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9 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson Aircraft Tire Corp.green2 sentences2004Fla., Inc., 637 So.2d 968, 970 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (observing, "Leave to amend should be freely given, the more so when a party seeks such a privilege at a hearing on a summary judgment motion and when the amendment is based on the same conduct, transaction and occurrence upon which the original claim was brought.") (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson Aircraft Tire Corp., 353 So.2d 137, 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)); B.P. 1994Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson Aircraft Tire Corp., 353 So.2d 137, 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Neilgreen2 sentences1990In Neil , the Court established the procedure to be followed when a party seeks to challenge the opposing party's peremptory excusals: A party concerned about the other side's use of peremptory challenges must make a timely objection and demonstrate on the record that the challenged persons are members of a distinct racial group and that there is a strong likelihood that they have been challenged solely because of their race. 457 So.2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984). 1989In State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984), we established the procedure based on article I, section 16, of the Florida Constitution, to be followed when a party seeks to challenge the opposing party's peremptory excusals: A party concerned about the other side's use of peremptory challenges must make a timely objection and demonstrate on the record that the challenged persons are members of a distinct racial group and that there is a strong likelihood that they have been challenged solely because of their race. | 2 | 2 |
Hall v. Animals.com, L.L.C.green1 sentence2023See, e.g., Hall v. Animals.com, L.L.C., 171 So. 3d 216 , 217- 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (holding that where appellee filed a motion to transfer venue based on a substantial connection to one county but failed to argue forum non conveniens in its motion, "the trial court erred in entertaining this argument [made for the first time at the motion hearing] without giving [the appellant] advance notice"); McDaniel Rsrv. | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2005Co. v. Wilson, 449 So.2d 421, 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) ("Leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.190(a), the more so when a party seeks such a privilege at or before a hearing on a motion for summary judgment.") (citation omitted). [9] In Stewart v. Johnson, 142 Fla. 425 , 194 So. 869 (1940), the court explained how the doctrine may not apply in such a situation by quoting section 483 of the Wills portion of Corpus Juris: `The doctrine is not applicable where the act of destruction is not referrable, wholly and solely, to the intention of setting up some ot 2005Co. v. Wilson, 449 So.2d 421, 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) ("Leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.190(a), the more so when a party seeks such a privilege at or before a hearing on a motion for summary judgment.") (citation omitted). [9] In Stewart v. Johnson, 142 Fla. 425 , 194 So. 869 (1940), the court explained how the doctrine may not apply in such a situation by quoting section 483 of the Wills portion of Corpus Juris: `The doctrine is not applicable where the act of destruction is not referrable, wholly and solely, to the intention of setting up some ot | 1 | 1 |
Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2005Co. v. Wilson, 449 So.2d 421, 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) ("Leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.190(a), the more so when a party seeks such a privilege at or before a hearing on a motion for summary judgment.") (citation omitted). [9] In Stewart v. Johnson, 142 Fla. 425 , 194 So. 869 (1940), the court explained how the doctrine may not apply in such a situation by quoting section 483 of the Wills portion of Corpus Juris: `The doctrine is not applicable where the act of destruction is not referrable, wholly and solely, to the intention of setting up some ot | 1 | 1 |
SPOLSKI GEN. CONTR. v. Jett-Aire Corp.green1 sentence2004Fla., Inc., 637 So.2d 968, 970 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (observing, "Leave to amend should be freely given, the more so when a party seeks such a privilege at a hearing on a summary judgment motion and when the amendment is based on the same conduct, transaction and occurrence upon which the original claim was brought.") (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson Aircraft Tire Corp., 353 So.2d 137, 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)); B.P. | 1 | 1 |
Venetoff v. Papasgreen1 sentence2003See Venetoff v. Papas, 732 So.2d 453, 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Haag v. Phillips
green
2 sentences1984Haag v. Phillips, 333 So.2d 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). 1977The court's refusal to allow Firestone to so amend was particularly prejudicial in light of this court's ruling in Armor Elevator, supra, that a third party plaintiff who was sued as an active tortfeasor could not claim indemnity from the employer without alleging that it was only passively negligent. [5] It is well established that leave to amend should be freely given, the more so when a party seeks such a privilege at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, Haag v. Phillips, 333 So.2d 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), and when the amendment is based on the same conduct, transaction and occurrence | 2 | 1977–1984 |
State v. Slappy
green
1 sentence1989(Footnote omitted.) We clarified the standards of Neil in State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), and held that any doubt as to whether the complaining party has met the initial burden required under Neil should be resolved in that party's favor. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Galloway Farms, Inc. v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance
green
1 sentence1989(Footnote omitted.) We clarified the standards of Neil in State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), and held that any doubt as to whether the complaining party has met the initial burden required under Neil should be resolved in that party's favor. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Andrews v. Adams
green
1 sentence1989(Footnote omitted.) We clarified the standards of Neil in State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), and held that any doubt as to whether the complaining party has met the initial burden required under Neil should be resolved in that party's favor. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Knipp v. Weinbaum
green
1 sentence1977Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So.2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Armor Elevator Co., Inc. v. Elevator Sales & S., Inc.
green
1 sentence1977The court's refusal to allow Firestone to so amend was particularly prejudicial in light of this court's ruling in Armor Elevator, supra, that a third party plaintiff who was sued as an active tortfeasor could not claim indemnity from the employer without alleging that it was only passively negligent. [5] It is well established that leave to amend should be freely given, the more so when a party seeks such a privilege at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, Haag v. Phillips, 333 So.2d 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), and when the amendment is based on the same conduct, transaction and occurrence | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.