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9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 2004–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Napue v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2025As to the second prong, although we address later the government’s argument that a Napue claim raised in a § 23-110 motion is not reversible if it is harmless under a more lenient standard for assessing harm, see infra Part II.C, under the materiality standard inherent to a Napue error, “a new trial is warranted so long as the false testimony ‘may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial’—that is, if it ‘in any reasonable likelihood could have affected the judgment of the jury.’” 8 Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. ----, 145 S. Ct. 612 , 626-27 (2025) (brackets omitted) (first quoting Napue, 2025As to the second prong, although we address later the government’s argument that a Napue claim raised in a § 23-110 motion is not reversible if it is harmless under a more lenient standard for assessing harm, see infra Part II.C, under the materiality standard inherent to a Napue error, “a new trial is warranted so long as the false testimony ‘may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial’—that is, if it ‘in any reasonable likelihood could have affected the judgment of the jury.’” 8 Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. ----, 145 S. Ct. 612 , 626-27 (2025) (brackets omitted) (first quoting Napue, | 2 | 5 |
United States v. Michael O'keefe, Sr. Eric Schmidt John O'Brien Gary Bennett Paul Schmitzgreen2 sentences2012See Napue, 360 U.S. at 271-72 , 79 S.Ct. 1173 (noting that “[we] make [our] own independent examination of the record,” including “re-examin[ing] the evidentiary bases” for the trial court’s determination); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (holding that the Napue standard is equivalent to that applicable to constitutional errors under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284, 294-95 (2d Cir.2002); United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 894 (5th Cir.1997). 2012See Napue, 360 U.S. at 271-72 , 79 S.Ct. 1173 (noting that “[we] make [our] own independent examination of the record,” including “re-examin[ing] the evidentiary bases” for the trial court’s determination); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (holding that the Napue standard is equivalent to that applicable to constitutional errors under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284, 294-95 (2d Cir.2002); United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 894 (5th Cir.1997). | 2 | 2 |
Giglio v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025As to the second prong, although we address later the government’s argument that a Napue claim raised in a § 23-110 motion is not reversible if it is harmless under a more lenient standard for assessing harm, see infra Part II.C, under the materiality standard inherent to a Napue error, “a new trial is warranted so long as the false testimony ‘may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial’—that is, if it ‘in any reasonable likelihood could have affected the judgment of the jury.’” 8 Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. ----, 145 S. Ct. 612 , 626-27 (2025) (brackets omitted) (first quoting Napue, 2025As to the second prong, although we address later the government’s argument that a Napue claim raised in a § 23-110 motion is not reversible if it is harmless under a more lenient standard for assessing harm, see infra Part II.C, under the materiality standard inherent to a Napue error, “a new trial is warranted so long as the false testimony ‘may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial’—that is, if it ‘in any reasonable likelihood could have affected the judgment of the jury.’” 8 Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. ----, 145 S. Ct. 612 , 626-27 (2025) (brackets omitted) (first quoting Napue, | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Bagleygreen2 sentences2025Although Mr. Redmond and the government disagree about who bears the burden with respect to the materiality prong of a Napue violation, this court has already held that “[o]nce the appellant has made sufficient demonstration of uncorrected false testimony[,] then the burden shifts to the government.” Mitchell, 101 A.3d at 1008 ; accord Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836, 845 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]e must conclude that appellant’s due process rights were violated necessitating a new trial if . . . the government cannot show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the false testimony was harmless in the co 2025Although Mr. Redmond and the government disagree about who bears the burden with respect to the materiality prong of a Napue violation, this court has already held that “[o]nce the appellant has made sufficient demonstration of uncorrected false testimony[,] then the burden shifts to the government.” Mitchell, 101 A.3d at 1008 ; accord Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836, 845 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]e must conclude that appellant’s due process rights were violated necessitating a new trial if . . . the government cannot show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the false testimony was harmless in the co | 1 | 2 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2025Although Mr. Redmond and the government disagree about who bears the burden with respect to the materiality prong of a Napue violation, this court has already held that “[o]nce the appellant has made sufficient demonstration of uncorrected false testimony[,] then the burden shifts to the government.” Mitchell, 101 A.3d at 1008 ; accord Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836, 845 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]e must conclude that appellant’s due process rights were violated necessitating a new trial if . . . the government cannot show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the false testimony was harmless in the co 2025Although Mr. Redmond and the government disagree about who bears the burden with respect to the materiality prong of a Napue violation, this court has already held that “[o]nce the appellant has made sufficient demonstration of uncorrected false testimony[,] then the burden shifts to the government.” Mitchell, 101 A.3d at 1008 ; accord Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836, 845 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]e must conclude that appellant’s due process rights were violated necessitating a new trial if . . . the government cannot show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the false testimony was harmless in the co | 1 | 2 |
O'Brien v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2012See O’Brien v. United States, 962 A.2d 282, 314 (D.C.2008) (stating in the context of a Rule 33 motion for new trial raising a Napue claim, “[t]his court reviews a decision to deny a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). 2012See O’Brien v. United States, 962 A.2d 282, 314 (D.C.2008) (stating in the context of a Rule 33 motion for new trial raising a Napue claim, “[t]his court reviews a decision to deny a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). | 1 | 2 |
Longus v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025Although Mr. Redmond and the government disagree about who bears the burden with respect to the materiality prong of a Napue violation, this court has already held that “[o]nce the appellant has made sufficient demonstration of uncorrected false testimony[,] then the burden shifts to the government.” Mitchell, 101 A.3d at 1008 ; accord Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836, 845 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]e must conclude that appellant’s due process rights were violated necessitating a new trial if . . . the government cannot show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the false testimony was harmless in the co 2025Although Mr. Redmond and the government disagree about who bears the burden with respect to the materiality prong of a Napue violation, this court has already held that “[o]nce the appellant has made sufficient demonstration of uncorrected false testimony[,] then the burden shifts to the government.” Mitchell, 101 A.3d at 1008 ; accord Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836, 845 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]e must conclude that appellant’s due process rights were violated necessitating a new trial if . . . the government cannot show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the false testimony was harmless in the co | 1 | 2 |
cluster 2534green1 sentence2025See Drake, 553 F.3d at 241 n.6 (“[C]ertain types of habeas claims, such as errors under Napue, are analyzed under their own harmless error standard.”). | 1 | 1 |
Vance Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCIgreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Jones, 202 A.3d at 1157 (Napue claim raised on § 23-110 motion); Nelson, 217 A.3d at 719 (same); Mitchell, 101 A.3d at 1009 (same); see also Glossip, 145 S. Ct. at 623 n.4 (2025) (explaining that the defendant seeking state habeas relief had no occasion 25 to raise his Napue claim on direct appeal); Haskell, 866 F.3d at 151 (“A defendant will usually be unable to litigate his claims of perjured testimony at ‘the trial itself’ because the trial is where the perjury occurs. | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025Although Mr. Redmond and the government disagree about who bears the burden with respect to the materiality prong of a Napue violation, this court has already held that “[o]nce the appellant has made sufficient demonstration of uncorrected false testimony[,] then the burden shifts to the government.” Mitchell, 101 A.3d at 1008 ; accord Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836, 845 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]e must conclude that appellant’s due process rights were violated necessitating a new trial if . . . the government cannot show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the false testimony was harmless in the co 2025Although Mr. Redmond and the government disagree about who bears the burden with respect to the materiality prong of a Napue violation, this court has already held that “[o]nce the appellant has made sufficient demonstration of uncorrected false testimony[,] then the burden shifts to the government.” Mitchell, 101 A.3d at 1008 ; accord Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836, 845 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]e must conclude that appellant’s due process rights were violated necessitating a new trial if . . . the government cannot show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the false testimony was harmless in the co | 1 | 1 |
Michael A. Jones v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025As to the second prong, although we address later the government’s argument that a Napue claim raised in a § 23-110 motion is not reversible if it is harmless under a more lenient standard for assessing harm, see infra Part II.C, under the materiality standard inherent to a Napue error, “a new trial is warranted so long as the false testimony ‘may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial’—that is, if it ‘in any reasonable likelihood could have affected the judgment of the jury.’” 8 Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. ----, 145 S. Ct. 612 , 626-27 (2025) (brackets omitted) (first quoting Napue, 2025As to the second prong, although we address later the government’s argument that a Napue claim raised in a § 23-110 motion is not reversible if it is harmless under a more lenient standard for assessing harm, see infra Part II.C, under the materiality standard inherent to a Napue error, “a new trial is warranted so long as the false testimony ‘may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial’—that is, if it ‘in any reasonable likelihood could have affected the judgment of the jury.’” 8 Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. ----, 145 S. Ct. 612 , 626-27 (2025) (brackets omitted) (first quoting Napue, | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Alvin Claygreen2 sentences2025See Clay, 720 F.3d at 1026 ; Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1112 ; Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 589 . 2025See Clay, 720 F.3d at 1026 ; Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1112 ; Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 589 . | 1 | 1 |
Gary Gathers & Keith Mitchell v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025Although Mr. Redmond and the government disagree about who bears the burden with respect to the materiality prong of a Napue violation, this court has already held that “[o]nce the appellant has made sufficient demonstration of uncorrected false testimony[,] then the burden shifts to the government.” Mitchell, 101 A.3d at 1008 ; accord Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836, 845 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]e must conclude that appellant’s due process rights were violated necessitating a new trial if . . . the government cannot show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the false testimony was harmless in the co 2025Although Mr. Redmond and the government disagree about who bears the burden with respect to the materiality prong of a Napue violation, this court has already held that “[o]nce the appellant has made sufficient demonstration of uncorrected false testimony[,] then the burden shifts to the government.” Mitchell, 101 A.3d at 1008 ; accord Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836, 845 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]e must conclude that appellant’s due process rights were violated necessitating a new trial if . . . the government cannot show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the false testimony was harmless in the co | 1 | 1 |
Bruce v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014Citing, inter alia, Bruce v. United States, 617 A.2d 986, 992-93 (D.C.1992), the mo-' tions court reasoned that appellants had waived their Napue claim and could not satisfy cause and prejudice. 2014This case is quite distinct from Bruce, supra, 617 A.2d at 992-93 , cited by the motions court and the government, where both parties were indubitably aware of the actually falsity of the testimony that gunshots were fired and, unlike here, the prosecutor unfailingly presented the government’s case on the basis of the true fact of an inoperable gun. | 1 | 1 |
Hawthorne v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2012Assessing Prejudice Normally, in evaluating a Napue claim, we would consider whether there was “ ‘any reasonable likelihood’ that false testimony could ‘have affected the judgment of the jury.’ ” 11 Hawthorne v. United States, 504 A.2d 580, 589-90 (D.C.1986) (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), which in turn was quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271 , 79 S.Ct. 1173 ). 2012Assessing Prejudice Normally, in evaluating a Napue claim, we would consider whether there was “ ‘any reasonable likelihood’ that false testimony could ‘have affected the judgment of the jury.’ ” 11 Hawthorne v. United States, 504 A.2d 580, 589-90 (D.C.1986) (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), which in turn was quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271 , 79 S.Ct. 1173 ). | 1 | 1 |
Eric Jenkins, Petitioner-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Christopher Artuz, Superintendent, Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Appelleegreen2 sentences2012See Napue, 360 U.S. at 271-72 , 79 S.Ct. 1173 (noting that “[we] make [our] own independent examination of the record,” including “re-examin[ing] the evidentiary bases” for the trial court’s determination); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (holding that the Napue standard is equivalent to that applicable to constitutional errors under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284, 294-95 (2d Cir.2002); United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 894 (5th Cir.1997). 2012See Napue, 360 U.S. at 271-72 , 79 S.Ct. 1173 (noting that “[we] make [our] own independent examination of the record,” including “re-examin[ing] the evidentiary bases” for the trial court’s determination); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (holding that the Napue standard is equivalent to that applicable to constitutional errors under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284, 294-95 (2d Cir.2002); United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 894 (5th Cir.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Card v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2008See Card v. United States, 776 A.2d 581, 602 (D.C.2001). 2008See Card v. United States, 776 A.2d 581, 602 (D.C.2001). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Groszgreen2 sentences2004See also United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 895 (5th Cir.1997) (no error where defense elicited contradictory information through cross-examination and had opportunity to use the information “to powerful effect”); United States v. Grosz, 76 F.3d 1318, 1327-28 (5th Cir.1996) (affirming conviction where defense had access to and made use of evidence that contradicted government witness’ falsehood); United States v. Adebayo, 985 F.2d 1333, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993) (no Napue violation where defense had “leeway” to explore government witness’ falsehood on cross-examination and took advantage of it 2004See also United States v. O'Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 895 (5th Cir.1997) (no error where defense elicited contradictory information through cross-examination and had opportunity to use the information "to powerful effect"); United States v. Grosz, 76 F.3d 1318, 1327-28 (5th Cir.1996) (affirming conviction where defense had access to and made use of evidence that contradicted government witness' falsehood); United States v. Adebayo, 985 F.2d 1333, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993) (no Napue violation where defense had "leeway" to explore government witness' falsehood on cross-examination and took advantage of it | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Oluremi Adebayo and Christopher A. Davisgreen2 sentences2004See also United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 895 (5th Cir.1997) (no error where defense elicited contradictory information through cross-examination and had opportunity to use the information “to powerful effect”); United States v. Grosz, 76 F.3d 1318, 1327-28 (5th Cir.1996) (affirming conviction where defense had access to and made use of evidence that contradicted government witness’ falsehood); United States v. Adebayo, 985 F.2d 1333, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993) (no Napue violation where defense had “leeway” to explore government witness’ falsehood on cross-examination and took advantage of it 2004See also United States v. O'Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 895 (5th Cir.1997) (no error where defense elicited contradictory information through cross-examination and had opportunity to use the information "to powerful effect"); United States v. Grosz, 76 F.3d 1318, 1327-28 (5th Cir.1996) (affirming conviction where defense had access to and made use of evidence that contradicted government witness' falsehood); United States v. Adebayo, 985 F.2d 1333, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993) (no Napue violation where defense had "leeway" to explore government witness' falsehood on cross-examination and took advantage of it | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thompson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025But see Thompson v. United States, 45 A.3d 688, 693 (D.C. 2012) (Napue claim concerning false pretrial testimony raised on direct appeal). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2025A Napue claim is one type of violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the landmark case establishing prosecutors’ duties of disclosure. 2025A Napue claim is one type of violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the landmark case establishing prosecutors’ duties of disclosure. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Woodall v. United States
green
2 sentences2025In stating this materiality standard, we have referred to both a “reasonable likelihood” and a “reasonable possibility” that the falsehood affected the verdict, but “there is no substantive difference in these formulations.” Woodall v. United States, 842 A.2d 690 , 696 & n.6 (D.C. 2004). 2025In stating this materiality standard, we have referred to both a “reasonable likelihood” and a “reasonable possibility” that the falsehood affected the verdict, but “there is no substantive difference in these formulations.” Woodall v. United States, 842 A.2d 690 , 696 & n.6 (D.C. 2004). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Michael D. Tann v. United States
green
2 sentences2025See Austin, 315 A.3d at 603 (overwhelming evidence supports a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained); Nelson, 217 A.3d at 723 (for a Napue violation, “[w]e have held that a factor that may also weigh in favor of finding harmless error is when the evidence against the defendant is so overwhelming, and consists of strong independent, circumstantial evidence, and other evidence to sufficiently mitigate any negative effect of the tainted evidence” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Tann v. United States, 127 A.3d 400 , 460 n. 2025See Austin, 315 A.3d at 603 (overwhelming evidence supports a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained); Nelson, 217 A.3d at 723 (for a Napue violation, “[w]e have held that a factor that may also weigh in favor of finding harmless error is when the evidence against the defendant is so overwhelming, and consists of strong independent, circumstantial evidence, and other evidence to sufficiently mitigate any negative effect of the tainted evidence” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Tann v. United States, 127 A.3d 400 , 460 n. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
George James Trepal v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences2025See Clay, 720 F.3d at 1026 ; Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1112 ; Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 589 . 2025See Clay, 720 F.3d at 1026 ; Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1112 ; Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 589 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Rosencrantz v. Lafler
green
2 sentences2025See Clay, 720 F.3d at 1026 ; Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1112 ; Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 589 . 2025See Clay, 720 F.3d at 1026 ; Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1112 ; Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 589 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Heath v. United States
green
2 sentences2019In its order in this case, the court cited Heath v. United States , 26 A.3d 266 , 280 (2011), as requiring a showing of "reasonable probability" rather than "reasonable possibility." Heath , however, did not involve a Napue claim and did not suggest that a "reasonable probability" standard governed such claims. 2019In its order in this case, the court cited Heath v. United States , 26 A.3d 266 , 280 (2011), as requiring a showing of "reasonable probability" rather than "reasonable possibility." Heath , however, did not involve a Napue claim and did not suggest that a "reasonable probability" standard governed such claims. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Hood v. United States
green
2 sentences2019Hood v. United States , 28 A.3d 553 , 564 (D.C. 2011) (footnotes omitted). 2019Hood v. United States , 28 A.3d 553 , 564 (D.C. 2011) (footnotes omitted). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Smith v. Phillips
green
2 sentences2012Thus, “when the ‘reliability of a given witness may be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 17 Our conclusion that a Napue claim does not depend on whether the government calls and questions the witness is supported by the Supreme Court’s grounding of Napue and Giglio on the Due Process Clause, for which “the touchstone ... is the fairness of the trial.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). 2012Thus, “when the ‘reliability of a given witness may be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 17 Our conclusion that a Napue claim does not depend on whether the government calls and questions the witness is supported by the Supreme Court’s grounding of Napue and Giglio on the Due Process Clause, for which “the touchstone ... is the fairness of the trial.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.