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9 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gebbie v. Cadle Co.green2 sentences1998See id. (violation of CUTPA existed where defendant dismantled plaintiff’s mobile home rather than evict her); see also Gebbie v. Cadle Co., 49 Conn. App. 265, 278-80 , 714 A.2d 678 (1998) (affirming trial court’s finding that CUTPA violation existed where defendant acknowledged that it was bound by loan restructure agreement but refused to honor it). 1998See id. (violation of CUTPA existed where defendant dismantled plaintiff’s mobile home rather than evict her); see also Gebbie v. Cadle Co., 49 Conn. App. 265, 278-80 , 714 A.2d 678 (1998) (affirming trial court’s finding that CUTPA violation existed where defendant acknowledged that it was bound by loan restructure agreement but refused to honor it). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2024The petitioner was not prejudiced by his first habeas counsel’s failure to claim under Brady v. Maryland ( 373 U.S. 83 ) that the state had improperly failed to disclose to him a codefendant’s written statement to the police that became known after the jury returned its verdict in the petitioner’s criminal trial, as the statement was not material within the meaning of Brady. 2024The petitioner was not prejudiced by his first habeas counsel’s failure to claim under Brady v. Maryland ( 373 U.S. 83 ) that the state had improperly failed to disclose to him a codefendant’s written statement to the police that became known after the jury returned its verdict in the petitioner’s criminal trial, as the statement was not material within the meaning of Brady. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2024The petitioner also argues that this court ‘‘can and should . . . take judicial notice of the additional Gomez transcript[s] and the statements recorded therein that evidence the existence of an agreement or understanding between Gomez and the state.’’ In support of this argument, the petitioner points to Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, 280 Conn. 514 , 911 A.2d 712 (2006), a case in which he claims the Supreme Court ‘‘took judicial notice of Superior Court transcripts and allowed them to serve as the factual predicate for a claim on appeal.’’ Although the petitioner is correct that the co 2024The petitioner also argues that this court ‘‘can and should . . . take judicial notice of the additional Gomez transcript[s] and the statements recorded therein that evidence the existence of an agreement or understanding between Gomez and the state.’’ In support of this argument, the petitioner points to Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, 280 Conn. 514 , 911 A.2d 712 (2006), a case in which he claims the Supreme Court ‘‘took judicial notice of Superior Court transcripts and allowed them to serve as the factual predicate for a claim on appeal.’’ Although the petitioner is correct that the co | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Brunetti
green
2 sentences2022Because the trial court was not alerted to this right to confrontation issue, it did not have occasion to make findings of fact regarding the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and whether that threat was sufficiently compelling to curtail any constitutional right to in person confrontation. ‘‘In such circumstances, the [petitioner] bears no responsibility for the evidentiary lacunae, and, therefore, it would be manifestly unfair to the [petitioner] for this court to reach the merits of the [respondent’s] claim upon a mere assumption that [the factual predicate to her claim has been met].’’ 2022Because the trial court was not alerted to this right to confrontation issue, it did not have occasion to make findings of fact regarding the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and whether that threat was sufficiently compelling to curtail any constitutional right to in person confrontation. ‘‘In such circumstances, the [petitioner] bears no responsibility for the evidentiary lacunae, and, therefore, it would be manifestly unfair to the [petitioner] for this court to reach the merits of the [respondent’s] claim upon a mere assumption that [the factual predicate to her claim has been met].’’ | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Brunetti v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences2022Because the trial court was not alerted to this right to confrontation issue, it did not have occasion to make findings of fact regarding the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and whether that threat was sufficiently compelling to curtail any constitutional right to in person confrontation. ‘‘In such circumstances, the [petitioner] bears no responsibility for the evidentiary lacunae, and, therefore, it would be manifestly unfair to the [petitioner] for this court to reach the merits of the [respondent’s] claim upon a mere assumption that [the factual predicate to her claim has been met].’’ 2022Because the trial court was not alerted to this right to confrontation issue, it did not have occasion to make findings of fact regarding the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and whether that threat was sufficiently compelling to curtail any constitutional right to in person confrontation. ‘‘In such circumstances, the [petitioner] bears no responsibility for the evidentiary lacunae, and, therefore, it would be manifestly unfair to the [petitioner] for this court to reach the merits of the [respondent’s] claim upon a mere assumption that [the factual predicate to her claim has been met].’’ | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Sanders v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2012The representation of [trial counsel] as to this plea offer was deficient per the ruling in Sanders v. [ Commissioner of Correction, supra, 83 Conn.App. at 543 , 851 A.2d 313 ], in that [trial counsel] never communicated the offer to petitioner or did so in such an ineffective and insufficient way or manner so as to effectively be no communication at all.'" [4] Practice Book § 23-21 provides in relevant part: "Except as otherwise provided herein, the procedures set forth in Sections 23-22 through 23-42 shall apply to any petition for a writ of habeas corpus which sets forth a claim of illegal 2012The representation of [trial counsel] as to this plea offer was deficient per the ruling in Sanders v. [ Commissioner of Correction, supra, 83 Conn.App. at 543 , 851 A.2d 313 ], in that [trial counsel] never communicated the offer to petitioner or did so in such an ineffective and insufficient way or manner so as to effectively be no communication at all.'" [4] Practice Book § 23-21 provides in relevant part: "Except as otherwise provided herein, the procedures set forth in Sections 23-22 through 23-42 shall apply to any petition for a writ of habeas corpus which sets forth a claim of illegal | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Santiago
green
1 sentence2010In raising the claim on appeal, the defendant relies heavily on the cases of State v. Phillips, supra, 102 Conn. App. 716 , and State v. Santiago, supra, 245 Conn. 301 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Phillips
green
1 sentence2010In raising the claim on appeal, the defendant relies heavily on the cases of State v. Phillips, supra, 102 Conn. App. 716 , and State v. Santiago, supra, 245 Conn. 301 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Bartone v. Robert L. Day Co.
green
1 sentence2008Instead, the plaintiffs [must] prove fraudulent concealment by the more exacting standard of clear, precise, and unequivocal evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. *388 We conclude that the plaintiffs failed to present a factual predicate for their claim that the defendant intentionally concealed the facts alleged in their interrogatory response. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Demos
green
2 sentences1994See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bohannon, supra, 376 Mass. 95 ; State v. Demos, 94 Wash. 2d 733, 736-37 , 619 P.2d 968 (1980). 1994See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bohannon, supra, 376 Mass. 95 ; State v. Demos, 94 Wash. 2d 733, 736-37 , 619 P.2d 968 (1980). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.