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9 Delaware opinions name it 3 courts 2011–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Huanggreen2 sentences2023The complaint was dismissed. 99 Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Del. 1992). 100 Id. at 1349 . 101 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) (recognizing that the absolute litigation privilege “does not protect against professional discipline for an attorney’s unethical conduct”); Ruberton v. Gabage, 654 A.2d 1002, 1007 (N.J. 2023The complaint was dismissed. 99 Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Del. 1992). 100 Id. at 1349 . 101 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) (recognizing that the absolute litigation privilege “does not protect against professional discipline for an attorney’s unethical conduct”); Ruberton v. Gabage, 654 A.2d 1002, 1007 (N.J. | 4 | 4 |
Short v. News-Journal Companygreen2 sentences2020Ch. 2019) (quoting Short v. News-Journal Co., 212 A.2d 718, 720 (Del. 1965)). 161 Barker v. Haung, 610 A.2d at 1345 (quoting Nix v. Sawyer, 466 A.2d 407, 411 (Del. 2019Mgmt., 22 A.3d at 711–712. 143 Short v. News-Journal Co., 212 A.2d 718, 720 (Del. 1965). | 2 | 2 |
Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co.green1 sentence2026But prelitigation communications “do not qualify as a protected activity if future litigation is not anticipated, and is therefore only a ‘possibility’—and this is true even if the communication is a necessary prerequisite to any future litigation.” Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC, 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). | 1 | 1 |
Tatro v. Eshamgreen1 sentence2024However, many jurisdictions ‘have recognized the utility in extending the privilege to cover communications made in advance of 30 Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1344 (Del. 1992) 1344. 31 Tatro v. Esham, 335 A.2d 623, 625-26 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
Hawkins v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2023The complaint was dismissed. 99 Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Del. 1992). 100 Id. at 1349 . 101 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) (recognizing that the absolute litigation privilege “does not protect against professional discipline for an attorney’s unethical conduct”); Ruberton v. Gabage, 654 A.2d 1002, 1007 (N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Ruberton v. Gabagegreen1 sentence2023The complaint was dismissed. 99 Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Del. 1992). 100 Id. at 1349 . 101 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) (recognizing that the absolute litigation privilege “does not protect against professional discipline for an attorney’s unethical conduct”); Ruberton v. Gabage, 654 A.2d 1002, 1007 (N.J. | 1 | 1 |
NACCO INDUSTRIES, INC. v. Applica Inc.green1 sentence2022That is, if a breaching party can prevent its counterparty, via injunction, from making “disparaging” statements in litigation alleging the breach, then the counterparty would be unable to enforce the contract 82 NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc., 997 A.2d 1, 35 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp.green1 sentence2022Mortg., 27 A.3d at 536 (citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 895 (Del. 2002)). 60 Unbound Partners Ltd. | 1 | 1 |
Nix v. Sawyergreen1 sentence2020Ch. 2019) (quoting Short v. News-Journal Co., 212 A.2d 718, 720 (Del. 1965)). 161 Barker v. Haung, 610 A.2d at 1345 (quoting Nix v. Sawyer, 466 A.2d 407, 411 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
Rain v. Rolls-Royce Corp.green1 sentence2019Can a party disparaged in litigation seek its damages under a contractual non-disparagement clause, even though a tort action on the same facts is barred for public policy reasons? 157 Fortunately for me, this 156 Answering Br., at 16. 157 Other states have considered the question of whether a claim for breach of contract can be barred by the absolute litigation privilege, and “[c]ourts in a number of jurisdictions have concluded that the absolute litigation privilege is applicable to breach of contract actions, at least where immunity from liability is consistent with the purpose of the privi | 1 | 1 |
Klein v. Sunbeam Corp.green1 sentence2019See, e.g., Klein v. Sunbeam Corp., 94 A.2d 385, 392 (Del. 1952) (“In the law of libel, privileged communications are divided into two classes, those absolutely privileged and those conditionally privileged. | 1 | 1 |
Patrick D. Kelly v. Marc Goldengreen2 sentences2019For example, in Missouri the absolute litigation privilege is “based on the policy favoring freedom of expression and the desire not to inhibit parties from detailing and advocating their claims in court and is absolute, regardless of motive.” Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 350 (8th Cir. 2003). 2019For example, in Missouri the absolute litigation privilege is “based on the policy favoring freedom of expression and the desire not to inhibit parties from detailing and advocating their claims in court and is absolute, regardless of motive.” Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 350 (8th Cir. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Robertson v. Industrial Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2017Co., 75 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 1954)). 12 Id. at 16. 7 asserts that, assuming Delaware law applies, limiting the absolute litigation privilege would defeat the purpose of the privilege.13 B. 2017Ct. App. 2014). 45 75 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 1954). 46 Id. 47 Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Nicholas A. James v. Daniel K. Leigh, and Kenny Leigh, P.A.green1 sentence2017Here, Tote meets that requirement, and the absolute litigation privilege applies. 44 James v. Leigh, 145 So. 3d 1006, 1008 (Fla. Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Gilbert v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2011For instance, in the mid-nineteenth century New York case Gilbert v. People, the defendant was charged with trespass for "entering the close of the plaintiffs and taking and killing divers sheep, and for other alleged injuries to sheep, wool, sheepskins and mutton.” Gilbert v. People, 1 Denio 41, 44 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1845). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Central Mortgage Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC
green
1 sentence2022Mortg., 27 A.3d at 536 (citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 895 (Del. 2002)). 60 Unbound Partners Ltd. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hoover v. Van Stone
green
1 sentence2019Oct. 31, 2018) (applying the absolute litigation privilege to statements made prior to judicial proceedings “so long as the statements were made in an effort to address the alleged grievance between the parties”). 141 Barker, 610 A.2d at 1345 (quoting Hoover, 540 F.Supp. at 1122 ). 30 to testify freely and counsel to argue zealously, and limiting the proliferation of follow-on lawsuits.”142 The absolute litigation privilege “affords a complete defense [to the tort of defamation] irrespective of accuracy or malice.” 143 That is because “the interest in encouraging a litigant’s unqualified cando | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Paige Capital Management, LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC
green
2 sentences2019Mgmt., 22 A.3d at 722–23 (assuming, without deciding, that the absolute litigation privilege may extend to pre-litigation communications); BRP Hold Ox. 2019Mgmt., 22 A.3d at 711–712. 143 Short v. News-Journal Co., 212 A.2d 718, 720 (Del. 1965). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Flanagan v. Blumenthal
green
1 sentence2017June 5, 2014) (“In denying the appellant‟s motion to dismiss based on the absolute litigation privilege, the Superior Court did not finally determine a claim of right of the appellant.”); Manley v. Marisco, 876 N.E. 2d 910 , 911 (Ohio 2007) (finding that an order denying a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the affidavit- of-merit requirement under the Ohio Civil Rules does not qualify for immediate appellate review); Flanagan v. Blumenthal, 828 A.2d 572 , 573 n.4 (Conn. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (“The general rule is that the denial of a motion dismiss is an | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.