“[C]ourts have refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense.”].) Nevertheless, an arrest does not fit within this definition. | 1 | 2 |
Merlet v. Rizzogreen1 sentence2023(See Merlet, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 59 [“Courts have concluded that subsidiary procedural actions or purely defensive actions cannot be the basis for malicious prosecution claims.”].) Sacor cannot be liable for opposing Larsen’s motion to vacate because courts “have long ‘refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense’[.] ” (Coleman v. Gulf Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Aranson v. Schroedergreen2 sentences2010Co. (2008) 119 Haw. 403 [ 198 P.3d 666 ]; see also generally Aranson v. Schroeder (1995) 140 N.H. 359 [ 671 A.2d 1023 ] [adopting malicious defense tort].) [17] As plaintiffs prevailed in the underlying action, I do not question their conduct. 2010Co. (2008) 119 Haw. 403 [ 198 P.3d 666 ]; see also generally Aranson v. Schroeder (1995) 140 N.H. 359 [ 671 A.2d 1023 ] [adopting malicious defense tort].) [17] As plaintiffs prevailed in the underlying action, I do not question their conduct. | 1 | 1 |
California Physicians' Service v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2010Co., supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 478 .) [15] I concede that if there is probable cause for one cause of action, it would be more difficult to establish malice for an alternative cause of action lacking probable cause. [16] A tort of malicious defense is recognized in few jurisdictions. ( California Physicians' Service v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1325 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 95 ]; Young v. Allstate Ins. 2010Co., supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 478 .) [15] I concede that if there is probable cause for one cause of action, it would be more difficult to establish malice for an alternative cause of action lacking probable cause. [16] A tort of malicious defense is recognized in few jurisdictions. ( California Physicians' Service v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1325 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 95 ]; Young v. Allstate Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bertero v. National General Corp.green2 sentences2017(See Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 960, 965-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ] [malicious prosecution action can *920 be based on continuing, as well as initiating, an action]; Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 580-582 [ 311 P.2d 494 ] [malicious prosecution action can be based on an administrative proceeding]; but see Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 52 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 ] [“[C]ourts have refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense.”].) Nevertheless, an arrest does not fit within this definition. 2017(See Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 960, 965-970 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 87 P.3d 802 ] [malicious prosecution action can *920 be based on continuing, as well as initiating, an action]; Hardy v. Vial (1957) 48 Cal.2d 577, 580-582 [ 311 P.2d 494 ] [malicious prosecution action can be based on an administrative proceeding]; but see Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 52 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 529 P.2d 608 ] [“[C]ourts have refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense.”].) Nevertheless, an arrest does not fit within this definition. | 2 | 6 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Eastin v. Bank of Stockton
green
2 sentences1990Group, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 793-794; Bertero v. National General Corp., supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 52-53.) Courts “have long ‘refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense’ ” (Coleman, supra, at p. 794, fn. 9 , quoting Bertero, supra, at p. 52 ) because creation of such a tort would jeopardize the “right of a defendant, involuntarily haled into court, to conduct a vigorous defense.” (Bertero, supra, at p. 52 , citing Eastin v. Bank of Stockton (1884) 66 Cal. 123 [ 4 P. 1106 ] and Ritter v. Ritter (1943) 381 I11. 549 [ 46 N.E.2d 41 ].) However, when as in Bertero a defendant goes beyond pure 1990Group, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 793-794; Bertero v. National General Corp., supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 52-53.) Courts “have long ‘refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense’ ” (Coleman, supra, at p. 794, fn. 9 , quoting Bertero, supra, at p. 52 ) because creation of such a tort would jeopardize the “right of a defendant, involuntarily haled into court, to conduct a vigorous defense.” (Bertero, supra, at p. 52 , citing Eastin v. Bank of Stockton (1884) 66 Cal. 123 [ 4 P. 1106 ] and Ritter v. Ritter (1943) 381 I11. 549 [ 46 N.E.2d 41 ].) However, when as in Bertero a defendant goes beyond pure | 3 | 1974–1990 |
Ritter v. Ritter
green
2 sentences1990Group, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 793-794; Bertero v. National General Corp., supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 52-53.) Courts “have long ‘refused to recognize a tort of malicious defense’ ” (Coleman, supra, at p. 794, fn. 9 , quoting Bertero, supra, at p. 52 ) because creation of such a tort would jeopardize the “right of a defendant, involuntarily haled into court, to conduct a vigorous defense.” (Bertero, supra, at p. 52 , citing Eastin v. Bank of Stockton (1884) 66 Cal. 123 [ 4 P. 1106 ] and Ritter v. Ritter (1943) 381 I11. 549 [ 46 N.E.2d 41 ].) However, when as in Bertero a defendant goes beyond pure 1974(See Ritter v. Ritter (1943) 381 Ill. 549 [ 46 N.E. 2d 41 ] and cases cited therein.) We do not propose to establish such a tort by our holding here. | 2 | 1974–1990 |
Idell v. Goodman
green
1 sentence2023Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782, 794, fn. 9 , quoting Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 52 (Bertero).) And unlike in Bertero, Sacor did not go “beyond purely defensive measures and file[] a cross-complaint,” thereby “ ‘seeking affirmative relief’ ” and taking “ ‘the offensive in attempting to prosecute a cause of action of [its] own.’ ” (Idell v. Goodman (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 262, 272 , citing Bertero, at p. 53.) Sacor also cannot be subject to a malicious prosecution suit for filing its motion to set aside the order vacating the judgment. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Downey Venture v. LMI Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2010Co., supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 478 .) [15] I concede that if there is probable cause for one cause of action, it would be more difficult to establish malice for an alternative cause of action lacking probable cause. [16] A tort of malicious defense is recognized in few jurisdictions. ( California Physicians' Service v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1325 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 95 ]; Young v. Allstate Ins. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Young v. Allstate Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2010Co. (2008) 119 Haw. 403 [ 198 P.3d 666 ]; see also generally Aranson v. Schroeder (1995) 140 N.H. 359 [ 671 A.2d 1023 ] [adopting malicious defense tort].) [17] As plaintiffs prevailed in the underlying action, I do not question their conduct. 2010Co. (2008) 119 Haw. 403 [ 198 P.3d 666 ]; see also generally Aranson v. Schroeder (1995) 140 N.H. 359 [ 671 A.2d 1023 ] [adopting malicious defense tort].) [17] As plaintiffs prevailed in the underlying action, I do not question their conduct. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Beverly Bail Bonds
green
1 sentence1986See generally Eisenberg, Sanctions on Appeal: A Survey and a Proposal for Computation Guidelines (1985) 20 U.S.F.L.Rev. 13.) [8] Bertero succinctly noted the elements necessary to establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution of a civil proceeding: "[A] plaintiff must plead and prove that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff's, favor [citations]; (2) was brought without probable cause [citations]; and (3) was initiated with malice [citations]." ( Ibid. ) [9] Bertero noted that courts have lon | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.