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9 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Novotnygreen2 sentences2024Applicable Law on Structural Error ¶ 11 Our supreme court has identified three standards of reversal applicable to criminal convictions: “(1) structural error requiring automatic reversal; (2) error requiring reversal for violation of an express legislative mandate; and (3) trial error requiring reversal under an outcome-determinative analysis only if the error was not harmless.” People v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, ¶ 21 ; see also People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 2 (“[R]eversal of a criminal conviction for other than structural error, in the absence of express legislative mandate or an app 2019Notably, while we did “not imply . . . that every violation of our statutes and rules prescribing the use of peremptory challenges must be disregarded as harmless,” we held that a reviewing court should apply “the proper outcome-determinative test” when analyzing an error that merely deprived the defendant of a peremptory challenge, “as distinguished from an actual Sixth Amendment violation.” Id. at ¶¶ 23, 27, 320 P.3d at 1202–03. | 2 | 6 |
Brecht v. Abrahamsonred2 sentences2024In other words, for there to be structural error, the error must “infect the entire trial process,” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993)), and “defy analysis by ‘harmless error’ standards,” id. at 7 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 ). 2024In other words, for there to be structural error, the error must “infect the entire trial process,” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993)), and “defy analysis by ‘harmless error’ standards,” id. at 7 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 ). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Olanored2 sentences2024In Olano , the error was unpreserved, so the outcome-determinative standard of reversal applied by the Supreme Court was plain error. 507 U.S. at 730, 741. [8] We use "statutory history" as a reference "to the evolution of a statute as it is amended over time by the legislature," which is different from "legislative history," a reference "to the development of a statute during the legislative process and prior to enactment or amendment." Carrera v. People , 2019 CO 83, ¶ 24 n.6, 449 P.3d 725, 730 n.6 (quoting Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n v. Martinez , 2019 CO 3, ¶ 30 n.2, 433 P.3d 22, 2 2024Continuing, the division pointed out that our court has likewise declined to presume prejudice and has applied an outcome-determinative standard of reversal to the presence (and brief participation) of an alternate juror as a thirteenth juror during the very beginning of deliberations. [7] Id. at ¶¶ 20-22 (citing James , ¶ 19, 426 P.3d at 341). ¶25 And, explained the division, both Olano and James reflect recent changes in the landscape of standards of reversal. | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Fulminantegreen2 sentences2024In other words, for there to be structural error, the error must “infect the entire trial process,” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993)), and “defy analysis by ‘harmless error’ standards,” id. at 7 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 ). 2024Applicable Law on Structural Error ¶ 11 Our supreme court has identified three standards of reversal applicable to criminal convictions: “(1) structural error requiring automatic reversal; (2) error requiring reversal for violation of an express legislative mandate; and (3) trial error requiring reversal under an outcome-determinative analysis only if the error was not harmless.” People v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, ¶ 21 ; see also People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 2 (“[R]eversal of a criminal conviction for other than structural error, in the absence of express legislative mandate or an app | 1 | 1 |
Neder v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2024In other words, for there to be structural error, the error must “infect the entire trial process,” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993)), and “defy analysis by ‘harmless error’ standards,” id. at 7 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 ). | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Californiayellow1 sentence2024Applicable Law on Structural Error ¶ 11 Our supreme court has identified three standards of reversal applicable to criminal convictions: “(1) structural error requiring automatic reversal; (2) error requiring reversal for violation of an express legislative mandate; and (3) trial error requiring reversal under an outcome-determinative analysis only if the error was not harmless.” People v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, ¶ 21 ; see also People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 2 (“[R]eversal of a criminal conviction for other than structural error, in the absence of express legislative mandate or an app | 1 | 1 |
James v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2024Id. at ¶¶ 13,15, 426 P.3d at 339-40. ¶60 Following Olano , James applied an outcome-determinative standard of reversal (harmless error), scrutinizing whether there was a reasonable possibility that the erroneous presence of the alternate during deliberations "would have adversely affected the verdict of a typical jury." ¶ 20, 426 P.3d at 341. 2024Continuing, the division pointed out that our court has likewise declined to presume prejudice and has applied an outcome-determinative standard of reversal to the presence (and brief participation) of an alternate juror as a thirteenth juror during the very beginning of deliberations. [7] Id. at ¶¶ 20-22 (citing James , ¶ 19, 426 P.3d at 341). ¶25 And, explained the division, both Olano and James reflect recent changes in the landscape of standards of reversal. | 1 | 1 |
Hagos v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2024Applicable Law on Structural Error ¶ 11 Our supreme court has identified three standards of reversal applicable to criminal convictions: “(1) structural error requiring automatic reversal; (2) error requiring reversal for violation of an express legislative mandate; and (3) trial error requiring reversal under an outcome-determinative analysis only if the error was not harmless.” People v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, ¶ 21 ; see also People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 2 (“[R]eversal of a criminal conviction for other than structural error, in the absence of express legislative mandate or an app | 1 | 1 |
People Ex Rel. Dggreen2 sentences2020Under this test, a parent bringing an ineffective assistance claim must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the hearing would have been different.” D.G., 140 P.3d at 308 . ¶ 47 But the United States Supreme Court cautioned against applying Strickland’s prejudice inquiry in a mechanical fashion. 2020See People in Interest of V.M.R., 768 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Colo. App. 1989) (adopting, without analysis, the outcome-determinative test for prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claims); see also People in Interest of C.H., 166 P.3d 288 , 291 (Colo. App. 2007) (same); People in Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299, 308 (Colo. App. 2006) (same). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Geistgreen1 sentence2020See In re Geist, 796 P.2d 1193, 1200 (Or. 1990) (“The statutory right to adequate trial counsel may prove illusory if there is no procedure for review of claims of inadequate counsel.”). 29 ¶ 68 In my view, it makes little sense to stretch Strickland beyond its Sixth Amendment, criminal, origins. | 1 | 1 |
People Ex Rel. Chgreen1 sentence2020See People in Interest of V.M.R., 768 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Colo. App. 1989) (adopting, without analysis, the outcome-determinative test for prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claims); see also People in Interest of C.H., 166 P.3d 288 , 291 (Colo. App. 2007) (same); People in Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299, 308 (Colo. App. 2006) (same). | 1 | 1 |
People in Interest of VMRgreen1 sentence2020See People in Interest of V.M.R., 768 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Colo. App. 1989) (adopting, without analysis, the outcome-determinative test for prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claims); see also People in Interest of C.H., 166 P.3d 288 , 291 (Colo. App. 2007) (same); People in Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299, 308 (Colo. App. 2006) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Leonard v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2018In a criminal trial, the fact finder must decide whether the defendant committed a particular crime by determining whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt “the existence of all essential elements necessary to constitute the offense charged.” Leonard v. People, 149 Colo. 360, 372 , 369 P.2d 54, 61 (1962). 2018In a criminal trial, the fact finder must decide whether the defendant committed a particular crime by determining whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt “the existence of all essential elements necessary to constitute the offense charged.” Leonard v. People, 149 Colo. 360, 372 , 369 P.2d 54, 61 (1962). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Pifer
green
2 sentences2015People v. Pifer , 2014 COA 93, ¶19 . ¶78 Even if a trial court has abused its discretion, an appellate court will reverse only if the error was not harmless “under the proper outcome-determinative test.” People v. Novotny , 2014 CO 18, ¶27 . 2015People v. Pifer, 2014 COA 93 , ¶ 19, 350 P.3d 936 . ¶ 78 Even if a trial court has abused its discretion, an appellate court will reverse only if the error was not harmless "under the proper outcome-determinative test." People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18 , ¶ 27, 320 P.3d 1194 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n v. Martinez
green
2 sentences2024In Olano , the error was unpreserved, so the outcome-determinative standard of reversal applied by the Supreme Court was plain error. 507 U.S. at 730, 741. [8] We use "statutory history" as a reference "to the evolution of a statute as it is amended over time by the legislature," which is different from "legislative history," a reference "to the development of a statute during the legislative process and prior to enactment or amendment." Carrera v. People , 2019 CO 83, ¶ 24 n.6, 449 P.3d 725, 730 n.6 (quoting Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n v. Martinez , 2019 CO 3, ¶ 30 n.2, 433 P.3d 22, 2 2024In Olano , the error was unpreserved, so the outcome-determinative standard of reversal applied by the Supreme Court was plain error. 507 U.S. at 730, 741. [8] We use "statutory history" as a reference "to the evolution of a statute as it is amended over time by the legislature," which is different from "legislative history," a reference "to the development of a statute during the legislative process and prior to enactment or amendment." Carrera v. People , 2019 CO 83, ¶ 24 n.6, 449 P.3d 725, 730 n.6 (quoting Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n v. Martinez , 2019 CO 3, ¶ 30 n.2, 433 P.3d 22, 2 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
v. Abu-Nantambu-El
green
1 sentence2024Applicable Law on Structural Error ¶ 11 Our supreme court has identified three standards of reversal applicable to criminal convictions: “(1) structural error requiring automatic reversal; (2) error requiring reversal for violation of an express legislative mandate; and (3) trial error requiring reversal under an outcome-determinative analysis only if the error was not harmless.” People v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, ¶ 21 ; see also People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 2 (“[R]eversal of a criminal conviction for other than structural error, in the absence of express legislative mandate or an app | 1 | 2024–2024 |
v. People
green
2 sentences2024In Olano , the error was unpreserved, so the outcome-determinative standard of reversal applied by the Supreme Court was plain error. 507 U.S. at 730, 741. [8] We use "statutory history" as a reference "to the evolution of a statute as it is amended over time by the legislature," which is different from "legislative history," a reference "to the development of a statute during the legislative process and prior to enactment or amendment." Carrera v. People , 2019 CO 83, ¶ 24 n.6, 449 P.3d 725, 730 n.6 (quoting Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n v. Martinez , 2019 CO 3, ¶ 30 n.2, 433 P.3d 22, 2 2024In Olano , the error was unpreserved, so the outcome-determinative standard of reversal applied by the Supreme Court was plain error. 507 U.S. at 730, 741. [8] We use "statutory history" as a reference "to the evolution of a statute as it is amended over time by the legislature," which is different from "legislative history," a reference "to the development of a statute during the legislative process and prior to enactment or amendment." Carrera v. People , 2019 CO 83, ¶ 24 n.6, 449 P.3d 725, 730 n.6 (quoting Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n v. Martinez, 2019 CO 3, ¶ 30 n.2, 433 P.3d 22, 29 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2020An outcome-determinative test in a criminal case, then, can properly focus on “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Id. at 695 . ¶ 55 In contrast, the prejudicial effect of counsel’s errors on the judge’s parental fitness determination is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify because a cold record seldom shows how any one or more of the factors may have dealt the deciding blow in the fitness determination. 2020In criminal trials, a defendant mounting an ineffective assistance claim must show that errors of counsel “actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. MacRander
red
2 sentences2019Id. at ¶ 27, 320 P.3d at 1203 . ¶22 In Novotny, we focused on the jurisprudential developments in the understanding of trial error and structural error that followed our 1992 decision in People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234 (Colo. 1992), which held that reversal is automatic where a trial court erroneously denies a challenge for cause, 828 P.2d at 243 . 2019Id. at ¶ 27, 320 P.3d at 1203 . ¶22 In Novotny, we focused on the jurisprudential developments in the understanding of trial error and structural error that followed our 1992 decision in People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234 (Colo. 1992), which held that reversal is automatic where a trial court erroneously denies a challenge for cause, 828 P.2d at 243 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Maestas
neutral
1 sentence2015This test requires a defendant to establish "a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the verdict." People v. Maestas, 2014 COA 139M, ¶ 12 , 343 P.3d 1038 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.