material error in Louisiana

2014Jones v. Black, 95-2530 (La.6/28/96), 676 So.2d 1067 ; Gonzales v. Xerox, 254 La. 182 , 320 So.2d 163, 165 (1975).

2002Jones v. Black, 95-2530 (La.6/28/96), 676 So.2d 1067 .

2003Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 94-1252 (La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 742 .

1998Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 94-1252 (La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 742 ; Holt v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.

2002Jones v. Gold-Kist, Inc., XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/23/02), [819] So.2d [1034], 2002 WL 124394 : Generally, where a jury verdict is tainted due to a material error at trial, making it untrustworthy, then the verdict must be overturned; however, when an otherwise complete trial record exists, the general rule is that an appellate court should, if it can, render judgment on the record.

2002App. 4 Cir. 1/23/02), 819 So.2d 1034 : Generally, where a jury verdict is tainted due to a material error at trial, making it untrustworthy, then the verdict must be overturned; however, when an otherwise complete trial record exists, the general rule is that an appellate court should, if it can, render judgment on the record.

1987We therefore believe that prior conviction of a crime and the nature of the crime may be inquired into for impeachment purposes on cross-examination.” This court, in the case of Fusilier v. Employers Insurance Company of Wausau, 235 So.2d 618 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1970), citing Middleton, supra, allowed the impeachment of a witness in a civil case by showing his convictions for several offenses.

1975We therefore believe that prior conviction of a crime and the nature of the crime may be inquired into for impeachment purposes on cross-examination." The Third Circuit in the case of Fusilier v. Employer's Insurance Company of Wausau, 235 So.2d 618 (La.App., 3rd Cir., 1970), citing Middleton , allowed the impeachment of a witness in a civil case by showing his convictions for several offenses including reckless driving.

2020R.S. 18:492 provides, in part: A. An action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified as a candidate in a primary election shall be based on one or more of the following grounds: *** (3) The defendant does not meet the qualifications for the office he seeks in the primary election. 3 law for one year and one day for violating Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 8.15 and 8.4.6 In re Kelly, 15-0414, p. 1 (La. 4/2/15), 164 So.3d 815, 815-816 .

2014Jones v. Black, 95-2530 (La.6/28/96), 676 So.2d 1067 ; Gonzales v. Xerox, 254 La. 182 , 320 So.2d 163, 165 (1975).

2007Significantly, the opinion distinguishes the Karno facts from those of Select Properties, Ltd. v. Rando, 453 So.2d 980 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984), noting: Nor does the breach in the instant case affect the plaintiffs' interest to the extent that the failure of the lessee to obtain required insurance did in Select Properties, Ltd. v. Rando, 453 So.2d 980 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984).

2007Significantly, the opinion distinguishes the Karno facts from those of Select Properties, Ltd. v. Rando, 453 So.2d 980 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984), noting: Nor does the breach in the instant case affect the plaintiffs' interest to the extent that the failure of the lessee to obtain required insurance did in Select Properties, Ltd. v. Rando, 453 So.2d 980 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984).

1987We therefore believe that prior conviction of a crime and the nature of the crime may be inquired into for impeachment purposes on cross-examination.” This court, in the case of Fusilier v. Employers Insurance Company of Wausau, 235 So.2d 618 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1970), citing Middleton, supra, allowed the impeachment of a witness in a civil case by showing his convictions for several offenses.

1985United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); State v. Perkins, 423 So.2d 1103 (La.1982); State v. Davenport, 399 So.2d 201 (La.1981); State v. Sylvester, 388 So.2d 1155 (La.1980).

1985United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); State v. Perkins, 423 So.2d 1103 (La.1982); State v. Davenport, 399 So.2d 201 (La.1981); State v. Sylvester, 388 So.2d 1155 (La.1980).

1985United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); State v. Perkins, 423 So.2d 1103 (La.1982); State v. Davenport, 399 So.2d 201 (La.1981); State v. Sylvester, 388 So.2d 1155 (La.1980).

1985United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); State v. Perkins, 423 So.2d 1103 (La.1982); State v. Davenport, 399 So.2d 201 (La.1981); State v. Sylvester, 388 So.2d 1155 (La.1980).

1985United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); State v. Perkins, 423 So.2d 1103 (La.1982); State v. Davenport, 399 So.2d 201 (La.1981); State v. Sylvester, 388 So.2d 1155 (La.1980).

1961Among more recent cases where the principle has been adopted and in which recovery was allowed, we find Spivey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (disability from heart attack), La.App., 127 So.2d 297 (4th Circuit, 1961, certoriari denied); McKnight v. Clemons (aggravation of heart condition), La.App., 114 So.2d 114 (1st Circuit, 1959); Cutno v. Neeb Kearney & Company (aggravation of pre-existing ulcer), 237 La. 828 , 112 So.2d 628 ; Brian v. Employers Casualty Co. (death from heart attack), La.App., 111 So.2d 161 (2nd Circuit, 1959, certiorari denied); Guillory v. Reimers-Schneider Co., Inc. (agg

1961Among more recent cases where the principle has been adopted and in which recovery was allowed, we find Spivey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (disability from heart attack), La.App., 127 So.2d 297 (4th Circuit, 1961, certoriari denied); McKnight v. Clemons (aggravation of heart condition), La.App., 114 So.2d 114 (1st Circuit, 1959); Cutno v. Neeb Kearney & Company (aggravation of pre-existing ulcer), 237 La. 828 , 112 So.2d 628 ; Brian v. Employers Casualty Co. (death from heart attack), La.App., 111 So.2d 161 (2nd Circuit, 1959, certiorari denied); Guillory v. Reimers-Schneider Co., Inc. (agg

1961Among more recent cases where the principle has been adopted and in which recovery was allowed, we find Spivey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (disability from heart attack), La.App., 127 So.2d 297 (4th Circuit, 1961, certoriari denied); McKnight v. Clemons (aggravation of heart condition), La.App., 114 So.2d 114 (1st Circuit, 1959); Cutno v. Neeb Kearney & Company (aggravation of pre-existing ulcer), 237 La. 828 , 112 So.2d 628 ; Brian v. Employers Casualty Co. (death from heart attack), La.App., 111 So.2d 161 (2nd Circuit, 1959, certiorari denied); Guillory v. Reimers-Schneider Co., Inc. (agg

1961Among more recent cases where the principle has been adopted and in which recovery was allowed, we find Spivey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (disability from heart attack), La.App., 127 So.2d 297 (4th Circuit, 1961, certoriari denied); McKnight v. Clemons (aggravation of heart condition), La.App., 114 So.2d 114 (1st Circuit, 1959); Cutno v. Neeb Kearney & Company (aggravation of pre-existing ulcer), 237 La. 828 , 112 So.2d 628 ; Brian v. Employers Casualty Co. (death from heart attack), La.App., 111 So.2d 161 (2nd Circuit, 1959, certiorari denied); Guillory v. Reimers-Schneider Co., Inc. (agg

1961Among more recent cases where the principle has been adopted and in which recovery was allowed, we find Spivey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (disability from heart attack), La.App., 127 So.2d 297 (4th Circuit, 1961, certoriari denied); McKnight v. Clemons (aggravation of heart condition), La.App., 114 So.2d 114 (1st Circuit, 1959); Cutno v. Neeb Kearney & Company (aggravation of pre-existing ulcer), 237 La. 828 , 112 So.2d 628 ; Brian v. Employers Casualty Co. (death from heart attack), La.App., 111 So.2d 161 (2nd Circuit, 1959, certiorari denied); Guillory v. Reimers-Schneider Co., Inc. (agg

1961Among more recent cases where the principle has been adopted and in which recovery was allowed, we find Spivey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (disability from heart attack), La.App., 127 So.2d 297 (4th Circuit, 1961, certoriari denied); McKnight v. Clemons (aggravation of heart condition), La.App., 114 So.2d 114 (1st Circuit, 1959); Cutno v. Neeb Kearney & Company (aggravation of pre-existing ulcer), 237 La. 828 , 112 So.2d 628 ; Brian v. Employers Casualty Co. (death from heart attack), La.App., 111 So.2d 161 (2nd Circuit, 1959, certiorari denied); Guillory v. Reimers-Schneider Co., Inc. (agg

1961Among more recent cases where the principle has been adopted and in which recovery was allowed, we find Spivey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (disability from heart attack), La.App., 127 So.2d 297 (4th Circuit, 1961, certoriari denied); McKnight v. Clemons (aggravation of heart condition), La.App., 114 So.2d 114 (1st Circuit, 1959); Cutno v. Neeb Kearney & Company (aggravation of pre-existing ulcer), 237 La. 828 , 112 So.2d 628 ; Brian v. Employers Casualty Co. (death from heart attack), La.App., 111 So.2d 161 (2nd Circuit, 1959, certiorari denied); Guillory v. Reimers-Schneider Co., Inc. (agg

1961Among more recent cases where the principle has been adopted and in which recovery was allowed, we find Spivey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (disability from heart attack), La.App., 127 So.2d 297 (4th Circuit, 1961, certoriari denied); McKnight v. Clemons (aggravation of heart condition), La.App., 114 So.2d 114 (1st Circuit, 1959); Cutno v. Neeb Kearney & Company (aggravation of pre-existing ulcer), 237 La. 828 , 112 So.2d 628 ; Brian v. Employers Casualty Co. (death from heart attack), La.App., 111 So.2d 161 (2nd Circuit, 1959, certiorari denied); Guillory v. Reimers-Schneider Co., Inc. (agg

1927Spratley, 172 U. S. 602 , the Court said: “In a suit where no property of a corporation is found within a state, and the judgment sought is a personal one, it is a material inquiry to ascertain whether the foreign corporation is engaged in doing business within the state.” The subject of service on an agent designated by a state statute was discussed at length.

1926Co., supra, it was said, in effect, that one of the material factors in determining whether an injury to a workman arises out of his employment is whether “the nature of the employment was such that the risk from which the injury resulted was greater for the workman than for a person not engaged in the employment.” To the same effect are the cases of Dyer v. Rapides Lumber Co., supra, and Ferguson v. Cady-McFarland Gravel Co., 156 La. 871 , 101 So. 248 .

1926Co., supra, it was said, in effect, that one of the material factors in determining whether an injury to a workman arises out of his employment is whether “the nature of the employment was such that the risk from which the injury resulted was greater for the workman than for a person not engaged in the employment.” To the same effect are the cases of Dyer v. Rapides Lumber Co., supra, and Ferguson v. Cady-McFarland Gravel Co., 156 La. 871 , 101 So. 248 .