witness who invokes privilege in California

1995In Price v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 836, 843 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 463 P.2d 721 ], the court stated that the defendant’s burden to establish materiality under section 1042 is discharged “1 “when defendant demonstrates a reasonable possibility that the anonymous informant whose identity is sought could give evidence on the issue of guilt which might result in defendant’s exoneration.” ’ ” To meet the requirement of reasonable possibility of exoneration, the court in People v. Walker, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at page 238 , required some showing that there was some point within the area survei

1995In Price v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 836, 843 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 463 P.2d 721 ], the court stated that the defendant’s burden to establish materiality under section 1042 is discharged “1 “when defendant demonstrates a reasonable possibility that the anonymous informant whose identity is sought could give evidence on the issue of guilt which might result in defendant’s exoneration.” ’ ” To meet the requirement of reasonable possibility of exoneration, the court in People v. Walker, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at page 238 , required some showing that there was some point within the area survei

2017At that hearing, the prosecution may offer evidence that discloses the *621 informant’s identity “to aid the court in its determination whether there is a reasonable possibility that nondisclosure might deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” (§ 1042, subd. (d).) After the hearings, the court “shall not order disclosure, nor strike the testimony of the witness who invokes the privilege, nor dismiss the criminal proceeding, if the party offering the witness refuses to disclose the identity of the informant, unless, based upon the evidence presented at . . . [the hearings], the court concludes t

2017At that hearing, the prosecution may offer evidence that discloses the *621 informant’s identity “to aid the court in its determination whether there is a reasonable possibility that nondisclosure might deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” (§ 1042, subd. (d).) After the hearings, the court “shall not order disclosure, nor strike the testimony of the witness who invokes the privilege, nor dismiss the criminal proceeding, if the party offering the witness refuses to disclose the identity of the informant, unless, based upon the evidence presented at . . . [the hearings], the court concludes t

2016Code, § 1042, subd. (d).) Evidence Code section 1042 does not state that a defendant may request an in camera hearing.2 (In re Benny S. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 102, 107 ; People v. Ingram (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 832, 840 .) In any event, “[i]t is incumbent on the defendant to make a prima facie showing for disclosure before an in camera hearing is appropriate.” (People v. Oppel (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1146, 1152 (Oppel); see People v. Fried (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1314-1315 (Fried).) Where the defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for disclosure of a confidential informant’

2016Code, § 1042, subd. (d).) Evidence Code section 1042 does not state that a defendant may request an in camera hearing.2 (In re Benny S. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 102, 107 ; People v. Ingram (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 832, 840 .) In any event, “[i]t is incumbent on the defendant to make a prima facie showing for disclosure before an in camera hearing is appropriate.” (People v. Oppel (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1146, 1152 (Oppel); see People v. Fried (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1314-1315 (Fried).) Where the defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for disclosure of a confidential informant’

2014Code, § 913, subd. (a); People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743 ), the jury was improperly permitted to infer defendant’s guilt from Finch’s silence. 6 But a witness may not refuse to testify based on the privilege against self- incrimination if he or she has been given immunity that is “coextensive with the scope of the privilege.” (Kastigar v. United States (1972) 406 U.S. 441, 449 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 212, 219 ]; cf. People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 305 [“Use of incriminating statements must be forbidden, as by a grant of immunity, and not merely unlikely, before the court may force a w

2014Code, § 913, subd. (a); People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743 ), the jury was improperly permitted to infer defendant’s guilt from Finch’s silence. 6 But a witness may not refuse to testify based on the privilege against self- incrimination if he or she has been given immunity that is “coextensive with the scope of the privilege.” (Kastigar v. United States (1972) 406 U.S. 441, 449 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 212, 219 ]; cf. People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 305 [“Use of incriminating statements must be forbidden, as by a grant of immunity, and not merely unlikely, before the court may force a w

2014Code, § 913, subd. (a); People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743 ), the jury was improperly permitted to infer defendant’s guilt from Finch’s silence. 6 But a witness may not refuse to testify based on the privilege against self- incrimination if he or she has been given immunity that is “coextensive with the scope of the privilege.” (Kastigar v. United States (1972) 406 U.S. 441, 449 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 212, 219 ]; cf. People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 305 [“Use of incriminating statements must be forbidden, as by a grant of immunity, and not merely unlikely, before the court may force a w

2014Code, § 1042, subd. (d).) Following the hearing, “[t]he court shall not order disclosure, nor strike the testimony of the witness who invokes the privilege, nor dismiss the criminal proceeding, if the party offering the witness refuses to disclose the identity of the informant, unless, based upon the evidence presented at the hearing held in the presence of the defendant and his counsel and the evidence presented at the in camera hearing, the court concludes that there is a reasonable possibility that nondisclosure might deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” (Ibid.) “An informant is a materi

1995(People v. Walker (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 230, 236 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 12 ].) Under section 1042, subdivision (d), “[t]he court shall not order disclosure, nor strike the testimony of the witness who invokes the privilege, nor dismiss the criminal proceeding, if the party offering the witness refuses *154 to disclose the identity of the informant, unless, based upon the evidence presented at the hearing held in the presence of the defendant and his counsel and the evidence presented at the in camera hearing, the court concludes that there is a reasonable possibility that nondisclosure might deprive

1995(People v. Walker (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 230, 236 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 12 ].) Under section 1042, subdivision (d), “[t]he court shall not order disclosure, nor strike the testimony of the witness who invokes the privilege, nor dismiss the criminal proceeding, if the party offering the witness refuses *154 to disclose the identity of the informant, unless, based upon the evidence presented at the hearing held in the presence of the defendant and his counsel and the evidence presented at the in camera hearing, the court concludes that there is a reasonable possibility that nondisclosure might deprive

1995(People v. Walker (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 230, 236 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 12 ].) Under section 1042, subdivision (d), “[t]he court shall not order disclosure, nor strike the testimony of the witness who invokes the privilege, nor dismiss the criminal proceeding, if the party offering the witness refuses *154 to disclose the identity of the informant, unless, based upon the evidence presented at the hearing held in the presence of the defendant and his counsel and the evidence presented at the in camera hearing, the court concludes that there is a reasonable possibility that nondisclosure might deprive

1995(People v. Walker (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 230, 236 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 12 ].) Under section 1042, subdivision (d), “[t]he court shall not order disclosure, nor strike the testimony of the witness who invokes the privilege, nor dismiss the criminal proceeding, if the party offering the witness refuses *154 to disclose the identity of the informant, unless, based upon the evidence presented at the hearing held in the presence of the defendant and his counsel and the evidence presented at the in camera hearing, the court concludes that there is a reasonable possibility that nondisclosure might deprive

1976(See People v. Rodgers, 54 Cal.App.3d 508, 518-519 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 719 ]; People v. Acuna, 35 Cal.App.3d 987, 992 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 878 ].) On the other hand, it might also be argued that such testimony could nevertheless be material in the particular circumstances of this case, i.e., there was a sudden police raid, someone else was in the house at the time, and the officer’s opinion of possession for sale was based not only on the quantity found on defendant’s person but also on the paraphernalia found elsewhere in the house.

1976(See People v. Rodgers, 54 Cal.App.3d 508, 518-519 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 719 ]; People v. Acuna, 35 Cal.App.3d 987, 992 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 878 ].) On the other hand, it might also be argued that such testimony could nevertheless be material in the particular circumstances of this case, i.e., there was a sudden police raid, someone else was in the house at the time, and the officer’s opinion of possession for sale was based not only on the quantity found on defendant’s person but also on the paraphernalia found elsewhere in the house.

1976(See People v. Rodgers, 54 Cal.App.3d 508, 518-519 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 719 ]; People v. Acuna, 35 Cal.App.3d 987, 992 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 878 ].) On the other hand, it might also be argued that such testimony could nevertheless be material in the particular circumstances of this case, i.e., there was a sudden police raid, someone else was in the house at the time, and the officer’s opinion of possession for sale was based not only on the quantity found on defendant’s person but also on the paraphernalia found elsewhere in the house.

1976(See People v. Rodgers, 54 Cal.App.3d 508, 518-519 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 719 ]; People v. Acuna, 35 Cal.App.3d 987, 992 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 878 ].) On the other hand, it might also be argued that such testimony could nevertheless be material in the particular circumstances of this case, i.e., there was a sudden police raid, someone else was in the house at the time, and the officer’s opinion of possession for sale was based not only on the quantity found on defendant’s person but also on the paraphernalia found elsewhere in the house.

1966Where the privilege has been invoked as to purely collateral matters, there is little danger of prejudice to the defendant and, therefore, the witness’s testimony may be used against him. [Citations.] On the other hand, if the witness by invoking the privilege precludes inquiry into the details of his direct testimony, there may be a substantial *765 danger of prejudice because the defense is deprived of the right to test the truth of his direct testimony and, therefore, that witness’s testimony should be stricken in whole or in part, [Citations].” (See People v. Abner, 209 Cal.App.2d 484, 489

1966Where the privilege has been invoked as to purely collateral matters, there is little danger of prejudice to the defendant and, therefore, the witness’s testimony may be used against him. [Citations.] On the other hand, if the witness by invoking the privilege precludes inquiry into the details of his direct testimony, there may be a substantial *765 danger of prejudice because the defense is deprived of the right to test the truth of his direct testimony and, therefore, that witness’s testimony should be stricken in whole or in part, [Citations].” (See People v. Abner, 209 Cal.App.2d 484, 489

1966Where the privilege has been invoked as to purely collateral matters, there is little danger of prejudice to the defendant and, therefore, the witness’s testimony may be used against him. [Citations.] On the other hand, if the witness by invoking the privilege precludes inquiry into the details of his direct testimony, there may be a substantial *765 danger of prejudice because the defense is deprived of the right to test the truth of his direct testimony and, therefore, that witness’s testimony should be stricken in whole or in part, [Citations].” (See People v. Abner, 209 Cal.App.2d 484, 489

1966Where the privilege has been invoked as to purely collateral matters, there is little danger of prejudice to the defendant and, therefore, the witness’s testimony may be used against him. [Citations.] On the other hand, if the witness by invoking the privilege precludes inquiry into the details of his direct testimony, there may be a substantial *765 danger of prejudice because the defense is deprived of the right to test the truth of his direct testimony and, therefore, that witness’s testimony should be stricken in whole or in part, [Citations].” (See People v. Abner, 209 Cal.App.2d 484, 489