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9 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Helton v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Taylor, 710 So.2d at 637 (citing Helton v. State, 106 So.2d 79 (Fla.1958)); see also Mazza v. State, 948 So.2d 872 /874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“Since at least 1941, a trial court has lacked authority to suspend or withhold indefinitely the imposition of sentence upon a convicted defendant except as an incident to probation under the provisions of Chapter 948, Florida Statutes.”). 2014See Taylor, 710 So.2d at 637 (citing Helton v. State, 106 So.2d 79 (Fla.1958)); see also Mazza v. State, 948 So.2d 872, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“Since at least 1941, a trial court has lacked authority to suspend or withhold indefinitely the imposition of sentence upon a convicted defendant except as an incident to probation under the provisions of Chapter 948, Florida Statutes.”). | 2 | 2 |
Mazza v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Taylor, 710 So.2d at 637 (citing Helton v. State, 106 So.2d 79 (Fla.1958)); see also Mazza v. State, 948 So.2d 872 /874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“Since at least 1941, a trial court has lacked authority to suspend or withhold indefinitely the imposition of sentence upon a convicted defendant except as an incident to probation under the provisions of Chapter 948, Florida Statutes.”). 2014See Taylor, 710 So.2d at 637 (citing Helton v. State, 106 So.2d 79 (Fla.1958)); see also Mazza v. State, 948 So.2d 872, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“Since at least 1941, a trial court has lacked authority to suspend or withhold indefinitely the imposition of sentence upon a convicted defendant except as an incident to probation under the provisions of Chapter 948, Florida Statutes.”). | 2 | 2 |
Taylor v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Taylor, 710 So.2d at 637 (citing Helton v. State, 106 So.2d 79 (Fla.1958)); see also Mazza v. State, 948 So.2d 872 /874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“Since at least 1941, a trial court has lacked authority to suspend or withhold indefinitely the imposition of sentence upon a convicted defendant except as an incident to probation under the provisions of Chapter 948, Florida Statutes.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Millergreen1 sentence2014See Taylor, 710 So.2d at 637 (citing Helton v. State, 106 So.2d 79 (Fla.1958)); see also Mazza v. State, 948 So.2d 872, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“Since at least 1941, a trial court has lacked authority to suspend or withhold indefinitely the imposition of sentence upon a convicted defendant except as an incident to probation under the provisions of Chapter 948, Florida Statutes.”). | 1 | 1 |
Lamb v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Lamb v. State, 18 So.3d 734, 735 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Kearse v. Stategreen1 sentence2001See Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 681-682 (Fla.1995). | 1 | 1 |
Standard Jury Instructions-Criminal Casesgreen1 sentence1998See Standard Jury Instructions-Criminal Cases (92-1), 603 So.2d 1175, 1195 (Fla.1992). | 1 | 1 |
First National Bank of Leesburg v. Hector Supply Co.green2 sentences1995Id. 254 So.2d at 781 (emphasis supplied) (recognizing tenancy by the entirety in bank account; remanding for determination of intent). [1] The Personal Representative argued that we should reverse because the trial court utilized a presumption that a tenancy by entirety was established, when such a presumption does not exist in regard to personal property. 1995Id. 254 So.2d at 781 (emphasis supplied) (recognizing tenancy by the entirety in bank account; remanding for determination of intent). [1] The Personal Representative argued that we should reverse because the trial court utilized a presumption that a tenancy by entirety was established, when such a presumption does not exist in regard to personal property. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Marchini
green
1 sentence1995As the court explained in In re Marchini, 45 B.R. 187 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1984), there is no presumption that the personal property is held as an estate by the entireties, rather than as tenancy in common, merely from the character or use of the personal property. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis
green
1 sentence1991The trial court utilized the standard of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis, 426 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1982), to analyze whether or not to release the "client list". | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Strong
green
1 sentence1989The Court in State v Strong, 504 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1987) did not change the Bender holding with regard to the above rationale. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Bender
green
1 sentence1989The Florida Supreme Court in State v Bender, 382 So.2d 697 (Fla. 198) held that the fact finder may presume that the utilized test procedure is rehable, the operator is qualified, and the presumptions of impairment are applicable when the evidence of motor vehicle driver intoxication presented pursuant to the Florida Implied Consent Law includes (1) an approved alcohol test method (See HRS Rule 10D-42.0211(9) and (2) by a properly licensed operator. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
United States v. Titus Thomas, AKA Tee
green
2 sentences1979The court utilized the test set forth in United States v. Thomas, supra, which provides that: ... [A]ffidavits containing misrepresentations are invalid if the error (1) was committed with an intent to deceive the magistrate, whether or not the error is material to the showing of probable cause; or (2) made non-intentionally, but the erroneous statement is material to *1086 the establishment of probable cause for the search. 1979Id. at 669 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.