9 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hopkinsgreen2 sentences2004People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849 (Colo.1989); People v. Freeman, supra. Factors to consider include: (1) the time lapse between the initial Miranda advisement and the subsequent interrogation, (2) the extent to which the suspect has been informed or is aware of the subject matter of the interrogation, (3) whether officers or the suspect initiated the interview, (4) whether and to what extent the suspect was reminded of his or her rights prior to the interrogation, (5) the clarity and form of the suspect’s acknowledgement and waiver, if any, and (6) the suspect’s background and experience with t 1994See People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849, 853 (Colo.1989) (“The prosecution’s burden in establishing a valid Miranda waiver is to prove the waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence.”). | 3 | 6 |
People v. Owensgreen2 sentences1999Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see People v. Owens, 969 P.2d 704, 706 . 1 When an objection is raised to the introduction of an incriminating statement on the basis that law enforcement officials obtained the statement in violation of Miranda, the People have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was made after a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of Miramda rights. 1999Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see People v. Owens, *438 969 P.2d 704, 706 . [1] When an objection is raised to the introduction of an incriminating statement on the basis that law enforcement officials obtained the statement in violation of Miranda , the People have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was made after a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. | 2 | 2 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences1999See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . 1999See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . | 1 | 3 |
People v. Brodergreen1 sentence2010See People v. Broder, No. 09SA228, 222 P.3d 328 , 2010 WL 104661, at *1 (Colo. Jan. 11, 2010). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Freeman
green
1 sentence2004People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849 (Colo.1989); People v. Freeman, supra. Factors to consider include: (1) the time lapse between the initial Miranda advisement and the subsequent interrogation, (2) the extent to which the suspect has been informed or is aware of the subject matter of the interrogation, (3) whether officers or the suspect initiated the interview, (4) whether and to what extent the suspect was reminded of his or her rights prior to the interrogation, (5) the clarity and form of the suspect’s acknowledgement and waiver, if any, and (6) the suspect’s background and experience with t | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Colorado v. Connelly
green
2 sentences1989Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 , 107 S.Ct. at 522 . 1989Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 , 107 S.Ct. at 522 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.