9 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Leegreen2 sentences2023See Lee, 175 Wis. 2d at 359-61 . 2023In the absence of countervailing evidence, once the [S]tate has established a prima facie case of waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness of an in-custody statement, the statement should be admitted into evidence. …. “[T]he general rule is that a prima facie case will be established ‘when the [S]tate has established that [the] 14 No. 2021AP1581-CR defendant has been told or has read all the rights and admonitions required in Miranda, and the defendant indicates he [or she] understands them and is willing to make a statement.’” Lee, 175 Wis. 2d at 359-60 (citation omitted). ¶24 We agree with | 2 | 2 |
Maryland v. Shatzergreen2 sentences2015See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990). 14 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 23 No. 2013AP1108-CR ¶60 Our holding merely clarifies that a valid Miranda waiver is sufficient for a criminal defendant to waive the right to have counsel present during questioning, and that courts need not presume any waiver is involuntary simply because the defendant is already represented by counsel. 2015See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990). 14 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 23 No. 2013AP1108-CR ¶60 Our holding merely clarifies that a valid Miranda waiver is sufficient for a criminal defendant to waive the right to have counsel present during questioning, and that courts need not presume any waiver is involuntary simply because the defendant is already represented by counsel. | 2 | 2 |
Minnick v. Mississippigreen2 sentences2015See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990). 14 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 23 No. 2013AP1108-CR ¶60 Our holding merely clarifies that a valid Miranda waiver is sufficient for a criminal defendant to waive the right to have counsel present during questioning, and that courts need not presume any waiver is involuntary simply because the defendant is already represented by counsel. 2015See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990). 14 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 23 No. 2013AP1108-CR ¶60 Our holding merely clarifies that a valid Miranda waiver is sufficient for a criminal defendant to waive the right to have counsel present during questioning, and that courts need not presume any waiver is involuntary simply because the defendant is already represented by counsel. | 2 | 2 |
Montejo v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2021See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 781-82 ; Delebreau, 362 Wis. 2d 542, ¶¶12-14 . 2015Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786-87 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Wardgreen2 sentences2021See State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶21 , 318 Wis. 2d 301 , 767 N.W.2d 236 . 11 No. 2020AP56-CR Goodchild Statement Challenge ¶20 Rejholec argues that Edson’s use of a “Reid-style interrogation”9 rendered his statements involuntary in violation of his right to due process. 2021See State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶21 , 318 Wis. 2d 301 , 767 N.W.2d 236 . 11 No. 2020AP56-CR Goodchild Statement Challenge ¶20 Rejholec argues that Edson’s use of a “Reid-style interrogation”9 rendered his statements involuntary in violation of his right to due process. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hamptongreen2 sentences2020See State v. Hampton, 2010 WI App 169, ¶33 , 330 Wis. 2d 531 , 793 N.W.2d 901 . ¶28 Donahue contends that the State presented no “explicit evidence that Mr. Donahue made any sort of a Miranda waiver as part [of his] prior police contact.” Thus, he appears to argue that the circuit court’s finding that he had a “basis for understanding the process” was clearly erroneous. 2020See State v. Hampton, 2010 WI App 169, ¶33 , 330 Wis. 2d 531 , 793 N.W.2d 901 . ¶28 Donahue contends that the State presented no “explicit evidence that Mr. Donahue made any sort of a Miranda waiver as part [of his] prior police contact.” Thus, he appears to argue that the circuit court’s finding that he had a “basis for understanding the process” was clearly erroneous. | 1 | 1 |
Schultz v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See id. at 748 . 2020Id. ¶23 Here, the circuit court found in its original decision denying Donahue’s suppression motion that there was “no evidence that the detectives had an inkling” that Donahue suffered from cognitive limitations at any point during the interrogation. | 1 | 1 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2012See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). ¶ 2. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hansongreen2 sentences1993WISCONSIN CASE LAW In State v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 217 , 401 N.W.2d 771, 780 (1987), the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: "If and when the United States Supreme Court interprets the federal constitution as granting lesser rights than this court believes are extended to persons under the Wisconsin Constitution, we will so hold." Thus far, however, Wisconsin has squarely aligned itself with the rulings of the United States Supreme Court. 1993WISCONSIN CASE LAW In State v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 217 , 401 N.W.2d 771, 780 (1987), the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: "If and when the United States Supreme Court interprets the federal constitution as granting lesser rights than this court believes are extended to persons under the Wisconsin Constitution, we will so hold." Thus far, however, Wisconsin has squarely aligned itself with the rulings of the United States Supreme Court. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Beaver
green
2 sentences2020State v. Beaver, 181 Wis. 2d 959, 967 , 512 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1994). 10 No. 2019AP590-CR ¶27 Further, the circuit court also found that Donahue had been “questioned by law enforcement” prior to his June 15, 2016 interrogation, and therefore had a “basis for understanding the process.” A defendant’s prior experience with law enforcement—and familiarity with Miranda warnings—is a proper factor for a court to consider when determining whether a valid Miranda waiver occurred. 2020State v. Beaver, 181 Wis. 2d 959, 967 , 512 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1994). 10 No. 2019AP590-CR ¶27 Further, the circuit court also found that Donahue had been “questioned by law enforcement” prior to his June 15, 2016 interrogation, and therefore had a “basis for understanding the process.” A defendant’s prior experience with law enforcement—and familiarity with Miranda warnings—is a proper factor for a court to consider when determining whether a valid Miranda waiver occurred. | 2 | 2020–2025 |
State v. Jesse J. Delebreau
green
2 sentences2021According to Delebreau, the Supreme Court’s holding in Montejo “is clear that a defendant is sufficiently apprised of his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel by the Miranda warnings, and that a valid Miranda waiver effectively waives the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as well as the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.” Delebreau, 362 Wis. 2d 542, ¶48 . ¶24 The defendants in both Montejo and Delebreau were represented by counsel at the time they were administered Miranda warnings and waived their rights. 2021See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 781-82 ; Delebreau, 362 Wis. 2d 542, ¶¶12-14 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Raheem Moore
green
2 sentences2020The court reiterated this finding when it denied Donahue’s motion for reconsideration, stating, “I don't see [any cognitive] limitations manifesting themselves in the video.” Consequently, we conclude Schultz supports, rather than undermines, the court’s determination that the State established a prima facie showing that Donahue validly waived his Miranda rights. 6 The only other case Donahue cites in support of his argument that the personal characteristics of a defendant may affect the level of proof necessary for the State to make a prima facie showing of a valid Miranda waiver is State v. 2020The court reiterated this finding when it denied Donahue’s motion for reconsideration, stating, “I don't see [any cognitive] limitations manifesting themselves in the video.” Consequently, we conclude Schultz supports, rather than undermines, the court’s determination that the State established a prima facie showing that Donahue validly waived his Miranda rights. 6 The only other case Donahue cites in support of his argument that the personal characteristics of a defendant may affect the level of proof necessary for the State to make a prima facie showing of a valid Miranda waiver is State v. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Evans
green
2 sentences2012Thus, Spaeth's statement to police was not derived from a source "wholly independent" from his compelled testimony, as required by Kastigar and State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225 , 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977), even though the statement was preceded by a valid Miranda warning. 2012Thus, Spaeth's statement to police was not derived from a source "wholly independent" from his compelled testimony, as required by Kastigar and State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225 , 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977), even though the statement was preceded by a valid Miranda warning. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Colorado v. Spring
green
1 sentence1993However, the law of the land, as enunciated in Spring, 479 U.S. at 573 , requires a particular showing of knowing intelligence in order for a valid Miranda waiver to take place. *358 II. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.