material error in Florida

2010See Matos v. State, 956 So.2d 1240, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (affirming revocation of community control after striking some of the violations but finding other violations were supported by the evidence); Butler v. State, 932 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (recognizing that when an appellate court reverses on a finding regarding one of the conditions of community control, remand is not required if the remaining violation or violations are substantial); Rawlins v. State, 711 So.2d 137, 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (finding unexcused absences from a treatment program, standing alone, may constitute

2010See Matos v. State, 956 So.2d 1240, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (affirming revocation of community control after striking some of the violations but finding other violations were supported by the evidence); Butler v. State, 932 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (recognizing that when an appellate court reverses on a finding regarding one of the conditions of community control, remand is not required if the remaining violation or violations are substantial); Rawlins v. State, 711 So.2d 137, 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (finding unexcused absences from a treatment program, standing alone, may constitute

2008Assistance Found., Inc. v. Clark, 668 So.2d 982 (Fla.1996); Gross v. Dep't of Health, 819 So.2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

2006A reviewing court may set aside agency action when it finds that the action is dependent on any finding of fact that is not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record, a material error in procedure, an erroneous interpretation of law, or an abuse of discretion. § 120.68(7), Fla. Stat. (2005); see Gross v. Dep't of Health, 819 So.2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

1984However, the standard for determining whether a new trial should be ordered on the basis of recanted testimony was set out in Henderson v. State, 136 Fla. 548 , 185 So. 625 (1939), where the Court stated: A material error or misstatement in the testimony of the witness for the prosecution may constitute ground for a new trial...

1980There we said, citing Henderson v. State, 135 Fla. 548 , 185 So. 625, 630 (1939): A material error or misstatement in the testimony of a witness for the prosecution may constitute ground for a new trial.

1994Compare, Pinellas County v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 379 So.2d 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversal justified where a time violation for which no extenuating circumstances existed adversely affected the fairness of the proceedings and constitutes a material error in procedures) with School Board of Sarasota County v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 382 So.2d 1361 , 1362 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversal not justified on grounds of a time violation when extenuating circumstances existed and no severe prejudice was shown).

1982Compare Pinellas County v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 379 So.2d 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversal justified where a time violation for which no extenuating circumstances existed adversely affected the fairness of the proceedings and constituted a material error in procedure) with School Board of Sarasota County v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 382 So.2d 1361 , 1362 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversal not justified on grounds of a time violation where extenuating circumstances existed and no severe prejudice was shown).

2025Cf. § 120.68(7)(c), Fla. Stat. (“The court shall remand a case to the agency for further proceedings . . . when it finds that: . . . [t]he fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure[.]” (emphasis added)); § 120.68(8), Fla. Stat. (requiring affirmance unless the court finds grounds for granting relief); see also Peoples Bank of Indian River Cnty. v. State, Dep’t of Banking & Fin., 395 So. 2d 521, 524 (Fla. 1981) (citing section 120.68(8), Florida Statutes (current section 120.68

1988E.g., Department of Business Regulation v. Hy-man, 417 So.2d 671, 673 (Fla.1982);' Peoples Bank of Indian River County v. State, Department of Banking and Finance, 395 So.2d 521, 524 (Fla.1981).

2024We note that in Murciano, this Court stated that the “scope of review” of non-final agency action was “‘no broader than the right of review by common law certiorari.’” 163 So. 3d at 664 (quoting CNL Resort Hotel, L.P. v. City of Doral, 991 So. 2d 417, 420 (3d DCA 2008) (quoting Fla. Dept. of Financial Servs. v. Fugett, 946 So. 2d 80, 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)).

2024We note that in Murciano, this Court stated that the “scope of review” of non-final agency action was “‘no broader than the right of review by common law certiorari.’” 163 So. 3d at 664 (quoting CNL Resort Hotel, L.P. v. City of Doral, 991 So. 2d 417, 420 (3d DCA 2008) (quoting Fla. Dept. of Financial Servs. v. Fugett, 946 So. 2d 80, 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)).

2024We note that in Murciano, this Court stated that the “scope of review” of non-final agency action was “‘no broader than the right of review by common law certiorari.’” 163 So. 3d at 664 (quoting CNL Resort Hotel, L.P. v. City of Doral, 991 So. 2d 417, 420 (3d DCA 2008) (quoting Fla. Dept. of Financial Servs. v. Fugett, 946 So. 2d 80, 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)).

2024We note that in Murciano, this Court stated that the “scope of review” of non-final agency action was “‘no broader than the right of review by common law certiorari.’” 163 So. 3d at 664 (quoting CNL Resort Hotel, L.P. v. City of Doral, 991 So. 2d 417, 420 (3d DCA 2008) (quoting Fla. Dept. of Financial Servs. v. Fugett, 946 So. 2d 80, 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)).

2016(First emphasis supplied); see also Stewart, 194 So. at 871 (“But the material inquiry in all cases is, whether the destruction of the will was animo revocandi, and to determine this it is necessary to consider the circumstances under which and the purposes and reasons for which it was destroyed; and where from all the circumstances in evidence it appears that the destruction or revocation was connected with, or because of, the execution of another will, and that the testator meant the revocation of the one to depend upon the validity of the other.... ”).

2015(First emphasis supplied); see also Stewart, 194 So. at 871 ("But the material inquiry in all cases is, whether the destruction of the will was animo revocandi, and to determine this it is necessary to consider the circumstances under which and the purposes and reasons for which it was destroyed; and where from all the circumstances in evidence it appears that the destruction or revocation was connected with, or because of, the execution of another will, and that the testator meant the revocation of the one to depend upon the validity of the other . . . .").

2010See Matos v. State, 956 So.2d 1240, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (affirming revocation of community control after striking some of the violations but finding other violations were supported by the evidence); Butler v. State, 932 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (recognizing that when an appellate court reverses on a finding regarding one of the conditions of community control, remand is not required if the remaining violation or violations are substantial); Rawlins v. State, 711 So.2d 137, 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (finding unexcused absences from a treatment program, standing alone, may constitute

2010See Matos v. State, 956 So.2d 1240, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (affirming revocation of community control after striking some of the violations but finding other violations were supported by the evidence); Butler v. State, 932 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (recognizing that when an appellate court reverses on a finding regarding one of the conditions of community control, remand is not required if the remaining violation or violations are substantial); Rawlins v. State, 711 So.2d 137, 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (finding unexcused absences from a treatment program, standing alone, may constitute

2010See Matos v. State, 956 So.2d 1240, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (affirming revocation of community control after striking some of the violations but finding other violations were supported by the evidence); Butler v. State, 932 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (recognizing that when an appellate court reverses on a finding regarding one of the conditions of community control, remand is not required if the remaining violation or violations are substantial); Rawlins v. State, 711 So.2d 137, 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (finding unexcused absences from a treatment program, standing alone, may constitute

2010See Matos v. State, 956 So.2d 1240, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (affirming revocation of community control after striking some of the violations but finding other violations were supported by the evidence); Butler v. State, 932 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (recognizing that when an appellate court reverses on a finding regarding one of the conditions of community control, remand is not required if the remaining violation or violations are substantial); Rawlins v. State, 711 So.2d 137, 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (finding unexcused absences from a treatment program, standing alone, may constitute

2010See Matos v. State, 956 So.2d 1240, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (affirming revocation of community control after striking some of the violations but finding other violations were supported by the evidence); Butler v. State, 932 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (recognizing that when an appellate court reverses on a finding regarding one of the conditions of community control, remand is not required if the remaining violation or violations are substantial); Rawlins v. State, 711 So.2d 137, 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (finding unexcused absences from a treatment program, standing alone, may constitute

2010See Matos v. State, 956 So.2d 1240, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (affirming revocation of community control after striking some of the violations but finding other violations were supported by the evidence); Butler v. State, 932 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (recognizing that when an appellate court reverses on a finding regarding one of the conditions of community control, remand is not required if the remaining violation or violations are substantial); Rawlins v. State, 711 So.2d 137, 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (finding unexcused absences from a treatment program, standing alone, may constitute

1994Compare, Pinellas County v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 379 So.2d 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversal justified where a time violation for which no extenuating circumstances existed adversely affected the fairness of the proceedings and constitutes a material error in procedures) with School Board of Sarasota County v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 382 So.2d 1361 , 1362 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversal not justified on grounds of a time violation when extenuating circumstances existed and no severe prejudice was shown).

1982Compare Pinellas County v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 379 So.2d 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversal justified where a time violation for which no extenuating circumstances existed adversely affected the fairness of the proceedings and constituted a material error in procedure) with School Board of Sarasota County v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 382 So.2d 1361 , 1362 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (reversal not justified on grounds of a time violation where extenuating circumstances existed and no severe prejudice was shown).

1993Appellant points out that in respect to violations of the time constraints set forth in chapter 120, the Administrative Procedure Act, for which the legislature has not provided a specific sanction, relief to an aggrieved party is appropriate if it is shown that the agency’s failure to comply with mandatory time requirements constitutes a material error in procedure that impairs the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the action, citing Department of Business Regulation v. Hyman, 417 So.2d 671 (Fla.1982); G & B of Jacksonville, Inc. v. State of Florida, Department of Business Regu

1988E.g., Department of Business Regulation v. Hy-man, 417 So.2d 671, 673 (Fla.1982);' Peoples Bank of Indian River County v. State, Department of Banking and Finance, 395 So.2d 521, 524 (Fla.1981).

2025Regul., Div. of Pari- Mutuel Wagering, 613 So. 2d 930, 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) ("It is axiomatic that where substantial competent evidence supports the findings and 3 conclusions of the administrative agency and the record discloses neither an abuse of discretion nor a violation of law by the agency, this court should not overturn the agency's determination.") (quoting Cohen School Bd. of Dade Cnty., Fla., 450 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)); see also Allstate Floridian Ins.

2025Regul., Div. of Pari- Mutuel Wagering, 613 So. 2d 930, 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) ("It is axiomatic that where substantial competent evidence supports the findings and 3 conclusions of the administrative agency and the record discloses neither an abuse of discretion nor a violation of law by the agency, this court should not overturn the agency's determination.") (quoting Cohen School Bd. of Dade Cnty., Fla., 450 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)); see also Allstate Floridian Ins.

2024See Robinson v. Comm’n on Ethics, 242 So. 3d 467, 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (stating that “pursuant to section 120.68(8), the order must be affirmed ‘[u]nless the court finds a ground for setting aside, modifying, remanding, or ordering agency 4 action or ancillary relief under a specified provision of [section 120.68].’” (quoting § 120.68(8), Fla. Stat.)).

2024Under section 120.68(7)(c), Florida Statutes (2021), “[t]he fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action” may be impaired by “a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure.” § 120.68(7)(c), Fla. Stat.; see also Citizens of Fla. v. Mayo, 333 So. 2d 1, 8-9 (Fla. 1976) (remanding where inadequate Commission findings caused a “material error in procedure” that “affected both - 25 - the fairness and the correctness” of the proceedings).

2018In Citizens I , we affirmed the Commission's order, in relevant part, "because [OPC (the non-settling appellant) ] ha[d] not demonstrated that the Commission violated the essential requirements of law or committed a material error in procedure by approving the negotiated settlement agreement over [OPC's] active objection" and competent, substantial evidence supported the order. 146 So.3d at 1153-54 , 1164 .

2018Likewise, we stated above that "a party challenging an order of the Commission on appeal has the burden [to] show[ ] a departure from the essential requirements of law and the legislation controlling the issue, or that the findings of the Commission are not supported by competent, substantial evidence." Supra p. 907-08; see Citizens I , 146 So.3d at 1149 ; Crist , 908 So.2d at 430 .

2015Under the Act, “[s]ection 948.06(8) imposes additional requirements on the trial court when a probationer before it on revocation proceedings is a [VFOSC].” Bailey v. State, 136 So. 3d 617, 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); see § 948.06(8)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013).

2014Carter v. Dep’t of Prof'l Regulation, Bd. of Optometry, 633 So.2d 3, 5-6 (Fla.1994).

2013Second, an administrative agency’s action may be set aside if “[t]he agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation compels a particular action[.]” § l'20.68(7)(d), Fla. Stat. See also Young v. Dep’t of Educ., Div. of Vocational Rehab., 943 So.2d 901, 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“A reviewing court may set aside agency action when it finds that the action is dependent on any finding of fact that is not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record, a material error in procedure, an erroneous interpretation of law, or an abuse of discretion.”).