must give instruction in District of Columbia

2017See (Anthony) Shuler v. United States, 677 A.2d 1014, 1017 (D.C. 1996). “[T]he weight of the evidence supporting the instruction is immaterial; as long as a jury could rationally convict on the lesser-included offense after crediting the evidence, the court must give the instruction no matter how inclined it might be to discount that evidence.” Id.

2017See (Anthony) Shuler v. United States, 677 A.2d 1014, 1017 (D.C. 1996). “[T]he weight of the evidence supporting the instruction is immaterial; as long as a jury could rationally convict on the lesser-included offense after crediting the evidence, the court must give the instruction no matter how inclined it might be to discount that evidence.” Id.

2006A lesser-ineluded offense instruction must be given when there is “evidence, however weak, sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant is guilty of the lesser rather than the greater offense.” Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 54 (D.C.1990) (en banc). “[T]he weight of the evidence supporting the instruction is immaterial; as long as a jury could rationally convict on the lesser-ineluded offense after crediting the evidence, the court must give the instruction no matter how inclined it might be to discount that evidence.” Shuler v. United States, 677 A.2d 1014, 1017 (D.C.1996) (em

2004The instruction must be provided if there is “evidence, however weak, sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant is guilty of the lesser rather than the greater offense.” Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 54 (D.C.1990) (en banc) (citing Graves v. United States, 490 A.2d 1086 (D.C.1984) (en banc)). “[T]he weight of the evidence supporting the instruction is immaterial; as long as a jury could rationally convict on the lesser-included offense after crediting the evidence, the court must give the instruction no matter how inclined it might be to discount that evidence.” Shuler v. U

2010However, no lesser-included offense instruction is permitted where the jury "would have to engage in an irrational or bizarre reconstruction of the facts of the case." Anderson v. United States, 490 A.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C.1985).

2010However, no lesser-included offense instruction is permitted where the jury “would have to engage in an irrational or bizarre reconstruction of the facts of the case.” Anderson v. United States, 490 A.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C.1985).

2004Specifically, “[t]he intent necessary to prove criminal negligence involuntary manslaughter is a ‘lack of awareness or failure to perceive the risk of injury from a course of conduct under circumstances in which the actor should have been aware of the risk.’ Thus, where the accused was aware of the risk of harm, but acted in conscious disregard of it, the killing is murder or voluntary manslaughter, and where the accused is not aware of the risk of harm, but should have been, the killing will be involuntary manslaughter.” *1074 Boykins, supra, 702 A.2d at 1250 -51 (quoting United States v. Bra

1996At the same time, the court is “not required to put the case to the jury on a basis that essentially indulges and even encourages speculations as to bizarre reconstruction.” Sinclair, 144 U.S.App.D.C. at 15, 444 F.2d at 890 ; see West v. United States, 499 A.2d 860, 865 (D.C.1985) (no error in withholding instruction that lacked a “rational basis” in the evidence and would have encouraged jury to undertake a “bizarre reconstruction” of the proof).

1996This requirement is “a minimal one; it means any evidence ... however weak.” Day v. United States, 390 A.2d 957, 962 (D.C.1978). 4 That is to say, the weight of the evidence supporting the instruction is immaterial; as long as a jury could rationally convict on the lesser-included offense after crediting the evidence, the court must give the instruction no matter how inclined it might be to discount that evidence.