valid Miranda waiver (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

valid Miranda waiver in California

36 California opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2026 10 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (20)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Williamsgreen
cal · 2010 · cited in 13 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2026
2 sentences

2025(People v. Tom (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1210, 1225 .) “After a valid Miranda waiver, readvisement prior to continued custodial interrogation is unnecessary ‘so long as a proper warning has been given, and “the subsequent interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The necessity for readvisement depends upon various circumstances, including the amount of time that has elapsed since the first waiver, changes in the identity of the interrogating officer and the location of the interrogation, any reminder of the prior advisement,

2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, at p. 104 ; Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 ; Leon, supra, at p. 843; Linton, supra, at p. 1171 ; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 .) The question of whether a valid Miranda waiver was given must be determined on “‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369 , 374–375, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; see United States v. 11.

613
People v. Micklegreen
cal · 1991 · cited in 6 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2016
2 sentences

2016Analysis Even if defendant had preserved the issue for review, we find that Detective Hickman was not required to fully readvise him of the Miranda warnings prior to the February 28, 2012, interview. “[A] Miranda readvisement is not necessary before a custodial interrogation is resumed, so long as a proper warning has been given, and ‘the subsequent interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 504 .) “We have established several factors to determine whether readvisement is necessary prior to a subsequent

2015(Ibid.) However, “[t]he defendant may waive effectuation of [his Miranda] rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” (Ibid.) 5. “‘After a valid Miranda waiver, readvisement prior to continued custodial interrogation is unnecessary “so long as a proper warning has been given, and ‘the subsequent interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.] The necessity for readvisement depends upon various circumstances, including the amount of time that has elapsed since the first waiver, changes in

56
People v. Lintongreen
cal · 2013 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2023
2 sentences

2023“To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1171 .) “As well, ‘[b]oth the state and federal Constitutions bar the prosecution from introducing a defendant’s involuntary confession into evidence at trial.’ [Citations.] As with Miranda waivers, the People bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the voluntariness of a confession.” (Peo

2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 104 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475 ; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831 , 843; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 ; People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 683 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.

28
Berghuis v. Thompkinsgreen
scotus · 2010 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2024
2 sentences

2024(See Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 381 [holding that after a suspect has been provided the Miranda advisements, law enforcement must cease questioning only after the suspect “invoke[s] his or her right to remain silent … unambiguously”]; Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459 [after being provided with the Miranda advisements, a suspect must invoke the Miranda right to counsel “unambiguously”].) Unlike Miranda, which requires custodial interrogation to apply, the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incrimination, i.e. the right to remain silent, is constant and applies to both custodial and

2014(Berghuis v. 12 Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 380, 382 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant understood the Miranda advisals.

22
People v. Duffgreen
cal · 2014 · cited in 7 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2023
2 sentences

2023“To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1171 .) “As well, ‘[b]oth the state and federal Constitutions bar the prosecution from introducing a defendant’s involuntary confession into evidence at trial.’ [Citations.] As with Miranda waivers, the People bear the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the voluntariness of a confession.” (Peo

2021(Id. at p. 444.) “ ‘To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.’ ” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 551 (Duff).) In addition, “[b]oth the state and federal Constitutions bar the prosecution from introducing a defendant’s involuntary confession into evidence at trial.” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1176 (Linton).) “As with Miranda waivers, the People bear the burden of establishing by

17
People v. Cruzgreen
cal · 2008 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2026
2 sentences

2026(People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 667 (Cruz).) “ ‘To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.’ ” (Suarez, at p. 160.) A waiver is knowing and intelligent if it is “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 .) “Determining the validity of a Miranda rights waiver requires

2024A valid waiver need not be of predetermined form, but instead must reflect that the suspect in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda decision. [Citation.] We have recognized that a valid waiver of Miranda rights may be express or implied. [Citations.] A suspect’s expressed willingness to answer questions after acknowledging an understanding of his or her Miranda rights has itself been held sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of such rights. [Citations.] In contrast, an unambiguous request for counsel or a refusal to talk bars further questioning.” (P

12
Davis v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1994 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2024
2 sentences

2024(See Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 381 [holding that after a suspect has been provided the Miranda advisements, law enforcement must cease questioning only after the suspect “invoke[s] his or her right to remain silent … unambiguously”]; Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459 [after being provided with the Miranda advisements, a suspect must invoke the Miranda right to counsel “unambiguously”].) Unlike Miranda, which requires custodial interrogation to apply, the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incrimination, i.e. the right to remain silent, is constant and applies to both custodial and

2024(See Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 381 [holding that after a suspect has been provided the Miranda advisements, law enforcement must cease questioning only after the suspect “invoke[s] his or her right to remain silent … unambiguously”]; Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459 [after being provided with the Miranda advisements, a suspect must invoke the Miranda right to counsel “unambiguously”].) Unlike Miranda, which requires custodial interrogation to apply, the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incrimination, i.e. the right to remain silent, is constant and applies to both custodial and

12
United States v. Bernard S.green
ca9 · 1986 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2024
2 sentences

2024(United States v. Bernard S. (9th Cir. 1986) 795 F.2d 749, 751 , disapproved on other grounds in United States v. Dozier (9th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 701 , 706.) A defendant’s language abilities may impair his ability to give a knowing and intelligent waiver and render his statement involuntary.

2016(United States v. Bernard S. (9th Cir. 1986) 795 F.2d 749, 751 (Bernard S.), disapproved on other grounds in United States v. Dozier (9th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 701 , 706; United States v. Heredia-Fernandez (9th Cir. 1985) 756 F.2d 1412, 1415 ; United States v. Martinez (9th Cir. 1978) 588 F.2d 1227, 1235 .) A defendant’s language abilities may impair his ability to give a knowing and intelligent waiver, and render his statement involuntary.

12
People v. Cunninghamgreen
cal · 2015 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2020
2 sentences

2020But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 479 .) “To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.” (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 .) “ ‘On review of a trial court’s decision on a Miranda issue, we accept the trial court’s determination of dispu

2016(People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 1125 (Gonzalez), citing Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452 , 461- 462 (Davis) [and noting "Davis now provides the standard by which we assess whether a defendant's reference to counsel constituted an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel"]; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 645 [noting an inquiry as to whether a defendant should " 'have somebody here talking for me' " is not an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel].) Officers may, but are not required to, seek clarification of ambiguous post-Mirand

12
People v. Gonzalezgreen
cal · 2005 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2016
2 sentences

2016(People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 1125 (Gonzalez), citing Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452 , 461- 462 (Davis) [and noting "Davis now provides the standard by which we assess whether a defendant's reference to counsel constituted an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel"]; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 645 [noting an inquiry as to whether a defendant should " 'have somebody here talking for me' " is not an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel].) Officers may, but are not required to, seek clarification of ambiguous post-Mirand

2015(People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 1125 .) An inquiry as to whether a defendant should “‘have somebody here talking for me’” does not constitute an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel.

12
People v. Williamsgreen
cal · 2013 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 184 .) Defendant contends his waiver at the hospital was not knowing and intelligent because he was likely being treated with narcotic painkillers; he had recently attempted suicide and had a history of mental illness; and during the interview he was disoriented, responded inappropriately to questioning, and digressed from the topic.

2014(People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 187 (Williams).) The prosecution must establish a valid Miranda waiver “by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation. [Citation.]” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1171 .) No express waiver is necessary.

12
People v. Nelsongreen
cal · 2012 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026When a juvenile’s waiver is at issue, consideration must be given to factors such as ‘the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given [to] him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.’ ” (People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 375 (Nelson).) In Nelson, our Supreme Court held that a 15-year-old defendant “implicitly” waived his Miranda rights “ ‘by willingly answering questions after acknowledging that he understood those rights.’ ” (Ibid.) “On appeal,

11
People v. Suarezgreen
cal · 2020 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023(See, e.g., People v. Potter (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 528 , 541-542 [person not in custody where he voluntarily went to police station, was told he did not have to talk to police and could end interview at any time, and was not restrained, and interview lasted under two hours].) We also reject Martinez’s claim that his Miranda waiver was invalid because Detective Nunez’s warnings were defective. “ ‘To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of th

11
People v. Stallworthgreen
calctapp · 2008 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
People v. Pearsongreen
cal · 2012 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
People v. Gamachegreen
cal · 2010 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
11
People v. Carringtongreen
cal · 2009 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
11
People v. Tullygreen
cal · 2012 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
11
People v. Scottgreen
cal · 2011 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
11
Edwards v. Arizonagreen
scotus · 1981 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (40)

CaseCitedYears
Miranda v. Arizona green
scotus · 1966
2 sentences

2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 104 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475 ; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831 , 843; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 ; People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 683 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.

2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 104 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475 ; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831 , 843; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 ; People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 683 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.

52004–2022
People v. Smith green
cal · 2007
2 sentences

2016Analysis Even if defendant had preserved the issue for review, we find that Detective Hickman was not required to fully readvise him of the Miranda warnings prior to the February 28, 2012, interview. “[A] Miranda readvisement is not necessary before a custodial interrogation is resumed, so long as a proper warning has been given, and ‘the subsequent interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 504 .) “We have established several factors to determine whether readvisement is necessary prior to a subsequent

2016Analysis Even if defendant had preserved the issue for review, we find that Detective Hickman was not required to fully readvise him of the Miranda warnings prior to the February 28, 2012, interview. “[A] Miranda readvisement is not necessary before a custodial interrogation is resumed, so long as a proper warning has been given, and ‘the subsequent interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 504 .) “We have established several factors to determine whether readvisement is necessary prior to a subsequent

42008–2016
Moran v. Burbine green
scotus · 1986
2 sentences

2026(People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 667 (Cruz).) “ ‘To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.’ ” (Suarez, at p. 160.) A waiver is knowing and intelligent if it is “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 .) “Determining the validity of a Miranda rights waiver requires

2023(See, e.g., People v. Potter (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 528 , 541-542 [person not in custody where he voluntarily went to police station, was told he did not have to talk to police and could end interview at any time, and was not restrained, and interview lasted under two hours].) We also reject Martinez’s claim that his Miranda waiver was invalid because Detective Nunez’s warnings were defective. “ ‘To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of th

32022–2026
People v. Davis green
cal · 2009
2 sentences

2024A valid waiver need not be of predetermined form, but instead must reflect that the suspect in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda decision. [Citation.] We have recognized that a valid waiver of Miranda rights may be express or implied. [Citations.] A suspect’s expressed willingness to answer questions after acknowledging an understanding of his or her Miranda rights has itself been held sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of such rights. [Citations.] In contrast, an unambiguous request for counsel or a refusal to talk bars further questioning.” (P

2016In considering the totality of the circumstances to determine if the defendant gave a valid Miranda waiver, and whether his statement was voluntary for due process purposes, the court takes into account the “background, experience, and conduct of the accused” (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 586 ), including the defendant’s language abilities.

22016–2024
United States v. James Joseph Owens green
ca9 · 1988
2 sentences

2024(United States v. Bernard S. (9th Cir. 1986) 795 F.2d 749, 751 , disapproved on other grounds in United States v. Dozier (9th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 701 , 706.) A defendant’s language abilities may impair his ability to give a knowing and intelligent waiver and render his statement involuntary.

2016(United States v. Bernard S. (9th Cir. 1986) 795 F.2d 749, 751 (Bernard S.), disapproved on other grounds in United States v. Dozier (9th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 701 , 706; United States v. Heredia-Fernandez (9th Cir. 1985) 756 F.2d 1412, 1415 ; United States v. Martinez (9th Cir. 1978) 588 F.2d 1227, 1235 .) A defendant’s language abilities may impair his ability to give a knowing and intelligent waiver, and render his statement involuntary.

22016–2024
People v. Tate green
cal · 2010
2 sentences

2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 104 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475 ; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831 , 843; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 ; People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 683 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.

2013(People v. Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 683 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.

22013–2022
People v. Kelly green
cal · 1990
1 sentence

2025While it is the People’s burden to prove a valid Miranda waiver (People v. Kelly, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 947 ), Guan did not dispute below that he understood his 9 Miranda rights, instead contending that he had understood and in fact invoked his right to counsel (a contention he does not renew on appeal).

12025–2025
People v. Tom green
cal · 2014
1 sentence

2025(People v. Tom (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1210, 1225 .) “After a valid Miranda waiver, readvisement prior to continued custodial interrogation is unnecessary ‘so long as a proper warning has been given, and “the subsequent interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The necessity for readvisement depends upon various circumstances, including the amount of time that has elapsed since the first waiver, changes in the identity of the interrogating officer and the location of the interrogation, any reminder of the prior advisement,

12025–2025
People v. McCurdy green
cal · 2014
1 sentence

2023(People v. McCurdy, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1086 .) The test of voluntariness considers several factors, including any element of police coercion, the length of the interrogation and its location and continuity, and the defendant’s maturity, education, and physical and mental health.

12023–2023
Maryland v. Shatzer green
scotus · 2010
2 sentences

2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 104 ; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475 ; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831 , 843; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 ; People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 683 .) To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.

2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, at p. 104 ; Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 ; Leon, supra, at p. 843; Linton, supra, at p. 1171 ; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 .) The question of whether a valid Miranda waiver was given must be determined on “‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369 , 374–375, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; see United States v. 11.

12022–2022
Johnson v. Zerbst green
scotus · 1938
2 sentences

2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, at p. 104 ; Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 ; Leon, supra, at p. 843; Linton, supra, at p. 1171 ; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 .) The question of whether a valid Miranda waiver was given must be determined on “‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369 , 374–375, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; see United States v. 11.

2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, at p. 104 ; Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 ; Leon, supra, at p. 843; Linton, supra, at p. 1171 ; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 .) The question of whether a valid Miranda waiver was given must be determined on “‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369 , 374–375, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; see United States v. 11.

12022–2022
North Carolina v. Butler red
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, at p. 104 ; Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 ; Leon, supra, at p. 843; Linton, supra, at p. 1171 ; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 .) The question of whether a valid Miranda waiver was given must be determined on “‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369 , 374–375, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; see United States v. 11.

2022(Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, at p. 104 ; Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 ; Leon, supra, at p. 843; Linton, supra, at p. 1171 ; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 .) The question of whether a valid Miranda waiver was given must be determined on “‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369 , 374–375, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; see United States v. 11.

12022–2022
United States v. Washington green
scotus · 1977
1 sentence

2022Washington (1977) 431 U.S. 181, 188 .) Language difficulties encountered by a defendant during custodial interrogation are “one factor” to be considered in determining whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her Miranda rights.

12022–2022
People v. Cisneros-Ramirez green
calctapp5d · 2018
1 sentence

2021Accordingly, a plea of guilty waives any right to raise questions regarding the evidence, including its sufficiency or admissibility, and this is true whether or not the subsequent claim of evidentiary error is founded on constitutional violations. [Citation.] . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cisneros-Ramirez (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 393, 405 .) In particular, a defendant who has pleaded guilty “is precluded 25 from obtaining appellate review of his motion to exclude statements on the grounds he was interrogated without a valid Miranda warning and waiver. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 406

12021–2021
United States v. Juan Price green
ca9 · 2019
1 sentence

2020“To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1171 .) In assessing whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent, relevant circumstances include “ ‘(i) the defendant’s mental capacity; (ii) whether the defendant signed a written waiver; (iii) whether the defendant was advised in his native tongue or had a translator; (iv) whether the defendant appeared to unde

12020–2020
People v. Hensley green
cal · 2014
1 sentence

2020But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 479 .) “To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.” (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1171 .) “ ‘On review of a trial court’s decision on a Miranda issue, we accept the trial court’s determination of dispu

12020–2020
Gerald Anthony Coleman v. Harry K. Singletary, Robert A. Butterworth green
ca11 · 1994
12016–2016
United States v. Guadalupe Javier Heredia-Fernandez green
ca9 · 1985
12016–2016
Nollie Lee Martin v. Louie L. Wainwright green
ca11 · 1985
1 sentence

2016Analysis Even if defendant had preserved the issue for review, we find that Detective Hickman was not required to fully readvise him of the Miranda warnings prior to the February 28, 2012, interview. “[A] Miranda readvisement is not necessary before a custodial interrogation is resumed, so long as a proper warning has been given, and ‘the subsequent interrogation is “reasonably contemporaneous” with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver.’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 504 .) “We have established several factors to determine whether readvisement is necessary prior to a subsequent

12016–2016
United States v. Evelio Martinez green
ca9 · 1979
12016–2016
Roper v. Simmons green
scotus · 2005
12015–2015
United States v. Sonja Harrison green
ca9 · 1994
12015–2015
Graham v. Florida green
scotus · 2010
12015–2015
People v. Abdul Y. green
calctapp · 1982
12015–2015
Doody v. Ryan green
ca9 · 2011
12015–2015
J. D. B. v. North Carolina green
scotus · 2011
12015–2015
People v. Charles P. green
calctapp · 1982
12015–2015
Pennsylvania v. Muniz green
scotus · 1990
12015–2015
In Re Jessie L. green
calctapp · 1982
12015–2015
People v. Bacon green
cal · 2010
12015–2015
People v. Lara green
cal · 1967
12015–2015
United States v. Jose Alfredo Perez-Lopez green
ca9 · 2003
12015–2015
People v. Lewis green
cal · 2001
12015–2015
People v. Gonzales green
cal · 2012
12015–2015
People v. Dykes green
cal · 2009
12015–2015
People v. Lewis green
cal · 2001
12015–2015
People v. Waidla green
cal · 2000
12014–2014
People v. Braeseke green
cal · 1980
12007–2007
Armour v. Nix green
scotus · 1980
12007–2007
California v. Braeseke neutral
scotus · 1980
12007–2007

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Penal Code § 187 (14) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 352 (6) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 402 (6) CA § Cal. Government Code § 70373 (4) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 288.7 (3) CA § Cal. Vehicle Code § 10851 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 36 (2004–2026) IL 15 (1990–2025) MA 10 (1990–2025) WI 9 (1993–2025) CO 9 (1989–2010) NE 8 (2006–2023) OH 7 (2013–2024) FL 6 (1983–2018) PA 6 (2012–2021) MI 5 (1978–2008) MS 4 (1976–2020) CT 3 (1996–2017) MN 3 (2001–2009) SD 3 (2010–2014) LA 3 (1995–2016) VA 3 (2024–2024) NJ 3 (2019–2024) UT 3 (1995–2023) OK 2 (1994–2007) TN 2 (2007–2026) WA 2 (1998–2016) NM 2 (2021–2023) GA 2 (1993–1997) TX 2 (2019–2024) AK 2 (1982–1985) NY 2 (2013–2024) MD 2 (2009–2011)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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