should adopt standard in Connecticut

2022In his original brief to this court, the defendant claimed that the lay opinion testimony improperly embraced an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury and, therefore, violated § 7-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.5 Following oral argument, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing two issues: (1) ‘‘Whether this court should adopt rule 704 (a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and overrule State v. Finan, 275 Conn. 60, 61 , 881 A.2d 187 (2005)?’’ And (2) ‘‘[i]f the court adopts rule 704 (a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, what standard should govern the admission

2022In his original brief to this court, the defendant claimed that the lay opinion testimony improperly embraced an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury and, therefore, violated § 7-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.5 Following oral argument, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing two issues: (1) ‘‘Whether this court should adopt rule 704 (a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and overrule State v. Finan, 275 Conn. 60, 61 , 881 A.2d 187 (2005)?’’ And (2) ‘‘[i]f the court adopts rule 704 (a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, what standard should govern the admission

2019In Caruso II, supra, 285 Conn. 649 , the plaintiff con- tended that this court in Penn had ‘‘too literally con- strued the language in . . . § 9-329a, so that basically [the plaintiff’s] burden became showing that but for the irregularities there would have been a different result . . . .’’6 (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff contended that this court should adopt the standard that the court had applied in Bortner v. Woodbridge, supra, 250 Conn. 241 , when construing a similar provision of § 9-328.

2012Instead, she suggests that the court should adopt the standard articulated by the First Circuit in Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., supra, 862 F.2d at 926 , or by this court in Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324 , 915 A.2d 790 (2007).

2012Instead, she suggests that the court should adopt the standard articulated by the First Circuit in Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., supra, 862 F.2d at 926 , or by this court in Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324 , 915 A.2d 790 (2007).

2012Instead, she suggests that the court should adopt the standard articulated by the First Circuit in Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., supra, 862 F.2d at 926 , or by this court in Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324 , 915 A.2d 790 (2007).

2011As I stated in my concurring opinion in State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537, 587-88 , 4 A.3d 1176 (2010) (Palmer, J., concurring), I believe that this court should adopt a rule, in the exercise of its inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice, requiring the police to record electronically all police station interrogations of suspects, unless it would not be reasonably feasible for the police to do so in a particular case.

2011As I stated in my concurring opinion in State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537, 587-88 , 4 A.3d 1176 (2010) (Palmer, J., concurring), I believe that this court should adopt a rule, in the exercise of its inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice, requiring the police to record electronically all police station interrogations of suspects, unless it would not be reasonably feasible for the police to do so in a particular case.

2009The state disputes the defendant’s claim that using a dangerous weapon in violation of § 53a-60 (a) (2) is the same thing as carrying a dangerous weapon in violation of § 53-206 (a), and also contends, essentially as an alternate ground for affirmance, that this court should adopt the rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 , 105 S. Ct. 471 , 83 L.

2009The state disputes the defendant’s claim that using a dangerous weapon in violation of § 53a-60 (a) (2) is the same thing as carrying a dangerous weapon in violation of § 53-206 (a), and also contends, essentially as an alternate ground for affirmance, that this court should adopt the rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 , 105 S. Ct. 471 , 83 L.

2008Id., at 842-43 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 , 183 P.3d 384 .

2008Id., at 842-43 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 , 183 P.3d 384 .

2005"When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977).

2005"When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977).

2005It has not, however, attempted to reconcile Demosthenes with its claim that due process requires a case for incompetence to be presented at all Rees competency hearings and has not provided any reasons why this court should adopt a standard that goes beyond the requirements of due process. [13] We also note that the plurality opinion in Ford v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. 399 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 , does not necessarily represent the governing law on this issue.

2005It has not, however, attempted to reconcile Demosthenes with its claim that due process requires a case for incompetence to be presented at all Rees competency hearings and has not provided any reasons why this court should adopt a standard that goes beyond the requirements of due process. [13] We also note that the plurality opinion in Ford v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. 399 , 106 S.Ct. 2595 , 91 L.Ed.2d 335 , does not necessarily represent the governing law on this issue.

2001The defendant argues, however, that this court should adopt a rule similar to that adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S. Ct. 823 , 74 L.

2001The defendant argues, however, that this court should adopt a rule similar to that adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S. Ct. 823 , 74 L.

2001The defendant argues, however, that this court should adopt a rule similar to that adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S. Ct. 823 , 74 L.

2001The defendant argues, however, that this court should adopt a rule similar to that adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 , 103 S. Ct. 823 , 74 L.

1996In this connection, the gist of the defendant’s argument is that, as a matter of state constitutional law, the court should adopt the principle, articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 162-63 , 385 N.E.2d 612 , 412 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), that a postinformation waiver of the right to counsel may occur only in the presence of counsel.

1996In this connection, the gist of the defendant’s argument is that, as a matter of state constitutional law, the court should adopt the principle, articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 162-63 , 385 N.E.2d 612 , 412 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), that a postinformation waiver of the right to counsel may occur only in the presence of counsel.