Second Circuit rule in Connecticut

1994It would be a bizarre result if this court [adopted the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ analysis] when in another courthouse, a few blocks away, the federal court, being bound by the Second Circuit rule, required [the ‘Roth entitlement test’]. [Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 92 S. Ct. 2701 , 33 L.

1994It would be a bizarre result if this court [adopted the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ analysis] when in another courthouse, a few blocks away, the federal court, being bound by the Second Circuit rule, required [the ‘Roth entitlement test’]. [Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 92 S. Ct. 2701 , 33 L.

1993Tedesco v. Stamford, 24 Conn. App. 377 , 385 (1991).

1992We do not believe that when Congress enacted the concurrent jurisdiction provision of $ 1983 that it intended to create such a disparate treatment of plaintiffs depending on their choice of a federal or state forum.” Tedesco v. Stamford, 24 Conn. App. 377, 385 , 588 A.2d 656 (1991), rev’d on other grounds, 222 Conn. 233 , 610 A.2d 574 (1992) (in Tedesco, the $ 1983 issue before the Appellate Court was whether the plaintiffs counsel must have submitted contemporaneous time records to recover attorney’s fees or if reconstructed time sheets were sufficient).

2002But the court said in Simmons v. State , 160 Conn. 492 , 500 (1971), that: "The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor and the prescribed method of taking must be strictly pursued." It would be incongruous to dilute and skewer the constitutional rights the plaintiffs have under the taking clause per Simmons to satisfy a Second Circuit exception to the usual test used to determine whether a preliminary injunction should issue based on the fact that the government is sought to be enjoined.

2000We do not believe that when Congress enacted the concurrent jurisdiction provisions of [ 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq.] that it intended to create such a disparate treatment of plaintiffs depending on their choice of a federal or state forum.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schnabel v. Tyler, supra, 743 n.4; see also Red Maple Properties v. Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 730 , 739 n.7, 610 A.2d 1238 (1992).

1999Thus, to say that the Second Circuit test, and by implication, our test for establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination is a de minimis one and/or that such a burden is a "modest one," see Viola , supra at 43 F.3d page 104, is, without more, not very helpful. ii With the foregoing comments in mind, the court will now apply the Second Circuit analysis as set forth in Chambers to the claims and facts of this case.

1999Thus, to say that the Second Circuit test, and by implication, our test for establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination is a de minimis one and/or that such a burden is a "modest one," see Viola , supra at 43 F.3d page 104, is, without more, not very helpful. ii With the foregoing comments in mind, the court will now apply the Second Circuit analysis as set forth in Chambers to the claims and facts of this case.

1999Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing that (1) she was in the protected age group; (2) she was qualified for the job; (3) she was discharged; (4) the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination." Montana v. First Federal S L of Rochester , 869 F.2d 100 , 104 (CA 2, 1989), citing Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat , 702 F.2d 322 , 324 (CA 2, 1983) The Second Circuit applies this test for a prima facie case to age discrimination and all Title VII cases.

1999Dister v. CT Page 8696 Continental Group , 859 F.2d 1108 , 1114 (CA 2, 1988).

1999Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing that (1) she was in the protected age group; (2) she was qualified for the job; (3) she was discharged; (4) the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination." Montana v. First Federal S L of Rochester , 869 F.2d 100 , 104 (CA 2, 1989), citing Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat , 702 F.2d 322 , 324 (CA 2, 1983) The Second Circuit applies this test for a prima facie case to age discrimination and all Title VII cases.

1995The Second Circuit stated the rule of law in such cases: "Liability in the instant typed equal protection case should depend on proof that 1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and 2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." Id., 609-610 .

1992We do not believe that when Congress enacted the concurrent jurisdiction provision of $ 1983 that it intended to create such a disparate treatment of plaintiffs depending on their choice of a federal or state forum.” Tedesco v. Stamford, 24 Conn. App. 377, 385 , 588 A.2d 656 (1991), rev’d on other grounds, 222 Conn. 233 , 610 A.2d 574 (1992) (in Tedesco, the $ 1983 issue before the Appellate Court was whether the plaintiffs counsel must have submitted contemporaneous time records to recover attorney’s fees or if reconstructed time sheets were sufficient).

1992We do not believe that when Congress enacted the concurrent jurisdiction provision of $ 1983 that it intended to create such a disparate treatment of plaintiffs depending on their choice of a federal or state forum.” Tedesco v. Stamford, 24 Conn. App. 377, 385 , 588 A.2d 656 (1991), rev’d on other grounds, 222 Conn. 233 , 610 A.2d 574 (1992) (in Tedesco, the $ 1983 issue before the Appellate Court was whether the plaintiffs counsel must have submitted contemporaneous time records to recover attorney’s fees or if reconstructed time sheets were sufficient).

1980In urging that we follow a per se rule for a violation of § 2122 of our rules, the defendant refers us to the adoption of such a rule by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for a violation of the federal counterpart of § 2122: rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 5 In United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1976), that court was presented with the question whether a guilty plea must be invalidated where the district court judge advised the defendant of most of the constitutional rights referred to in rule 11 (c) but failed explicitly to inform him o

1980United States v. Journet, supra, 636 .