Napue violation in Pennsylvania

2026A Napue error consists of three elements: (1) a prosecution witness testified falsely3; (2) the prosecution either knew or should have known that the testimony was false4; and (3) the prosecutor failed to correct it.5 See Glossip, 604 U.S. at 246 (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269 ).

2026A Napue error consists of three elements: (1) a prosecution witness testified falsely3; (2) the prosecution either knew or should have known that the testimony was false4; and (3) the prosecutor failed to correct it.5 See Glossip, 604 U.S. at 246 (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269 ).

2026I, § 14; accord 42 Pa.C.S. § 6501; see also Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007) (“Despite our prior indications that all claims that can be channeled into the PCRA should be so channeled, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not been suspended in this Commonwealth.” (citation omitted)).

2026I, § 14; accord 42 Pa.C.S. § 6501; see also Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007) (“Despite our prior indications that all claims that can be channeled into the PCRA should be so channeled, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not been suspended in this Commonwealth.” (citation omitted)).

2026In practice, unless the uncontradicted evidence of guilt is truly “overwhelming,”10 a Napue error serves as “a veritable hair trigger for setting aside the conviction[.]” United States v. Butler, 955 F.3d 1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230, 241 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[I]f it is established that the government 9 The differences between the Brady and Napue standards are facially obvious.

2026In practice, unless the uncontradicted evidence of guilt is truly “overwhelming,”10 a Napue error serves as “a veritable hair trigger for setting aside the conviction[.]” United States v. Butler, 955 F.3d 1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230, 241 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[I]f it is established that the government 9 The differences between the Brady and Napue standards are facially obvious.

2026Glossip, 604 U.S. at 248 .17 17 See also Hallowell, 383 A.2d at 910-912 (granting new trial where the uncorrected false testimony concerned promises of leniency and came from a codefendant, “who testified as the only eyewitness to the killing and robbery”); Wallace, 455 A.2d at 1191 (granting new trial where material witness’s “testimony on several items concerning his criminal record and background was false, and was allowed to go uncorrected by the district attorney”); Moehring, 285 A.2d at 489 (granting new trial where material witness’s “false testimony, uncorrected by the Commonwealth, ma

2026Since the Majority concludes the reasonable probability standard supersedes the Napue standard, PCRA petitioners will be forced to litigate false-testimony claims under the Brady materiality standard.14 They 13 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 210 A.3d 1014, 1018-1019 (Pa. 2019) (“In the context of a post-conviction challenge to counsel’s stewardship, prejudice is established where the truth-determining process was so undermined that ‘no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place,’ i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome of th

2026Since the Majority concludes the reasonable probability standard supersedes the Napue standard, PCRA petitioners will be forced to litigate false-testimony claims under the Brady materiality standard.14 They 13 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 210 A.3d 1014, 1018-1019 (Pa. 2019) (“In the context of a post-conviction challenge to counsel’s stewardship, prejudice is established where the truth-determining process was so undermined that ‘no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place,’ i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome of th

2026In practice, unless the uncontradicted evidence of guilt is truly “overwhelming,”10 a Napue error serves as “a veritable hair trigger for setting aside the conviction[.]” United States v. Butler, 955 F.3d 1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230, 241 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[I]f it is established that the government 9 The differences between the Brady and Napue standards are facially obvious.

2026In practice, unless the uncontradicted evidence of guilt is truly “overwhelming,”10 a Napue error serves as “a veritable hair trigger for setting aside the conviction[.]” United States v. Butler, 955 F.3d 1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230, 241 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[I]f it is established that the government 9 The differences between the Brady and Napue standards are facially obvious.

2026Under Brady, the test for materiality is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-434 (citations omitted; emphases added).

2026Under Brady, the test for materiality is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-434 (citations omitted; emphases added).

2026The Napue standard is also “considerably less demanding than other materiality standards on constitutional claims arising from criminal cases.” Clements v. Madden, 112 F.4th 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2026The Napue standard is also “considerably less demanding than other materiality standards on constitutional claims arising from criminal cases.” Clements v. Madden, 112 F.4th 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2026Since the Majority concludes the reasonable probability standard supersedes the Napue standard, PCRA petitioners will be forced to litigate false-testimony claims under the Brady materiality standard.14 They 13 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 210 A.3d 1014, 1018-1019 (Pa. 2019) (“In the context of a post-conviction challenge to counsel’s stewardship, prejudice is established where the truth-determining process was so undermined that ‘no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place,’ i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome of th

2026Since the Majority concludes the reasonable probability standard supersedes the Napue standard, PCRA petitioners will be forced to litigate false-testimony claims under the Brady materiality standard.14 They 13 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 210 A.3d 1014, 1018-1019 (Pa. 2019) (“In the context of a post-conviction challenge to counsel’s stewardship, prejudice is established where the truth-determining process was so undermined that ‘no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place,’ i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome of th

2026“Assuming the plea agreement is legally possible to fulfill, when the parties enter the plea agreement on the record, and the court accepts and approves the plea, then the parties and the court must abide by the terms of the agreement.” Commonwealth v. Parsons, 969 A.2d 1259, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).

2026See Commonwealth v. Felder, 247 A.3d 14, 20 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “an issue identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant’s brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived” (citation and emphasis omitted)). - 26 -

2026See Commonwealth v. Felder, 247 A.3d 14, 20 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “an issue identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant’s brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived” (citation and emphasis omitted)). - 26 -

2026Cf. id. at 334-335 (holding the “innocence requirement” set forth in Section 9543(a)(2)(iii) of the PCRA “cannot foreclose federal habeas review of [ ] ineffective assistance claims”).

2026Resultingly, the Commonwealth is required to show [J-49-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 13 “beyond a reasonable doubt that the [Napue error] did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. at 246 (citation omitted); accord Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 .

2026See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 266 (Pa. 2013) (“As [Simpson] has ... simply suggested that under the circumstances a deal between Hall and the Commonwealth ‘must have been made,’ without proffering any evidence, the PCRA court correctly dismissed this claim without a hearing.”); Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 412 (Pa. 2003) (“[Champney’s] mere assumption that something such as a promise to assist in reducing [a witness’s] federal sentence must have been made is not sufficient to establish that such an agreement in fact existed.”).

2026See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 266 (Pa. 2013) (“As [Simpson] has ... simply suggested that under the circumstances a deal between Hall and the Commonwealth ‘must have been made,’ without proffering any evidence, the PCRA court correctly dismissed this claim without a hearing.”); Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 412 (Pa. 2003) (“[Champney’s] mere assumption that something such as a promise to assist in reducing [a witness’s] federal sentence must have been made is not sufficient to establish that such an agreement in fact existed.”).

2026Since the Majority concludes the reasonable probability standard supersedes the Napue standard, PCRA petitioners will be forced to litigate false-testimony claims under the Brady materiality standard.14 They 13 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 210 A.3d 1014, 1018-1019 (Pa. 2019) (“In the context of a post-conviction challenge to counsel’s stewardship, prejudice is established where the truth-determining process was so undermined that ‘no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place,’ i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome of th

2026Since the Majority concludes the reasonable probability standard supersedes the Napue standard, PCRA petitioners will be forced to litigate false-testimony claims under the Brady materiality standard.14 They 13 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 210 A.3d 1014, 1018-1019 (Pa. 2019) (“In the context of a post-conviction challenge to counsel’s stewardship, prejudice is established where the truth-determining process was so undermined that ‘no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place,’ i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome of th

2026Glossip, 604 U.S. at 248 .17 17 See also Hallowell, 383 A.2d at 910-912 (granting new trial where the uncorrected false testimony concerned promises of leniency and came from a codefendant, “who testified as the only eyewitness to the killing and robbery”); Wallace, 455 A.2d at 1191 (granting new trial where material witness’s “testimony on several items concerning his criminal record and background was false, and was allowed to go uncorrected by the district attorney”); Moehring, 285 A.2d at 489 (granting new trial where material witness’s “false testimony, uncorrected by the Commonwealth, ma

2026Glossip, 604 U.S. at 248 .17 17 See also Hallowell, 383 A.2d at 910-912 (granting new trial where the uncorrected false testimony concerned promises of leniency and came from a codefendant, “who testified as the only eyewitness to the killing and robbery”); Wallace, 455 A.2d at 1191 (granting new trial where material witness’s “testimony on several items concerning his criminal record and background was false, and was allowed to go uncorrected by the district attorney”); Moehring, 285 A.2d at 489 (granting new trial where material witness’s “false testimony, uncorrected by the Commonwealth, ma

2026See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 220 n.10 (1982); accord Rega v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 115 F.4th 235 , 244 (3d Cir. 2024).

2026See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 , 220 n.10 (1982); accord Rega v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 115 F.4th 235 , 244 (3d Cir. 2024).

2026Greevy v. Reifsteck, 115 A. 130, 132 (Pa. 1921) (stating that, while the General Assembly may enact legislation affecting the availability of habeas corpus relief, the “right to a habeas corpus is recognized in [A]rticle 1, [Section] 14, of the [Pennsylvania] Constitution … , and hence [a detainee] cannot be wholly deprived thereof, or the right be so hampered as to amount to a practical deprivation”). [J-49-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 11 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a state court’s rejection of Napue claim was not entitled to deference because the court “applied a state law standard f

2026The Napue materiality “standard is ‘lower, more favorable to the defendant[ ] and hostile to the prosecution as compared to the standard of a general Brady withholding violation.”9 Rega, 115 F.4th at 244 (citing Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2017)).

2026The Napue materiality “standard is ‘lower, more favorable to the defendant[ ] and hostile to the prosecution as compared to the standard of a general Brady withholding violation.”9 Rega, 115 F.4th at 244 (citing Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2017)).

2025See Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 280 (Pa. 2008) (reiterating that - 15 - Counsel’s arguments presented in support of a motion are not evidence).

2025See Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 280 (Pa. 2008) (reiterating that - 15 - Counsel’s arguments presented in support of a motion are not evidence).

2025See Commonwealth v. Conforti, 303 A.3d 715 , 730 (Pa. 2023) (requiring proof for a Brady claim of a “reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different”); see Commonwealth v. Romansky, 702 A.2d 1064, 1068 (Pa. Super. 1997) (explaining that for a Napue claim, testimony must be materially false, such that “it could in any reasonable likelihood have influenced the verdict”).

2025See Commonwealth v. Conforti, 303 A.3d 715 , 730 (Pa. 2023) (requiring proof for a Brady claim of a “reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different”); see Commonwealth v. Romansky, 702 A.2d 1064, 1068 (Pa. Super. 1997) (explaining that for a Napue claim, testimony must be materially false, such that “it could in any reasonable likelihood have influenced the verdict”).

2025See Commonwealth v. Conforti, 303 A.3d 715 , 730 (Pa. 2023) (requiring proof for a Brady claim of a “reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different”); see Commonwealth v. Romansky, 702 A.2d 1064, 1068 (Pa. Super. 1997) (explaining that for a Napue claim, testimony must be materially false, such that “it could in any reasonable likelihood have influenced the verdict”).

2025See Commonwealth v. Conforti, 303 A.3d 715 , 730 (Pa. 2023) (requiring proof for a Brady claim of a “reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different”); see Commonwealth v. Romansky, 702 A.2d 1064, 1068 (Pa. Super. 1997) (explaining that for a Napue claim, testimony must be materially false, such that “it could in any reasonable likelihood have influenced the verdict”).

2024Brief for Commonwealth at 52-53. 71 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (stating that evidence is material within the meaning of Brady when there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed).

2024And, it would have been apparent to the jury that the testimony of Trooper Mowrey that the registers at Kennie’s Market were “off,” was entirely incorrect and false.42 The PCRA court therefore concluded that Dowling “is entitled to a new trial as a result of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance and failure to investigate . . . and for the 39 Id. at 29 (footnoted omitted). 40 Id. at 30 (citing Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 (2009)). 41 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Wallace, 455 A.2d 1187, 1190-91 (Pa. 1983)). 42 Id. at 30-31. [J-70-2022] - 15 Commonwealth’s failure to comply with its obligatio

2024And, it would have been apparent to the jury that the testimony of Trooper Mowrey that the registers at Kennie’s Market were “off,” was entirely incorrect and false.42 The PCRA court therefore concluded that Dowling “is entitled to a new trial as a result of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance and failure to investigate . . . and for the 39 Id. at 29 (footnoted omitted). 40 Id. at 30 (citing Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 (2009)). 41 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Wallace, 455 A.2d 1187, 1190-91 (Pa. 1983)). 42 Id. at 30-31. [J-70-2022] - 15 Commonwealth’s failure to comply with its obligatio