extremely important principle (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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extremely important principle in Illinois

9 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1972–1991 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (0)

CaseFollowedCited
No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois.

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Ashe v. Swenson green
scotus · 1970
2 sentences

1982Ed. 2d 469, 475 , 90 S. Ct. 1189 , where, in the course of describing the doctrine, the court said: ‘ “ Collateral estoppel” is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice.

1981Ed. 2d 469, 475 , 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194 , as follows: “ ‘Collateral estoppel’ is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice.

91972–1991
People v. Williams green
ill · 1975
2 sentences

1981It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit * ° ( 59 Ill. 2d 557, 560 , 332 N.E.2d 461 , 462-63.) The only basis for relitigating a factual issue is where there has been some additional evidence or a “peculiar circumstance” which warrants reconsideration, or where there is an articulable reason for not presenting relevant evidence at the prior hearing.

1977It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” See also People v. Haran, 27 Ill. 2d 229 , 188 N.E.2d 707 ; People v. Williams, 59 Ill. 2d 557 , 322 N.E.2d 461 .

21977–1981
The PEOPLE v. Haran green
ill · 1963
2 sentences

1978It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. ***” *** This court noted in People v. Haran, 27 Ill. 2d 229, 231 , that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was “well defined” in Hoffman v. Hoffman, 330 Ill. 413 .

1977It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” See also People v. Haran, 27 Ill. 2d 229 , 188 N.E.2d 707 ; People v. Williams, 59 Ill. 2d 557 , 322 N.E.2d 461 .

21977–1978
People v. Grayson green
ill · 1974
1 sentence

1991It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’ ” (People v. Grayson (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 260, 263 , quoting Ashe v. Swenson (1970), 397 U.S. 436, 443 , 25 L.

11991–1991
Relph v. Board of Education of DePue Unit School District No. 103 green
ill · 1981
2 sentences

1982It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. »*<*’* <**”« * »’ ” As to the requirement of a valid and final judgment, the court noted in Relph v. Board of Education (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 436, 442-44 , 420 N.E.2d 147 , that finality, for purposes of applying res judicata (including therein collateral estoppel), required that the potential for appellate review had been exhausted.

1982It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. »*<*’* <**”« * »’ ” As to the requirement of a valid and final judgment, the court noted in Relph v. Board of Education (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 436, 442-44 , 420 N.E.2d 147 , that finality, for purposes of applying res judicata (including therein collateral estoppel), required that the potential for appellate review had been exhausted.

11982–1982
Hoffman v. Hoffman green
ill · 1928
1 sentence

1978It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. ***” *** This court noted in People v. Haran, 27 Ill. 2d 229, 231 , that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was “well defined” in Hoffman v. Hoffman, 330 Ill. 413 .

11978–1978

Where else courts name it

MD 12 (1976–2015) TX 11 (1973–2024) IL 9 (1972–1991) MI 7 (1976–2022) IN 6 (1980–2013) GA 6 (1975–2022) CT 6 (1987–2018) CA 6 (1994–2023) PA 5 (1978–1984) LA 4 (1978–2022) AL 4 (1997–2005) DC 4 (1976–2002) MO 3 (1978–2010) NY 3 (1975–1982) NJ 2 (1977–2011) OH 2 (1994–1999) SC 2 (2014–2019) VA 2 (1982–1988) AZ 2 (1982–2007) NM 2 (1973–1985)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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