defense of governmental immunity in Michigan

1986In Hyde v Michigan (not officially reported), a divided Court of Appeals ruled that Parker v Highland Park, supra, did not apply because this Court had subsequently held in Murray v Beyer Memorial Hospital, 409 Mich 217, 221 ; 293 NW2d 341 (1980), that "the rule of Parker is to be applied to all cases pending on December 27, 1978, in which an express challenge to the defense of governmental immunity was made and preserved as well as all cases started after that date,” and, in the view of the majority, the plaintiff had not made and preserved an express challenge to the defense of governmental

1986In Hyde v Michigan (not officially reported), a divided Court of Appeals ruled that Parker v Highland Park, supra, did not apply because this Court had subsequently held in Murray v Beyer Memorial Hospital, 409 Mich 217, 221 ; 293 NW2d 341 (1980), that "the rule of Parker is to be applied to all cases pending on December 27, 1978, in which an express challenge to the defense of governmental immunity was made and preserved as well as all cases started after that date,” and, in the view of the majority, the plaintiff had not made and preserved an express challenge to the defense of governmental

1990In Stein , the Supreme Court held that a hospital owned by a governmental entity that did not challenge the correctness of the Supreme Court’s decision in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183 ; 273 NW2d 413 (1978), or assert a defense of governmental immunity before Ross, supra, was decided, had not raised or preserved the issue.

1990In Stein , the Supreme Court held that a hospital owned by a governmental entity that did not challenge the correctness of the Supreme Court’s decision in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183 ; 273 NW2d 413 (1978), or assert a defense of governmental immunity before Ross, supra, was decided, had not raised or preserved the issue.

1983Even if we were to assume, as plaintiff would have us hold, that the operation and maintenance of a regional sewage disposal system could be carried out by the private sector and thus is not a governmental function according to Justices Fitzgerald, Levin and Kavanagh, see Perry, supra, p 215 , and Thomas, supra, pp 21-25 , it does not follow that the trial court erred in holding that *219 defendant was entitled to the defense of governmental immunity.

1982In Thomas v Dep’t of State Highways, 398 Mich 1, 12 ; 247 NW2d 530 (1976), Chief Justice Coleman and Justice Ryan concurred with Justice Williams’ common-law analysis that the repair and maintenance of highways is a governmental function under the statute and that, as a result, the defense of governmental immunity is available to the state highway department.

1987See Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 662-668 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979); Pittman v City of Taylor, 398 Mich 41, 50 ; 247 NW2d 512 (1976); Daley v LaCroix, 384 Mich 4, 14 ; 179 NW2d 390 (1970); Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218, 236 ; 21 NW2d 105 (1946). [Murray, supra, pp 221-222 .] In Placek, supra, the Court adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence and then determined to what extent the new rule should be applied.

1987See Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 662-668 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979); Pittman v City of Taylor, 398 Mich 41, 50 ; 247 NW2d 512 (1976); Daley v LaCroix, 384 Mich 4, 14 ; 179 NW2d 390 (1970); Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218, 236 ; 21 NW2d 105 (1946). [Murray, supra, pp 221-222 .] In Placek, supra, the Court adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence and then determined to what extent the new rule should be applied.

1983The five members of the Court voting for reversal in both Rosario, supra, and Gerzeski, supra, disagreed as to whether all nuisances in fact may *109 defeat a defense of governmental immunity.

1983The five members of the Court voting for reversal in both Rosario, supra, and Gerzeski, supra, disagreed as to whether all nuisances in fact may defeat a defense of governmental immunity.

1987See Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 662-668 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979); Pittman v City of Taylor, 398 Mich 41, 50 ; 247 NW2d 512 (1976); Daley v LaCroix, 384 Mich 4, 14 ; 179 NW2d 390 (1970); Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218, 236 ; 21 NW2d 105 (1946). [Murray, supra, pp 221-222 .] In Placek, supra, the Court adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence and then determined to what extent the new rule should be applied.

1987See Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 662-668 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979); Pittman v City of Taylor, 398 Mich 41, 50 ; 247 NW2d 512 (1976); Daley v LaCroix, 384 Mich 4, 14 ; 179 NW2d 390 (1970); Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218, 236 ; 21 NW2d 105 (1946). [Murray, supra, pp 221-222 .] In Placek, supra, the Court adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence and then determined to what extent the new rule should be applied.

2017Admittedly, defendants could have pleaded the defense more explicitly by including the words “governmental immunity,” or citing the GTLA, but the pleading was sufficient, and defendants were entitled to rely on the defense of governmental immunity as a basis for their motion.3 Turning to the merits of defendants’ motion, summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(7) “when a claim is barred by immunity granted by law.” Beals v Michigan, 497 Mich 363, 370 ; 871 NW2d 5 (2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

2017Admittedly, defendants could have pleaded the defense more explicitly by including the words “governmental immunity,” or citing the GTLA, but the pleading was sufficient, and defendants were entitled to rely on the defense of governmental immunity as a basis for their motion.3 Turning to the merits of defendants’ motion, summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(7) “when a claim is barred by immunity granted by law.” Beals v Michigan, 497 Mich 363, 370 ; 871 NW2d 5 (2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

1992Id. at 578 .

1990Id. at 578 .

1986In Lowery v Dep’t of Corrections, 146 Mich App 342 ; 380 NW2d 99 (1985), we held that a complaint that merely alleges injuries committed by prison personnel or inmates does not avoid the defense of governmental immunity.

1986In Lowery v Dep’t of Corrections, 146 Mich App 342 ; 380 NW2d 99 (1985), we held that a complaint that merely alleges injuries committed by prison personnel or inmates does not avoid the defense of governmental immunity.

1983The five members of the Court voting for reversal in both Rosario, supra, and Gerzeski, supra, disagreed as to whether all nuisances in fact may *109 defeat a defense of governmental immunity.

1983The five members of the Court voting for reversal in both Rosario, supra, and Gerzeski, supra, disagreed as to whether all nuisances in fact may defeat a defense of governmental immunity.

1984In Morris v Radley, 306 Mich 689 ; 11 NW2d 291 (1943), a defendant did not assert a defense of governmental immunity because the Supreme Court had, in an earlier unrelated case, ruled that that defense was unavailable to a county road commission (one such commission was a defendant in Morris).

1984In Morris v Radley, 306 Mich 689 ; 11 NW2d 291 (1943), a defendant did not assert a defense of governmental immunity because the Supreme Court had, in an earlier unrelated case, ruled that that defense was unavailable to a county road commission (one such commission was a defendant in Morris).

1983Ford v Detroit, 91 Mich App 33 ; 283 NW2d 739 (1979).

1983Ford v Detroit, supra, pp 335-336 .

1978Plaintiffs cite Christie v Board of Regents of University of Michigan, 364 Mich 202 ; 111 NW2d 30 (1961), in which Justice Black wrote that the purchase of a liability insurance policy by a governmental agency should constitute a waiver of immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage.

1978Plaintiffs cite Christie v Board of Regents of University of Michigan, 364 Mich 202 ; 111 NW2d 30 (1961), in which Justice Black wrote that the purchase of a liability insurance policy by a governmental agency should constitute a waiver of immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage.

2025While “an appellee who has taken no cross appeal may still urge in support of the judgment in its favor reasons that were rejected by a lower court,” Middlebrooks v Wayne Co, 446 Mich 151 , 166 n 41; 521 NW2d 774 (1994) (quotation marks and citations omitted), that is not what plaintiffs are doing.

2025While “an appellee who has taken no cross appeal may still urge in support of the judgment in its favor reasons that were rejected by a lower court,” Middlebrooks v Wayne Co, 446 Mich 151 , 166 n 41; 521 NW2d 774 (1994) (quotation marks and citations omitted), that is not what plaintiffs are doing.

2019At the summary disposition motion hearing, plaintiff’s counsel stated that plaintiff would not contest the dismissal of those claims with respect to DLBA only. -2- Flatford v City of Monroe, 17 F3d 162 (CA 6, 1994)].

2018During the course of the proceedings, defendant filed an emergency -1- motion to amend the court’s scheduling order following publication of Yono v Dep’t of Transp, 499 Mich 636 ; 885 NW2d 445 (2016), in which the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the highway exception to governmental immunity where parking spaces are involved.

2018During the course of the proceedings, defendant filed an emergency -1- motion to amend the court’s scheduling order following publication of Yono v Dep’t of Transp, 499 Mich 636 ; 885 NW2d 445 (2016), in which the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the highway exception to governmental immunity where parking spaces are involved.

2007Finally, but for Mack , I would hold that defendant abandoned the defense of governmental immunity. 467 Mich 186 ; 649 NW2d 47 (2002).

2007Finally, but for Mack , I would hold that defendant abandoned the defense of governmental immunity. 467 Mich 186 ; 649 NW2d 47 (2002).

2006We granted oral argument on the applications for leave to appeal and to cross-appeal, directing the parties to include among the issues to be addressed at oral argument: (1) whether among the remedies against a party who fails to file an affidavit of meritorious defense, as required by MCL 600.2912e, is a default, and under what circumstances, if any, is such a remedy mandatory; and (2) the effect, if any, that reliance on the defense of governmental immunity has on the obligation to file an affidavit of meritorious defense under MCL 600.2912e. [Costa v Community Emergency Medical Services, In

2006We granted oral argument on the application, directing the parties to include among the issues to be addressed at oral argument: (1) whether among the remedies against a party who fails to file an affidavit of meritorious defense, as required by MCL 600.2912e, is a default, and under what circumstances, if any, is such a remedy mandatory; and (2) the effect, if any, that reliance on the defense of governmental immunity has on the obligation to file an affidavit of meritorious defense under MCL 600.2912e. [ Costa v. Community Emergency Medical Services, Inc., 473 Mich. 877 , 699 N.W.2d 305 (200

2006We granted oral argument on the application, directing the parties to include among the issues to be addressed at oral argument: (1) whether among the remedies against a party who fails to file an affidavit of meritorious defense, as required by MCL 600.2912e, is a default, and under what circumstances, if any, is such a remedy mandatory; and (2) the effect, if any, that reliance on the defense of governmental immunity has on the obligation to file an affidavit of meritorious defense under MCL 600.2912e. [ Costa v. Community Emergency Medical Services, Inc., 473 Mich. 877 , 699 N.W.2d 305 (200

2004The majority states: "We do not believe that our Supreme Court intended the court rule to be read so restrictively that governmental bodies would be forced through discovery and trial whenever their motion for dismissal is denied on grounds other than MCR 2.116(C)(7), merely because the plaintiff contends that the governmental agency is not immune. [Op. 625, 689 N.W.2d 506 (emphasis added).]" Impliedly, if not outrightly stated, the majority believes that plaintiffs allege facts outside the scope of governmental immunity simply to avoid governmental immunity, and not because the cause of actio

1998We granted leave to appeal, and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. n We begin with the fundamental principle that governmental agencies are statutorily immune from tort liability “[e]xcept as otherwise provided.” 5 In Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 618 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), we characterized § 7 as a “broad grant of immunity” subject to “narrowly drawn statutory exceptions.” 6 Although the general effect of the 1986 amendments to the governmental tort liability act was to preserve, and in some instances to expand, the immunity available to governmental a

1998We granted leave to appeal, and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. n We begin with the fundamental principle that governmental agencies are statutorily immune from tort liability “[e]xcept as otherwise provided.” 5 In Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 618 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), we characterized § 7 as a “broad grant of immunity” subject to “narrowly drawn statutory exceptions.” 6 Although the general effect of the 1986 amendments to the governmental tort liability act was to preserve, and in some instances to expand, the immunity available to governmental a

1998Plaintiff also argued that MSU “operated” a hospital pursuant to subsection 7(4) and that, in the alternative, the hospital exception violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Michigan Constitution because it “fails to treat all university-employed physicians [in Michigan] in a like manner with regard to governmental immunity.” A divided Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s arguments and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, ruling that Dr. Sauer was entitled to the defense of governmental immunity. 215 Mich App 389 ; 547 NW2d 40 (1996).

1998Plaintiff also argued that MSU “operated” a hospital pursuant to subsection 7(4) and that, in the alternative, the hospital exception violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Michigan Constitution because it “fails to treat all university-employed physicians [in Michigan] in a like manner with regard to governmental immunity.” A divided Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s arguments and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, ruling that Dr. Sauer was entitled to the defense of governmental immunity. 215 Mich App 389 ; 547 NW2d 40 (1996).