69 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1875–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re JFCgreen2 sentences2024However, a parent who fails to comply with one or more material requirements cannot avoid termination under subsection (O) “merely by showing that he complied with the plan’s other requirements.” Id. “[P]arents cannot 44 overcome the complete failure to comply with a material requirement by arguing that performing other requirements constitutes substantial compliance with the plan overall.” Id.; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 278 (“[T]hese sporadic incidents of partial compliance [with the service plan] do not alter the undisputed fact that the parents violated many material provisions of the tria 2014See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 278 . | 2 | 2 |
Lisa Kramer, F/K/A Lisa Kastleman v. Bryan Kastlemangreen2 sentences2022See Kramer v. Kastleman, 508 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2017) (“This, of course, is always the case when remand is required based on a material error affecting the trial court’s just-and-right property division; a party could always get more, less, or different.”). 8 2021See id. at 807–08 (holding that ex-husband’s argument failed to recognize that the court had divided community property unevenly because of his behavior during the 31 marriage and would have to re-divide the assets to reach a new “just and right” division if it erred by characterizing the ex-husband’s claimed cash as community property); see also Kramer, 508 S.W.3d at 216 (“This, of course, is always the case when remand is required based on a material error affecting the trial court’s just-and-right property division; a party could always get more, less, or different.”). | 2 | 2 |
Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Swansongreen2 sentences2009The Texas Supreme Court has held that fiduciaries have a duty to disclose material facts within their knowledge to the beneficiary, and that, consequently, whether the beneficiary relied upon the fiduciary to make the disclosure is "not a material inquiry." See Johnson v. Peckham , 120 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. 1938) (holding that trial court did not err in refusing to submit special issue to jury inquiring whether one partner relied on other partner to make disclosure about prior negotiations for sale of property); cf. Schlumberger , 959 S.W.2d at 181 (distinguishing Johnson by noting that there 2009The Texas Supreme Court has held that fiduciaries have a duty to disclose material facts within their knowledge to the beneficiary, and that, consequently, whether the beneficiary relied upon the fiduciary to make the disclosure is “not a material inquiry.” See Johnson v. Peckham, 120 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. 1938) (holding that trial court did not err in refusing to submit special issue to jury inquiring whether one partner relied on other partner to make disclosure about prior negotiations for sale of property); cf. Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 181 (distinguishing Johnson by noting that there wa | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Peckhamgreen2 sentences2009The Texas Supreme Court has held that fiduciaries have a duty to disclose material facts within their knowledge to the beneficiary, and that, consequently, whether the beneficiary relied upon the fiduciary to make the disclosure is "not a material inquiry." See Johnson v. Peckham , 120 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. 1938) (holding that trial court did not err in refusing to submit special issue to jury inquiring whether one partner relied on other partner to make disclosure about prior negotiations for sale of property); cf. Schlumberger , 959 S.W.2d at 181 (distinguishing Johnson by noting that there 2009The Texas Supreme Court has held that fiduciaries have a duty to disclose material facts within their knowledge to the beneficiary, and that, consequently, whether the beneficiary relied upon the fiduciary to make the disclosure is “not a material inquiry.” See Johnson v. Peckham, 120 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. 1938) (holding that trial court did not err in refusing to submit special issue to jury inquiring whether one partner relied on other partner to make disclosure about prior negotiations for sale of property); cf. Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 181 (distinguishing Johnson by noting that there wa | 2 | 2 |
Rodriguez v. Stategreen2 sentences2025“It is incumbent upon a defendant relying on [Rule 21.3(e)] to show that acts or omissions constituting fraud prevented the missing witness from appearing in court.” Rodriguez v. State, 21 S.W.3d 562, 567 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). 2013The underlying rationale for the fraud provision in this rule is “to provide relief in those rare instances in which a material defense witness is deceived or tricked into not appearing in court.” Rodriguez, 21 S.W.3d at 567 . | 1 | 2 |
In Re MCGgreen1 sentence2023See In re M.C.G., 329 S.W.3d 674, 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (supp. op. on reh’g) (“The Family Code does not provide for substantial compliance with a family services plan.” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
Salinas v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See Salinas, 980 S.W.2d at 521 . | 1 | 1 |
Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C.green1 sentence2022See id. | 1 | 1 |
Carle v. Carlegreen1 sentence2021See id. at 807–08 (holding that ex-husband’s argument failed to recognize that the court had divided community property unevenly because of his behavior during the 31 marriage and would have to re-divide the assets to reach a new “just and right” division if it erred by characterizing the ex-husband’s claimed cash as community property); see also Kramer, 508 S.W.3d at 216 (“This, of course, is always the case when remand is required based on a material error affecting the trial court’s just-and-right property division; a party could always get more, less, or different.”). | 1 | 1 |
Holden v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657 . | 1 | 1 |
Almanza v. Stategreen1 sentence2016It may well be a violation of fundamental fairness, a violation of due process of law, a violation of the due course of law of the land.” Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 176 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Leegreen2 sentences2016See id. or the delay in providing an accounting, appellee reasons that, even if these items were undisputed, they "cannot substitute Although the former statute provided (and the current statute for the missing fact finding that any such breaches constituted continues to provide) that a tmstee may be removed for a material violation causing any material loss," a ground _ specified in the statute (material violation of tmst resulting in material financial loss, incompetence, or *791 [31) [32] Nonetheless, we believe the trial judge's insolvency) or "for other cause, in the discretion of the rea 2016We agree with the trial court that act on the part of the trial court and hence subject upon breaches of fiduciary duty can constitute material violations review to the 'arbitrary and unreasonable* standard," See id. of the trust. | 1 | 1 |
Carr v. Huntgreen1 sentence2015Id. at 858; see also mitted a material error in instructing the jury regarding Carr v. Hunt, 651 S.W.2d 875 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas issue 3 that they could consider consequential loss, © 2015 Thomson Reuters. | 1 | 1 |
Cornelius Cooper v. Southern Companygreen1 sentence2014See Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 741, 743, 745 (11th Cir.2004), overruled on other grounds by Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 , 126 S.Ct. 1195 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.green2 sentences2014See Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 741, 743, 745 (11th Cir.2004), overruled on other grounds by Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 , 126 S.Ct. 1195 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006). 2014See Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 741, 743, 745 (11th Cir.2004), overruled on other grounds by Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 , 126 S.Ct. 1195 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Erwin v. Stategreen1 sentence2004See Erwin , 729 S.W.2d at 713–14 . | 1 | 1 |
| Gray v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Motilla v. State
green
2 sentences2015Page at 766 ; citing Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352 , 355-57 Appellant Emmanuel Von Allen Evans Page Petition For Discretionary Review 12 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). 2014Page at 766 ; citing Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352 , 355-57 Appellant Emmanuel Von Allen Evans Page Petition For Discretionary Review 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Reid v. Byrd
neutral
2 sentences1941In the case of Reid v. Byrd, Tex.Civ.App., 34 S.W.2d 305, 307 , the following is quoted with approval from Franco-Texan Land Co. v. Simpson, 1 Tex.Civ.App. 600 , 20 S.W. 953 : “But, although the contract and deed show a sale in gross, it may be shown by parol evidence under appropriate pleadings that the sale was actually one by the acre”. 1941In the case of Reid v. Byrd, 34 S. W. (2d) 305 , the following is quoted with approval from Franco-Texan Land Co. v. Simpson, 20 S. W. 953 : “But, although the contract and deed show a sale in gross, it may be shown by parol evidence under appropriate pleadings that the sale was actually one by the acre.” The pleadings in the present case having- alleged a mutual mistake in the mineral deed sought to be reformed, the parties were not precluded by recitations contained in such deed from showing that the sale was one by the acre. 3 Neither was it essential to the vendors’ case to allege and prov | 2 | 1941–1941 |
Franco-Texan Land Co. v. Simpson
neutral
2 sentences1941In the case of Reid v. Byrd, Tex.Civ.App., 34 S.W.2d 305, 307 , the following is quoted with approval from Franco-Texan Land Co. v. Simpson, 1 Tex.Civ.App. 600 , 20 S.W. 953 : “But, although the contract and deed show a sale in gross, it may be shown by parol evidence under appropriate pleadings that the sale was actually one by the acre”. 1941In the case of Reid v. Byrd, 34 S. W. (2d) 305 , the following is quoted with approval from Franco-Texan Land Co. v. Simpson, 20 S. W. 953 : “But, although the contract and deed show a sale in gross, it may be shown by parol evidence under appropriate pleadings that the sale was actually one by the acre.” The pleadings in the present case having- alleged a mutual mistake in the mineral deed sought to be reformed, the parties were not precluded by recitations contained in such deed from showing that the sale was one by the acre. 3 Neither was it essential to the vendors’ case to allege and prov | 2 | 1941–1941 |
Daughtrey v. Knolle
green
2 sentences1941We have examined the official recorded opinion in the clerk’s office and find the above quotation, taken from the South/ Western Reporter, is correct, and that the official State Report is incorrect In tne case of Daughtrey v. Knolle, 44 Tex. 450 , loc.cit. 455, the court say: “Unquestionably, where land is sold by the acre, and in many cases when the sale is in gross, and through fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake there is a material error in the quantity of land conveyed by the deed, relief may be had in equity, whether the deed contains a covenant of warranty or not; for the court acts in 1941We have examined the official recorded opinion in the clerk’s office and find the above quotation, taken from the South Western Reporter, is correct, and that the official State Report is incorrect.) In the case of Daugherty v. Knolle, 44 Texas 450 , loc. cit. 455, the court say: “Unquestionably, where land is sold by the acre and in many cases when the sale is in gross and through fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake there is a material error in the quantity of land conveyed by the deed, relief may be had in equity, whether the deed contains a covenant of warranty or not; for the court acts i | 2 | 1941–1941 |
Eastern Texas Electric Co. v. Baker
green
2 sentences1926App.) 254 S. W. 933 . 1925App.) 254 S. W. 933 . | 2 | 1925–1926 |
Thomas v. State
green
2 sentences1877The State v. Smith, 2 Ired. * * * “If the facts show that the error was calculated to injure the rights of the defendants, and was, therefore, a material error, although the charge was not excepted to, it constitutes a good ground for a new trial, and the refusal of a new trial in such a case will be a sufficient ground for a reversal.” Moore, J., also, in the case of Thomas v. The State, 43 Texas, 658 , says: “The unexplained possession of stolen property recently after the theft is unquestionably a circumstance which often tends to prove the guilt of the party in whose possession it is found 1876Proc., and references.) Where the court in its charge has directed attention to the subject, by telling the jury that such unexplained possession raises a presumption of the guilt of the possessor, or is prima facie evidence of guilt, it has not been in many cases regarded as a material error, though it is said not to be “strictly correct.” (Thomas v. The State, 43 Tex., 658 ; Calvin Thompson v. The State, 43 Tex., 268 .) The charge, as a whole, and in connection with the facts of the case, may show that it was neither intended nor understood as meaning that the law attached to such possession | 2 | 1876–1877 |
Guidry v. State
green
1 sentence2025Rule 21.3(e) provides that a “defendant must be granted a new trial, or a new trial on punishment . . . when a material defense witness has been kept from court by force, threats, or fraud[.]” Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Wilson v. State
green
1 sentence2025Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Robert Scott, Commissioner of Education v. Alphonso Crutch LSC Charter School, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015“Adverse Actions” include (a) a material violation of the terms of the charter listed in paragraphs 2 and 3, including accountability provisions; (b) failure to satisfy generally accepted accounting standards of fiscal management; or (c) failure to comply with an applicable law or rule.” Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Carmona v. State
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Thompson v. State
green
1 sentence2015Appellant hereby incorporates by reference the Statement of Facts portion of this brief as set forth at 3-8, supra. “[P]ossible prejudice to a defendant should be avoided unless there are sufficient reasons to have his witness appear handcuffed and in jail clothing.” Thompson v. State, 514 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State of Texas v. Jeremy Thomas
green
1 sentence2014Thomas, 426 S.W.3d at 236-37 . 6 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ex Parte Dutchover
green
1 sentence2006On collateral review of such claims, it is the burden of the applicant to not only show there is a material violation, Ex parte Dutchover , 779 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Bishop v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| United States ex rel. Johnson v. Rundle green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Kostroun v. Plsek neutral | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Southern States Steel Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Kurth neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Cossman neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Hopson v. Gulf Oil Corp. green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Taylor v. Grant Lovejoy green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Guy v. State green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Hart v. State neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Burton-Lingo Co. v. Morton green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| O'Conner v. State neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| City of Farmersville v. Texas-Louisiana Power Co. green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Moore v. Ivey neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Hookfin green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Dougherty v. Holscheider green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Harden v. State green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Wills Point Mercantile Co. v. Southern Rock Island Plow Co. neutral | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Herrera v. State green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Warren v. State green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| King v. State neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.