surrounding circumstances test in California

2018At least in the case of a truth incompetent minor, the court may rely exclusively on these out-of-court statements only 'if the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility....' " ( Lucero L. , supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1249 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting *725 Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 .) Father contends that the juvenile court ignored this requirement of "clear truthfulness" when it determined that I.C.'s statements

2018At least in the case of a truth incompetent minor, the court may rely exclusively on these out-of-court statements only 'if the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility....' " ( Lucero L. , supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1249 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting *725 Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 .) Father contends that the juvenile court ignored this requirement of "clear truthfulness" when it determined that I.C.'s statements

2018At least in the case of a truth incompetent minor, the court may rely exclusively on these out-of-court statements only 'if the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility....' " ( Lucero L. , supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1249 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting *725 Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 .) Father contends that the juvenile court ignored this requirement of "clear truthfulness" when it determined that I.C.'s statements

2018At least in the case of a truth incompetent minor, the court may rely exclusively on these out-of-court statements only 'if the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility....' " ( Lucero L. , supra , 22 Cal.4th at p. 1249 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 , 998 P.2d 1019 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting *725 Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 .) Father contends that the juvenile court ignored this requirement of "clear truthfulness" when it determined that I.C.'s statements

2014However, as the Arceo court correctly pointed out, Lilly "observed that '[w]hen a court can be confident . . . "the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility," the Sixth Amendment's residual "trustworthiness" test allows the admission of the declarant's statements.'" (Arceo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 , quoting Lilly, supra, at p. 136 .) Here, "[i]n addition to the 'reasonable assurance' of the veracity that ordinarily flows from a person's interest in not being criminally implicated [citation],

2003In Lilly , a plurality of the United States Supreme Court said that the admission of an accomplice’s out-of-court custodial confession that incriminates the defendant is not admissible as a declaration against interest because it “does not come within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” ( Lilly, supra, 527 U.S. 116, 134, fn. 5 [ 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1899 ].) The court added that when “a court can be confident—as in the context of hearsay falling within a firmly rooted exception—that ‘the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would

2000At least in the case of a truth incompetent minor, the court may rely exclusively on these out-of-court statements only "if the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility...." ( Idaho v. Wright, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 820 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 .) [7] Turning to the present case, the juvenile court found that Lucero's hearsay statements possessed sufficient indicia of reliability under Cindy L., specifically that "the statements that Lucero made to Liliana Rodriguez were spontaneous...." We must uphold the co

2000At least in the case of a truth incompetent minor, the court may rely exclusively on these out-of-court statements only "if the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility...." ( Idaho v. Wright, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 820 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 .) [7] Turning to the present case, the juvenile court found that Lucero's hearsay statements possessed sufficient indicia of reliability under Cindy L., specifically that "the statements that Lucero made to Liliana Rodriguez were spontaneous...." We must uphold the co

2015(See In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 710 [raising this same issue regarding a referee’s factual findings from a hearing transcript]; see also Lilly v. 24 While I agree that the juvenile court thoughtfully evaluated the evidence, our duty nonetheless is to determine if there is substantial evidence that I.C.’s truthfulness was “ ‘so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.’ ” (Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1249 .) I conclude there is not, based on my review of the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment b

2014(See Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 269 [“Via cross-examination or further investigation the prosecutors might have discovered evidence, for example, that defendant had coerced [the deceased witnesses] into making [their statements], just as they had introduced evidence that he induced [another witness] to perjure himself….”].) Contrary to Sanchez’s arguments, the truthfulness of the hearsay was not so obvious from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross- examination would have been of marginal utility.

2014(E.g., People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 170-177 [statement against penal interest (§ 1230)]; People v. Duke (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 23, 28-29 [same]; People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 326-329, 334-335 [same].) As noted above, California does not have a catchall exception to the hearsay rule based on “indicia of reliability.” (Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1289 & fn. 24; In re Cindy L., supra, 17 12.

2014(E.g., People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 170-177 [statement against penal interest (§ 1230)]; People v. Duke (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 23, 28-29 [same]; People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 326-329, 334-335 [same].) As noted above, California does not have a catchall exception to the hearsay rule based on “indicia of reliability.” (Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1289 & fn. 24; In re Cindy L., supra, 17 12.

2014(E.g., People v. Cervantes (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162, 170-177 [statement against penal interest (§ 1230)]; People v. Duke (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 23, 28-29 [same]; People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 326-329, 334-335 [same].) As noted above, California does not have a catchall exception to the hearsay rule based on “indicia of reliability.” (Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1289 & fn. 24; In re Cindy L., supra, 17 12.

2011(Lilly, at pp. 126-134; see also People v. Schmaus (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 846, 857 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 521 ] [stating Lilly plurality opinion casts doubt on Greenberger].) But Lilly , which involved a 50-page custodial confession, also observed that “[w]hen a court can be confident . . . ‘the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility,’ the Sixth Amendment’s residual ‘trustworthiness’ test allows the admission of the declarant’s statements.” (Lilly, supra, at pp. 136, 139 [confession of an accomplice whi

2011(Lilly, at pp. 126-134; see also People v. Schmaus (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 846, 857 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 521 ] [stating Lilly plurality opinion casts doubt on Greenberger].) But Lilly , which involved a 50-page custodial confession, also observed that “[w]hen a court can be confident . . . ‘the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility,’ the Sixth Amendment’s residual ‘trustworthiness’ test allows the admission of the declarant’s statements.” (Lilly, supra, at pp. 136, 139 [confession of an accomplice whi

2003In Lilly , a plurality of the United States Supreme Court said that the admission of an accomplice’s out-of-court custodial confession that incriminates the defendant is not admissible as a declaration against interest because it “does not come within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” ( Lilly, supra, 527 U.S. 116, 134, fn. 5 [ 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1899 ].) The court added that when “a court can be confident—as in the context of hearsay falling within a firmly rooted exception—that ‘the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would

2003In Lilly , a plurality of the United States Supreme Court said that the admission of an accomplice’s out-of-court custodial confession that incriminates the defendant is not admissible as a declaration against interest because it “does not come within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” ( Lilly, supra, 527 U.S. 116, 134, fn. 5 [ 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1899 ].) The court added that when “a court can be confident—as in the context of hearsay falling within a firmly rooted exception—that ‘the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would

2003In Lilly , a plurality of the United States Supreme Court said that the admission of an accomplice’s out-of-court custodial confession that incriminates the defendant is not admissible as a declaration against interest because it “does not come within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” ( Lilly, supra, 527 U.S. 116, 134, fn. 5 [ 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1899 ].) The court added that when “a court can be confident—as in the context of hearsay falling within a firmly rooted exception—that ‘the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would

2003In Lilly , a plurality of the United States Supreme Court said that the admission of an accomplice’s out-of-court custodial confession that incriminates the defendant is not admissible as a declaration against interest because it “does not come within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” ( Lilly, supra, 527 U.S. 116, 134, fn. 5 [ 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1899 ].) The court added that when “a court can be confident—as in the context of hearsay falling within a firmly rooted exception—that ‘the declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would

1997Declarations Against Interest The hearsay exception for declarations against interest was recognized in California in People v. Spriggs (1964) 60 Cal.2d 868, 874 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 389 P.2d 377 ].

1997Declarations Against Interest The hearsay exception for declarations against interest was recognized in California in People v. Spriggs (1964) 60 Cal.2d 868, 874 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 389 P.2d 377 ].