36 California opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2025(People v. Tom (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1210, 1225 .) “After a valid Miranda waiver, readvisement prior to continued custodial interrogation is unnecessary ‘so long as a proper warning has been given, and “the subsequent interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The necessity for readvisement depends upon various circumstances, including the amount of time that has elapsed since the first waiver, changes in the identity of the interrogating officer and the location of the interrogation, any reminder of the prior advisement, 2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, at p. 104 ; Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 ; Leon, supra, at p. 843; Linton, supra, at p. 1171 ; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 .) The question of whether a valid Miranda waiver was given must be determined on “‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369 , 374–375, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; see United States v. 11. | 6 | 13 |
People v. Micklegreen2 sentences2016Analysis Even if defendant had preserved the issue for review, we find that Detective Hickman was not required to fully readvise him of the Miranda warnings prior to the February 28, 2012, interview. “[A] Miranda readvisement is not necessary before a custodial interrogation is resumed, so long as a proper warning has been given, and ‘the subsequent interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 504 .) “We have established several factors to determine whether readvisement is necessary prior to a subsequent 2015(Ibid.) However, “[t]he defendant may waive effectuation of [his Miranda] rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” (Ibid.) 5. “‘After a valid Miranda waiver, readvisement prior to continued custodial interrogation is unnecessary “so long as a proper warning has been given, and ‘the subsequent interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.] The necessity for readvisement depends upon various circumstances, including the amount of time that has elapsed since the first waiver, changes in | 5 | 6 |
People v. Lintongreen2 sentences2023“To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1171 .) “As well, ‘[b]oth the state and federal Constitutions bar the prosecution from introducing a defendant’s involuntary confession into evidence at trial.’ [Citations.] As with Miranda waivers, the People bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the voluntariness of a confession.” (Peo 2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 104 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475 ; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831 , 843; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 ; People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 683 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation. | 2 | 8 |
Berghuis v. Thompkinsgreen2 sentences2024(See Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 381 [holding that after a suspect has been provided the Miranda advisements, law enforcement must cease questioning only after the suspect “invoke[s] his or her right to remain silent … unambiguously”]; Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459 [after being provided with the Miranda advisements, a suspect must invoke the Miranda right to counsel “unambiguously”].) Unlike Miranda, which requires custodial interrogation to apply, the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incrimination, i.e. the right to remain silent, is constant and applies to both custodial and 2014(Berghuis v. 12 Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 380, 382 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant understood the Miranda advisals. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Duffgreen2 sentences2023“To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1171 .) “As well, ‘[b]oth the state and federal Constitutions bar the prosecution from introducing a defendant’s involuntary confession into evidence at trial.’ [Citations.] As with Miranda waivers, the People bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the voluntariness of a confession.” (Peo 2021(Id. at p. 444.) “ ‘To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.’ ” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 551 (Duff).) In addition, “[b]oth the state and federal Constitutions bar the prosecution from introducing a defendant’s involuntary confession into evidence at trial.” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1176 (Linton).) “As with Miranda waivers, the People bear the burden of establishing by | 1 | 7 |
People v. Cruzgreen2 sentences2026(People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 667 (Cruz).) “ ‘To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.’ ” (Suarez, at p. 160.) A waiver is knowing and intelligent if it is “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 .) “Determining the validity of a Miranda rights waiver requires 2024A valid waiver need not be of predetermined form, but instead must reflect that the suspect in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda decision. [Citation.] We have recognized that a valid waiver of Miranda rights may be express or implied. [Citations.] A suspect’s expressed willingness to answer questions after acknowledging an understanding of his or her Miranda rights has itself been held sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of such rights. [Citations.] In contrast, an unambiguous request for counsel or a refusal to talk bars further questioning.” (P | 1 | 2 |
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024(See Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 381 [holding that after a suspect has been provided the Miranda advisements, law enforcement must cease questioning only after the suspect “invoke[s] his or her right to remain silent … unambiguously”]; Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459 [after being provided with the Miranda advisements, a suspect must invoke the Miranda right to counsel “unambiguously”].) Unlike Miranda, which requires custodial interrogation to apply, the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incrimination, i.e. the right to remain silent, is constant and applies to both custodial and 2024(See Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 381 [holding that after a suspect has been provided the Miranda advisements, law enforcement must cease questioning only after the suspect “invoke[s] his or her right to remain silent … unambiguously”]; Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459 [after being provided with the Miranda advisements, a suspect must invoke the Miranda right to counsel “unambiguously”].) Unlike Miranda, which requires custodial interrogation to apply, the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incrimination, i.e. the right to remain silent, is constant and applies to both custodial and | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Bernard S.green2 sentences2024(United States v. Bernard S. (9th Cir. 1986) 795 F.2d 749, 751 , disapproved on other grounds in United States v. Dozier (9th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 701 , 706.) A defendant’s language abilities may impair his ability to give a knowing and intelligent waiver and render his statement involuntary. 2016(United States v. Bernard S. (9th Cir. 1986) 795 F.2d 749, 751 (Bernard S.), disapproved on other grounds in United States v. Dozier (9th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 701 , 706; United States v. Heredia-Fernandez (9th Cir. 1985) 756 F.2d 1412, 1415 ; United States v. Martinez (9th Cir. 1978) 588 F.2d 1227, 1235 .) A defendant’s language abilities may impair his ability to give a knowing and intelligent waiver, and render his statement involuntary. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2020But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 479 .) “To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.” (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 .) “ ‘On review of a trial court’s decision on a Miranda issue, we accept the trial court’s determination of dispu 2016(People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 1125 (Gonzalez), citing Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452 , 461- 462 (Davis) [and noting "Davis now provides the standard by which we assess whether a defendant's reference to counsel constituted an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel"]; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 645 [noting an inquiry as to whether a defendant should " 'have somebody here talking for me' " is not an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel].) Officers may, but are not required to, seek clarification of ambiguous post-Mirand | 1 | 2 |
People v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2016(People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 1125 (Gonzalez), citing Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452 , 461- 462 (Davis) [and noting "Davis now provides the standard by which we assess whether a defendant's reference to counsel constituted an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel"]; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 645 [noting an inquiry as to whether a defendant should " 'have somebody here talking for me' " is not an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel].) Officers may, but are not required to, seek clarification of ambiguous post-Mirand 2015(People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 1125 .) An inquiry as to whether a defendant should “‘have somebody here talking for me’” does not constitute an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2014(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 184 .) Defendant contends his waiver at the hospital was not knowing and intelligent because he was likely being treated with narcotic painkillers; he had recently attempted suicide and had a history of mental illness; and during the interview he was disoriented, responded inappropriately to questioning, and digressed from the topic. 2014(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 187 (Williams).) The prosecution must establish a valid Miranda waiver “by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation. [Citation.]” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1171 .) No express waiver is necessary. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Nelsongreen1 sentence2026When a juvenile’s waiver is at issue, consideration must be given to factors such as ‘the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given [to] him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.’ ” (People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 375 (Nelson).) In Nelson, our Supreme Court held that a 15-year-old defendant “implicitly” waived his Miranda rights “ ‘by willingly answering questions after acknowledging that he understood those rights.’ ” (Ibid.) “On appeal, | 1 | 1 |
People v. Suarezgreen1 sentence2023(See, e.g., People v. Potter (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 528 , 541-542 [person not in custody where he voluntarily went to police station, was told he did not have to talk to police and could end interview at any time, and was not restrained, and interview lasted under two hours].) We also reject Martinez’s claim that his Miranda waiver was invalid because Detective Nunez’s warnings were defective. “ ‘To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of th | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Stallworthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pearsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gamachegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Carringtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Tullygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Scottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Edwards v. Arizonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 104 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475 ; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831 , 843; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 ; People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 683 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation. 2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 104 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475 ; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831 , 843; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 ; People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 683 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation. | 5 | 2004–2022 |
People v. Smith
green
2 sentences2016Analysis Even if defendant had preserved the issue for review, we find that Detective Hickman was not required to fully readvise him of the Miranda warnings prior to the February 28, 2012, interview. “[A] Miranda readvisement is not necessary before a custodial interrogation is resumed, so long as a proper warning has been given, and ‘the subsequent interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 504 .) “We have established several factors to determine whether readvisement is necessary prior to a subsequent 2016Analysis Even if defendant had preserved the issue for review, we find that Detective Hickman was not required to fully readvise him of the Miranda warnings prior to the February 28, 2012, interview. “[A] Miranda readvisement is not necessary before a custodial interrogation is resumed, so long as a proper warning has been given, and ‘the subsequent interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 504 .) “We have established several factors to determine whether readvisement is necessary prior to a subsequent | 4 | 2008–2016 |
Moran v. Burbine
green
2 sentences2026(People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 667 (Cruz).) “ ‘To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.’ ” (Suarez, at p. 160.) A waiver is knowing and intelligent if it is “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 .) “Determining the validity of a Miranda rights waiver requires 2023(See, e.g., People v. Potter (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 528 , 541-542 [person not in custody where he voluntarily went to police station, was told he did not have to talk to police and could end interview at any time, and was not restrained, and interview lasted under two hours].) We also reject Martinez’s claim that his Miranda waiver was invalid because Detective Nunez’s warnings were defective. “ ‘To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of th | 3 | 2022–2026 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences2024A valid waiver need not be of predetermined form, but instead must reflect that the suspect in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda decision. [Citation.] We have recognized that a valid waiver of Miranda rights may be express or implied. [Citations.] A suspect’s expressed willingness to answer questions after acknowledging an understanding of his or her Miranda rights has itself been held sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of such rights. [Citations.] In contrast, an unambiguous request for counsel or a refusal to talk bars further questioning.” (P 2016In considering the totality of the circumstances to determine if the defendant gave a valid Miranda waiver, and whether his statement was voluntary for due process purposes, the court takes into account the “background, experience, and conduct of the accused” (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 586 ), including the defendant’s language abilities. | 2 | 2016–2024 |
United States v. James Joseph Owens
green
2 sentences2024(United States v. Bernard S. (9th Cir. 1986) 795 F.2d 749, 751 , disapproved on other grounds in United States v. Dozier (9th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 701 , 706.) A defendant’s language abilities may impair his ability to give a knowing and intelligent waiver and render his statement involuntary. 2016(United States v. Bernard S. (9th Cir. 1986) 795 F.2d 749, 751 (Bernard S.), disapproved on other grounds in United States v. Dozier (9th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 701 , 706; United States v. Heredia-Fernandez (9th Cir. 1985) 756 F.2d 1412, 1415 ; United States v. Martinez (9th Cir. 1978) 588 F.2d 1227, 1235 .) A defendant’s language abilities may impair his ability to give a knowing and intelligent waiver, and render his statement involuntary. | 2 | 2016–2024 |
People v. Tate
green
2 sentences2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 104 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475 ; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831 , 843; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 ; People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 683 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation. 2013(People v. Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 683 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation. | 2 | 2013–2022 |
People v. Kelly
green
1 sentence2025While it is the People’s burden to prove a valid Miranda waiver (People v. Kelly, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 947 ), Guan did not dispute below that he understood his 9 Miranda rights, instead contending that he had understood and in fact invoked his right to counsel (a contention he does not renew on appeal). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Tom
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Tom (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1210, 1225 .) “After a valid Miranda waiver, readvisement prior to continued custodial interrogation is unnecessary ‘so long as a proper warning has been given, and “the subsequent interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The necessity for readvisement depends upon various circumstances, including the amount of time that has elapsed since the first waiver, changes in the identity of the interrogating officer and the location of the interrogation, any reminder of the prior advisement, | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. McCurdy
green
1 sentence2023(People v. McCurdy, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1086 .) The test of voluntariness considers several factors, including any element of police coercion, the length of the interrogation and its location and continuity, and the defendant’s maturity, education, and physical and mental health. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Maryland v. Shatzer
green
2 sentences2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 104 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475 ; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831 , 843; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 ; People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 683 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation. 2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, at p. 104 ; Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 ; Leon, supra, at p. 843; Linton, supra, at p. 1171 ; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 .) The question of whether a valid Miranda waiver was given must be determined on “‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369 , 374–375, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; see United States v. 11. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, at p. 104 ; Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 ; Leon, supra, at p. 843; Linton, supra, at p. 1171 ; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 .) The question of whether a valid Miranda waiver was given must be determined on “‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369 , 374–375, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; see United States v. 11. 2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, at p. 104 ; Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 ; Leon, supra, at p. 843; Linton, supra, at p. 1171 ; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 .) The question of whether a valid Miranda waiver was given must be determined on “‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369 , 374–375, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; see United States v. 11. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
North Carolina v. Butler
red
2 sentences2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, at p. 104 ; Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 ; Leon, supra, at p. 843; Linton, supra, at p. 1171 ; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 .) The question of whether a valid Miranda waiver was given must be determined on “‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369 , 374–375, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; see United States v. 11. 2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, at p. 104 ; Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 ; Leon, supra, at p. 843; Linton, supra, at p. 1171 ; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 .) The question of whether a valid Miranda waiver was given must be determined on “‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369 , 374–375, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; see United States v. 11. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
United States v. Washington
green
1 sentence2022Washington (1977) 431 U.S. 181, 188 .) Language difficulties encountered by a defendant during custodial interrogation are “one factor” to be considered in determining whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her Miranda rights. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Cisneros-Ramirez
green
1 sentence2021Accordingly, a plea of guilty waives any right to raise questions regarding the evidence, including its sufficiency or admissibility, and this is true whether or not the subsequent claim of evidentiary error is founded on constitutional violations. [Citation.] . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cisneros-Ramirez (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 393, 405 .) In particular, a defendant who has pleaded guilty “is precluded 25 from obtaining appellate review of his motion to exclude statements on the grounds he was interrogated without a valid Miranda warning and waiver. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 406 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Juan Price
green
1 sentence2020“To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1171 .) In assessing whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent, relevant circumstances include “ ‘(i) the defendant’s mental capacity; (ii) whether the defendant signed a written waiver; (iii) whether the defendant was advised in his native tongue or had a translator; (iv) whether the defendant appeared to unde | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Hensley
green
1 sentence2020But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 479 .) “To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.” (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 .) “ ‘On review of a trial court’s decision on a Miranda issue, we accept the trial court’s determination of dispu | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Gerald Anthony Coleman v. Harry K. Singletary, Robert A. Butterworth green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| United States v. Guadalupe Javier Heredia-Fernandez green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Nollie Lee Martin v. Louie L. Wainwright
green
1 sentence2016Analysis Even if defendant had preserved the issue for review, we find that Detective Hickman was not required to fully readvise him of the Miranda warnings prior to the February 28, 2012, interview. “[A] Miranda readvisement is not necessary before a custodial interrogation is resumed, so long as a proper warning has been given, and ‘the subsequent interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 504 .) “We have established several factors to determine whether readvisement is necessary prior to a subsequent | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| United States v. Evelio Martinez green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Roper v. Simmons green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| United States v. Sonja Harrison green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Graham v. Florida green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Abdul Y. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Doody v. Ryan green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| J. D. B. v. North Carolina green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Charles P. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Pennsylvania v. Muniz green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| In Re Jessie L. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Bacon green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Lara green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| United States v. Jose Alfredo Perez-Lopez green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Lewis green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Gonzales green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Dykes green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Lewis green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Waidla green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Braeseke green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Armour v. Nix green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| California v. Braeseke neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.