Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1917–1980 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Kirklandgreen2 sentences1980If any part or portion of the omission alleged to be erroneous is itself impertinent, irrelevant or improper the assignment of error must fail. [Cits.]” Brown v. Kirkland, 108 Ga. App. 651, 654 ( 134 SE2d 472 ) (1963). 1980If any part or portion of the omission alleged to be erroneous is itself impertinent, irrelevant or improper the assignment of error must fail. [Cits.]” Brown v. Kirkland, 108 Ga. App. 651, 654 ( 134 SE2d 472 ) (1963). | 1 | 1 |
Garrett v. Stategreen2 sentences1971Dowdell v. State, 194 Ga. 578 (3) ( 22 SE2d 310 ); Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 765 ( 48 SE2d 377 ); Pruitt v. State, 88 Ga. App. 711 (7) ( 77 SE2d 552 ); Dye v. State, 118 Ga. App. 570 (2) ( 165 SE2d 183 ). 6. 1971Dowdell v. State, 194 Ga. 578 (3) ( 22 SE2d 310 ); Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 765 ( 48 SE2d 377 ); Pruitt v. State, 88 Ga. App. 711 (7) ( 77 SE2d 552 ); Dye v. State, 118 Ga. App. 570 (2) ( 165 SE2d 183 ). 6. | 1 | 1 |
Southern Railway Co. v. Lunsfordgreen2 sentences1940See in this connection the “Little-Watchman” case, Southern Railway Co. v. Lunsford, 57 Ga. App. 53, 57 ( 194 S. E. 602 ). *864 The court charged the jury that the plaintiff contended that his injuries are permanent and will prevent him from engaging in his occupation as flagman; that he was thirty-six years of age at the time he received his injuries, and was earning approximately $225 a month, and that if “he is otherwise entitled to recover these would be legitimate items of damage to be considered in making your award, that is the element of pain and suffering, past, present, and future, r 1940See in this connection the “Little-Watchman” case, Southern Railway Co. v. Lunsford, 57 Ga. App. 53, 57 ( 194 S. E. 602 ). *864 The court charged the jury that the plaintiff contended that his injuries are permanent and will prevent him from engaging in his occupation as flagman; that he was thirty-six years of age at the time he received his injuries, and was earning approximately $225 a month, and that if “he is otherwise entitled to recover these would be legitimate items of damage to be considered in making your award, that is the element of pain and suffering, past, present, and future, r | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Smallgreen2 sentences1924The giving of this excerpt was not cause for a new trial, since the court elsewhere in the charge fully and correctly instructed the jury that if the claimant was such a purchaser, a verdict should be returned in its favor. (a) “Even though a particular instruction takent alone may be open to the criticism that it required a given qualification, yet where it plainly appears that elsewhere in the charge this very qualification of the doctrine laid down in such instruction was so distinctly and clearly, stated as that the jury were not misled as to the true law, the giving of the instruction wil 1924The giving of this excerpt was not cause for a new trial, since the court elsewhere in the charge fully and correctly instructed the jury that if the claimant was such a purchaser, a verdict should be returned in its favor. (a) “Even though a particular instruction takent alone may be open to the criticism that it required a given qualification, yet where it plainly appears that elsewhere in the charge this very qualification of the doctrine laid down in such instruction was so distinctly and clearly, stated as that the jury were not misled as to the true law, the giving of the instruction wil | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dye v. State
neutral
2 sentences1971Dowdell v. State, 194 Ga. 578 (3) ( 22 SE2d 310 ); Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 765 ( 48 SE2d 377 ); Pruitt v. State, 88 Ga. App. 711 (7) ( 77 SE2d 552 ); Dye v. State, 118 Ga. App. 570 (2) ( 165 SE2d 183 ). 6. 1971Dowdell v. State, 194 Ga. 578 (3) ( 22 SE2d 310 ); Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 765 ( 48 SE2d 377 ); Pruitt v. State, 88 Ga. App. 711 (7) ( 77 SE2d 552 ); Dye v. State, 118 Ga. App. 570 (2) ( 165 SE2d 183 ). 6. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Dowdell v. State
green
2 sentences1971Dowdell v. State, 194 Ga. 578 (3) ( 22 SE2d 310 ); Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 765 ( 48 SE2d 377 ); Pruitt v. State, 88 Ga. App. 711 (7) ( 77 SE2d 552 ); Dye v. State, 118 Ga. App. 570 (2) ( 165 SE2d 183 ). 6. 1971Dowdell v. State, 194 Ga. 578 (3) ( 22 SE2d 310 ); Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 765 ( 48 SE2d 377 ); Pruitt v. State, 88 Ga. App. 711 (7) ( 77 SE2d 552 ); Dye v. State, 118 Ga. App. 570 (2) ( 165 SE2d 183 ). 6. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Pruitt v. State
neutral
2 sentences1971Dowdell v. State, 194 Ga. 578 (3) ( 22 SE2d 310 ); Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 765 ( 48 SE2d 377 ); Pruitt v. State, 88 Ga. App. 711 (7) ( 77 SE2d 552 ); Dye v. State, 118 Ga. App. 570 (2) ( 165 SE2d 183 ). 6. 1971Dowdell v. State, 194 Ga. 578 (3) ( 22 SE2d 310 ); Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 765 ( 48 SE2d 377 ); Pruitt v. State, 88 Ga. App. 711 (7) ( 77 SE2d 552 ); Dye v. State, 118 Ga. App. 570 (2) ( 165 SE2d 183 ). 6. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Crowe v. State
green
2 sentences1960“One may be legally convicted of a felony other than treason or perjury where the only evidence diz'ectly connecting him with the offense charged is the testimony of an accomplice, and where the only corroboration is the testimony of other accomplices.” (Italics ours.) Pope v. State, 171 Ga. 655 ( 156 S. E. 599 ); Crowe v. State, 83 Ga. App. 325 ( 63 S. E. 2d 682 ). 1960“One may be legally convicted of a felony other than treason or perjury where the only evidence diz'ectly connecting him with the offense charged is the testimony of an accomplice, and where the only corroboration is the testimony of other accomplices.” (Italics ours.) Pope v. State, 171 Ga. 655 ( 156 S. E. 599 ); Crowe v. State, 83 Ga. App. 325 ( 63 S. E. 2d 682 ). | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Pope v. State
green
2 sentences1960“One may be legally convicted of a felony other than treason or perjury where the only evidence diz'ectly connecting him with the offense charged is the testimony of an accomplice, and where the only corroboration is the testimony of other accomplices.” (Italics ours.) Pope v. State, 171 Ga. 655 ( 156 S. E. 599 ); Crowe v. State, 83 Ga. App. 325 ( 63 S. E. 2d 682 ). 1960“One may be legally convicted of a felony other than treason or perjury where the only evidence diz'ectly connecting him with the offense charged is the testimony of an accomplice, and where the only corroboration is the testimony of other accomplices.” (Italics ours.) Pope v. State, 171 Ga. 655 ( 156 S. E. 599 ); Crowe v. State, 83 Ga. App. 325 ( 63 S. E. 2d 682 ). | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Branch v. State
neutral
2 sentences1945In his argument counsel cited Branch v. State, 5 Ga. App. 651 (2) ( 63 S. E. 714 ), and Stevens v. State, 8 Ga. App. 217 (3) ( 68 S. E. 874 ), in support of these contentions. 1945In his argument counsel cited Branch v. State, 5 Ga. App. 651 (2) ( 63 S. E. 714 ), and Stevens v. State, 8 Ga. App. 217 (3) ( 68 S. E. 874 ), in support of these contentions. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Stevens v. State
green
2 sentences1945In his argument counsel cited Branch v. State, 5 Ga. App. 651 (2) ( 63 S. E. 714 ), and Stevens v. State, 8 Ga. App. 217 (3) ( 68 S. E. 874 ), in support of these contentions. 1945In his argument counsel cited Branch v. State, 5 Ga. App. 651 (2) ( 63 S. E. 714 ), and Stevens v. State, 8 Ga. App. 217 (3) ( 68 S. E. 874 ), in support of these contentions. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Shelton v. State
neutral
2 sentences1945The part omitted is as follows: ‘Without justifying or mitigating circumstances/ ” The excerpt excepted to is almost in the language of this court in Reddick v. *400 State, 11 Ga. App. 150 (2) ( 74 S. E. 901 ); and complies with the rule there stated.- -.See also in this connection, Shelton v. State, 11 Ga. App. 148 ( 74 S. E. 846 ). 1945The part omitted is as follows: ‘Without justifying or mitigating circumstances/ ” The excerpt excepted to is almost in the language of this court in Reddick v. *400 State, 11 Ga. App. 150 (2) ( 74 S. E. 901 ); and complies with the rule there stated.- -.See also in this connection, Shelton v. State, 11 Ga. App. 148 ( 74 S. E. 846 ). | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Reddick v. State
green
2 sentences1945The part omitted is as follows: ‘Without justifying or mitigating circumstances/ ” The excerpt excepted to is almost in the language of this court in Reddick v. *400 State, 11 Ga. App. 150 (2) ( 74 S. E. 901 ); and complies with the rule there stated.- -.See also in this connection, Shelton v. State, 11 Ga. App. 148 ( 74 S. E. 846 ). 1945The part omitted is as follows: ‘Without justifying or mitigating circumstances/ ” The excerpt excepted to is almost in the language of this court in Reddick v. *400 State, 11 Ga. App. 150 (2) ( 74 S. E. 901 ); and complies with the rule there stated.- -.See also in this connection, Shelton v. State, 11 Ga. App. 148 ( 74 S. E. 846 ). | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. South
green
2 sentences1942The policy provides that a total disability insured against is where the insured '“has become totally and permanently disabled by bodily injury or disease, so that he is and will be permanently, continuously, and wholly prevented thereby from performing any work for compensation, gain, or profit, and from following any gainful occupation.” This excerpt from the charge is assigned as error in that the court did not further charge the jury as respects total disability in the above language of the policy, and that the failure to so charge was error and a denial to the defendant of the equal prote 1942The policy provides that a total disability insured against is where the insured '“has become totally and permanently disabled by bodily injury or disease, so that he is and will be permanently, continuously, and wholly prevented thereby from performing any work for compensation, gain, or profit, and from following any gainful occupation.” This excerpt from the charge is assigned as error in that the court did not further charge the jury as respects total disability in the above language of the policy, and that the failure to so charge was error and a denial to the defendant of the equal prote | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Taylor v. Southern States Life Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence1942The policy provides that a total disability insured against is where the insured '“has become totally and permanently disabled by bodily injury or disease, so that he is and will be permanently, continuously, and wholly prevented thereby from performing any work for compensation, gain, or profit, and from following any gainful occupation.” This excerpt from the charge is assigned as error in that the court did not further charge the jury as respects total disability in the above language of the policy, and that the failure to so charge was error and a denial to the defendant of the equal prote | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Spencer v. Brooks
neutral
2 sentences1917Reid: (a) This charge was not, for any of the reasons assigned, such error as to demand the grant of a new trial. ■ (b) While in one sense the plaintiff was a vice-principal of the defendant, rather than a fellow servant of the negligent employee (Spencer v. Brooks, 97 Ga. 681 , 25 S. E. 480 ; Moore v. Dublin Cotton Mills, 127 Ga. 609 , 56 S. E. 839 , 10 L. 1917Reid: (a) This charge was not, for any of the reasons assigned, such error as to demand the grant of a new trial. ■ (b) While in one sense the plaintiff was a vice-principal of the defendant, rather than a fellow servant of the negligent employee (Spencer v. Brooks, 97 Ga. 681 , 25 S. E. 480 ; Moore v. Dublin Cotton Mills, 127 Ga. 609 , 56 S. E. 839 , 10 L. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Moore v. Dublin Cotton Mills
green
2 sentences1917Reid: (a) This charge was not, for any of the reasons assigned, such error as to demand the grant of a new trial. ■ (b) While in one sense the plaintiff was a vice-principal of the defendant, rather than a fellow servant of the negligent employee (Spencer v. Brooks, 97 Ga. 681 , 25 S. E. 480 ; Moore v. Dublin Cotton Mills, 127 Ga. 609 , 56 S. E. 839 , 10 L. 1917Reid: (a) This charge was not, for any of the reasons assigned, such error as to demand the grant of a new trial. ■ (b) While in one sense the plaintiff was a vice-principal of the defendant, rather than a fellow servant of the negligent employee (Spencer v. Brooks, 97 Ga. 681 , 25 S. E. 480 ; Moore v. Dublin Cotton Mills, 127 Ga. 609 , 56 S. E. 839 , 10 L. | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.