surrounding circumstances test in Georgia

2015To establish “trustworthiness,” the proponent must demonstrate that “‘the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.’” Chapel, 270 Ga. at 155 ; Milich, § 19:32, at 837.

2015To establish “trustworthiness,” the proponent must demonstrate that “ ‘the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.’ ” Chapel, 270 Ga. at 155 ; Milich, § 19:32, at 837.

2008“The test is whether the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.” (Punctuation omitted.) Yancey v. State, 275 Ga. 550, 553 (2) ( 570 SE2d 269 ) (2002). 4 Here, the truthfulness of the statement could have been challenged had the declarant been subject to cross-examination.

2008“The test is whether the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.” (Punctuation omitted.) Yancey v. State, 275 Ga. 550, 553 (2) ( 570 SE2d 269 ) (2002). 4 Here, the truthfulness of the statement could have been challenged had the declarant been subject to cross-examination.

2013In determining whether a statement is sufficiently trustworthy, the trial court was required to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the declaration, and “[o]nly where the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross examination would be of marginal utility does the hearsay rule not bar admission of a hearsay statement at trial.” Phillips v. State, 275 Ga. 595, 597 (4) ( 571 SE2d 361 ) (2002) (punctuation and footnote omitted).

2013In determining whether a statement is sufficiently trustworthy, the trial court was required to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the declaration, and “[o]nly where the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross examination would be of marginal utility does the hearsay rule not bar admission of a hearsay statement at trial.” Phillips v. State, 275 Ga. 595, 597 (4) ( 571 SE2d 361 ) (2002) (punctuation and footnote omitted).

2008Although a trial court’s determination of trustworthiness will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, Culmer, supra at 331 (2), we conclude under the totality of the circumstances, that Davis’ declarations to Wulff were not “coupled with circumstances which attribute verity to [them],” (punctuation omitted) Belmar, supra at 797 (2), and thus are inherently untrustworthy.

2008Although a trial court’s determination of trustworthiness will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, Culmer, supra at 331 (2), we conclude under the totality of the circumstances, that Davis’ declarations to Wulff were not “coupled with circumstances which attribute verity to [them],” (punctuation omitted) Belmar, supra at 797 (2), and thus are inherently untrustworthy.

1995The Supreme Court early grounded the exception on “the extreme improbability of [the statement’s] falsity.” Massee-Felton Lumber Co. v. Sirmans, 122 Ga. 297, 299 ( 50 SE 92 ) (1905). *738 The State submits that five indicia of reliability justified admission: (1) Ferguson’s statements to his job supervisor were admissible as declarations against his pecuniary interest in continued employment, OCGA § 24-3-8, and any other statements he made about these credit card charges were admissible since they were intertwined with these admissions against interest; (2) he consistently denied authorizing t

1995The standard is whether ‘the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.’ Id. at [820].” United States v. Accetturo, 966 F2d 631, 634 (11th Cir. 1992). “ ‘[T]here must be something present which the law considers a substitute for the oath of the declarant and his cross examination by the party against whom the hearsay is offered. . . .’ [Cits.]” (Emphasis omitted.) Higgs v. State, 256 Ga. 606, 607-608 (3) ( 351 SE2d 448 ) (1987).

1995The standard is whether ‘the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.’ Id. at [820].” United States v. Accetturo, 966 F2d 631, 634 (11th Cir. 1992). “ ‘[T]here must be something present which the law considers a substitute for the oath of the declarant and his cross examination by the party against whom the hearsay is offered. . . .’ [Cits.]” (Emphasis omitted.) Higgs v. State, 256 Ga. 606, 607-608 (3) ( 351 SE2d 448 ) (1987).