absolute litigation privilege in Maryland

2024Driskill, Inc. v. Abdnor, 901 F.2d 383, 386 (4th Cir. 1990) (“A cause of action for breach of a duty imposed by statute or case law, and not by contract, is a tort action.”): Ademiluyi v. PennyMac Mortg.

2024Driskill, Inc. v. Abdnor, 901 F.2d 383, 386 (4th Cir. 1990) (“A cause of action for breach of a duty imposed by statute or case law, and not by contract, is a tort action.”): Ademiluyi v. PennyMac Mortg.

2019See O'Brien & Gere Engineers, Inc. v. City of Salisbury , 447 Md. 394 , 414, 135 A.3d 473 (2016). 22 Counsel for the defendants acknowledged this distinction at oral argument. 23 Older Maryland cases often use the term "privilege" in contexts where a court today would use the term "immunity." The Court of Appeals has explained that " 'immunity' is the more descriptive term" when the issue is whether an official "may be held civilly liable for damages for conduct that is allegedly wrongful-conduct which, if committed by someone else, would subject the person to such liability." Gill v. Ripley ,

2019See O'Brien & Gere Engineers, Inc. v. City of Salisbury , 447 Md. 394 , 414, 135 A.3d 473 (2016). 22 Counsel for the defendants acknowledged this distinction at oral argument. 23 Older Maryland cases often use the term "privilege" in contexts where a court today would use the term "immunity." The Court of Appeals has explained that " 'immunity' is the more descriptive term" when the issue is whether an official "may be held civilly liable for damages for conduct that is allegedly wrongful-conduct which, if committed by someone else, would subject the person to such liability." Gill v. Ripley ,

2019See O'Brien & Gere Engineers, Inc. v. City of Salisbury , 447 Md. 394 , 414, 135 A.3d 473 (2016). 22 Counsel for the defendants acknowledged this distinction at oral argument. 23 Older Maryland cases often use the term "privilege" in contexts where a court today would use the term "immunity." The Court of Appeals has explained that " 'immunity' is the more descriptive term" when the issue is whether an official "may be held civilly liable for damages for conduct that is allegedly wrongful-conduct which, if committed by someone else, would subject the person to such liability." Gill v. Ripley ,

2019See O'Brien & Gere Engineers, Inc. v. City of Salisbury , 447 Md. 394 , 414, 135 A.3d 473 (2016). 22 Counsel for the defendants acknowledged this distinction at oral argument. 23 Older Maryland cases often use the term "privilege" in contexts where a court today would use the term "immunity." The Court of Appeals has explained that " 'immunity' is the more descriptive term" when the issue is whether an official "may be held civilly liable for damages for conduct that is allegedly wrongful-conduct which, if committed by someone else, would subject the person to such liability." Gill v. Ripley ,

2015See also Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 192 , 434 A.2d 547 (1981) (stating that under both the American and the English versions of the absolute litigation privilege, the privilege is not “defeasible by malice.”).

2015See also Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 192 , 434 A.2d 547 (1981) (stating that under both the American and the English versions of the absolute litigation privilege, the privilege is not “defeasible by malice.”).

2015The purpose of the absolute litigation privilege is to protect “the free and unfettered administration of justice,” Bartlett, 69 Md. at 226 , 14 A. 518 , by “serving] the ultimate goal of information exchange and discovery of the truth.” Norman, 418 Md. at 660 , 17 A.3d 697 (footnote omitted).

2015The purpose of the absolute litigation privilege is to protect “the free and unfettered administration of justice,” Bartlett, 69 Md. at 226 , 14 A. 518 , by “serving] the ultimate goal of information exchange and discovery of the truth.” Norman, 418 Md. at 660 , 17 A.3d 697 (footnote omitted).

2015The individual contractual right to redress will yield to the public right — that is, the absolute litigation privilege will apply — when in the particular case that “would promote the due administration of justice and free expression by participants in judicial proceedings.” Rain, 626 F.3d at 378 .

2015We must consider, then, whether in the circumstances of this case application of the absolute litigation privilege to immunize the City from liability for breaching its non-disparagement agreement with OBG “would promote the due administration of justice and free expression by participants in judicial proceedings.” Rain, 626 F.3d at 378 .

2015The court opined that the purposes of the absolute litigation privilege are to “ensure free access to the courts, promote complete and truthful testimony, encourage zealous advocacy, give finality to judgments, and avoid unending litigation.” Id. at 115.

2015Id. at 116-17 More recently, an intermediate appellate court in another district in California held that the absolute litigation privilege applied to protect a litigation participant from liability for breaching a non-disparagement agreement.

2015It observed that as a matter of law “‘an individual cannot waive a right designed to protect both the individual and the public.’” Id. at 1008-09 (quoting Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So. 2d 850, 860 (Fla. 2007)).

2015It observed that as a matter of law “ ‘an individual cannot waive a right designed to protect both the individual and the public.’ ” Id. at 1008-09 (quoting Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So.2d 850, 860 (Fla.2007)).

2015In both the American and English versions of the absolute litigation privilege, the privilege applies notwithstanding that the litigation participant’s “purpose or motive was malicious, [that] he [or she] knew that the statement was false, or [that] his [or her] conduct was otherwise unreasonable.” Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1 , 415 A.2d 292 (1980).

2015In both the American and English versions of the absolute litigation privilege, the privilege applies notwithstanding that the litigation participant’s “purpose or motive was malicious, [that] he [or she] knew that the statement was false, or [that] his [or her] conduct was otherwise unreasonable.” Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1 , 415 A.2d 292 (1980).

2015Corp., 315 Wis.2d 772 , 762 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Ct.App.2008) (explaining that “[pjersonal rights may be waivable, but public rights are not” and holding the power of eminent domain effectuates a public purpose and may not be waived); Campbell v. Mahoney, 306 Mont. 45 , 29 P.3d 1034 (2001) (distinguishing between nonwaivable public rights and waivable private rights and concluding that Montana’s “good time” statute for inmates was waivable). 17 (e) As our review of the decisional law shows, there is a strong trend favoring application of the absolute litigation privilege to immunize litigation par

2015Corp., 315 Wis.2d 772 , 762 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Ct.App.2008) (explaining that “[pjersonal rights may be waivable, but public rights are not” and holding the power of eminent domain effectuates a public purpose and may not be waived); Campbell v. Mahoney, 306 Mont. 45 , 29 P.3d 1034 (2001) (distinguishing between nonwaivable public rights and waivable private rights and concluding that Montana’s “good time” statute for inmates was waivable). 17 (e) As our review of the decisional law shows, there is a strong trend favoring application of the absolute litigation privilege to immunize litigation par

2015The court emphasized that the policy underlying the absolute litigation privilege “favor[s] freedom of expression and the desire not to inhibit parties from detailing and advocating their claims in court.” Id.

2015The Seventh Circuit held that Indiana observed an absolute privilege protecting all “relevant statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding,” in order to preserve the “due administration of justice by providing actors in judicial proceedings with the freedom to participate without fear of future defamation claims.” Id. at 376 (quoting Hartman v. Keri, 883 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Ind.2008)); see also Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 350 (8th Cir.2004) (noting that Missouri provided an absolute litigation privilege covering statements made in judicial proceedings, again relying on “the policy fa

2015In Vivian v. La-brucherie, 214 Cal.App.4th 267 , 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 (2013), Labrucherie’s boyfriend, nicknamed “Dodi,” sought injunctive relief against her ex-husband, Vivian, a county deputy sheriff.

2015In Vivian v. La-brucherie, 214 Cal.App.4th 267 , 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 (2013), Labrucherie’s boyfriend, nicknamed “Dodi,” sought injunctive relief against her ex-husband, Vivian, a county deputy sheriff.

2015See, e.g., Adams, 288 Md. at 8 , 415 A.2d 292 (extending the absolute litigation privilege to defamatory statements made in documents prepared for use in litigation, but not filed, because “[t]he evaluation and investigation of facts and opinions for the purpose of determining what, if anything, is to be raised or used in pending litigation is as integral a part of the search for truth ... as is the presentation of such facts and opinions during the course of the trial ...”); Offen v. Brenner, 402 Md. 191, 202 , 935 A.2d 719 (2007) (commenting that “the basis for extending absolute immunity [i

2015See, e.g., Adams, 288 Md. at 8 , 415 A.2d 292 (extending the absolute litigation privilege to defamatory statements made in documents prepared for use in litigation, but not filed, because “[t]he evaluation and investigation of facts and opinions for the purpose of determining what, if anything, is to be raised or used in pending litigation is as integral a part of the search for truth ... as is the presentation of such facts and opinions during the course of the trial ...”); Offen v. Brenner, 402 Md. 191, 202 , 935 A.2d 719 (2007) (commenting that “the basis for extending absolute immunity [i

2015See Kerpelman v. Bricker, 23 Md.App. 628, 630 , 329 A.2d 423 (1974). .

2015See Kerpelman v. Bricker, 23 Md.App. 628, 630 , 329 A.2d 423 (1974). .

2015Id. at 376 . 8 The Seventh Circuit held that Indiana observed an absolute privilege protecting all “relevant statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding,” in order to preserve the “due administration of justice by providing actors in judicial proceedings with the freedom to participate without fear of future defamation claims.” Id. at 376 (quoting Hartman v. Keri, 883 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Ind. 2008)); see also Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 350 (8 th Cir. 2004) (noting that Missouri provided an absolute litigation privilege covering statements made in judicial proceedings, again relying

2015The Seventh Circuit held that Indiana observed an absolute privilege protecting all “relevant statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding,” in order to preserve the “due administration of justice by providing actors in judicial proceedings with the freedom to participate without fear of future defamation claims.” Id. at 376 (quoting Hartman v. Keri, 883 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Ind.2008)); see also Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 350 (8th Cir.2004) (noting that Missouri provided an absolute litigation privilege covering statements made in judicial proceedings, again relying on “the policy fa

2015Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-31 , 103 S.Ct. 1108 , 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) ("The immunity of parties and witnesses from subsequent damages liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings was well established in English common law") (footnote omitted) (citing Cutler v. Dixon, 76 Eng.

2015Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-31 , 103 S.Ct. 1108 , 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) ("The immunity of parties and witnesses from subsequent damages liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings was well established in English common law") (footnote omitted) (citing Cutler v. Dixon, 76 Eng.

2015Id. at 376 . 8 The Seventh Circuit held that Indiana observed an absolute privilege protecting all “relevant statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding,” in order to preserve the “due administration of justice by providing actors in judicial proceedings with the freedom to participate without fear of future defamation claims.” Id. at 376 (quoting Hartman v. Keri, 883 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Ind. 2008)); see also Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 350 (8 th Cir. 2004) (noting that Missouri provided an absolute litigation privilege covering statements made in judicial proceedings, again relying

2015The Seventh Circuit held that Indiana observed an absolute privilege protecting all “relevant statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding,” in order to preserve the “due administration of justice by providing actors in judicial proceedings with the freedom to participate without fear of future defamation claims.” Id. at 376 (quoting Hartman v. Keri, 883 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Ind.2008)); see also Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 350 (8th Cir.2004) (noting that Missouri provided an absolute litigation privilege covering statements made in judicial proceedings, again relying on “the policy fa