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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ashe v. Swensongreen2 sentences2016It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." ( Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436 , 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 , 475.) Courts often speak of applying full faith and credit to a sister state's judgment in order to implement res judicata principles. ( Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1258 , 1271, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 914 .) "With respect to judgments, 'the full faith and credit obligation is exacting.' [Citat 2016It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future 23 lawsuit.” (Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 443 .)4 The Attorney General does not defend the application of collateral estoppel/issue preclusion in this case; rather, she takes the position the trial court did not apply it at all. | 2 | 5 |
Nakash v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016(See Nakash v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 59 , 67, 241 Cal.Rptr. 578 [res judicata]; McClain v. Rush (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 18 , 28-29, 264 Cal.Rptr. 563 [collateral estoppel].) " 'Collateral estoppel' is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. 2016(See Nakash v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 59 , 67, 241 Cal.Rptr. 578 [res judicata]; McClain v. Rush (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 18 , 28-29, 264 Cal.Rptr. 563 [collateral estoppel].) " 'Collateral estoppel' is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. | 1 | 2 |
McClain v. Rushgreen2 sentences2016(See Nakash v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 59 , 67, 241 Cal.Rptr. 578 [res judicata]; McClain v. Rush (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 18 , 28-29, 264 Cal.Rptr. 563 [collateral estoppel].) " 'Collateral estoppel' is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. 2016(See Nakash v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 59 , 67, 241 Cal.Rptr. 578 [res judicata]; McClain v. Rush (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 18 , 28-29, 264 Cal.Rptr. 563 [collateral estoppel].) " 'Collateral estoppel' is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Whitegreen2 sentences1994It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.' ( Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 443 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 ]; see also People v. White (1986) 185 Cal. App.3d 822, 827 [ 231 Cal. Rptr. 569 ].) The principle thus precludes relitigation of an ultimate fact issue `"if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous trial is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; if (2) the previous trial resulted in a final judgme 1994It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.' ( Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 443 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 ]; see also People v. White (1986) 185 Cal. App.3d 822, 827 [ 231 Cal. Rptr. 569 ].) The principle thus precludes relitigation of an ultimate fact issue `"if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous trial is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; if (2) the previous trial resulted in a final judgme | 1 | 1 |
People v. Taylorgreen2 sentences1994It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.' ( Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 443 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 ]; see also People v. White (1986) 185 Cal. App.3d 822, 827 [ 231 Cal. Rptr. 569 ].) The principle thus precludes relitigation of an ultimate fact issue `"if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous trial is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; if (2) the previous trial resulted in a final judgme 1994It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.' ( Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 443 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 ]; see also People v. White (1986) 185 Cal. App.3d 822, 827 [ 231 Cal. Rptr. 569 ].) The principle thus precludes relitigation of an ultimate fact issue `"if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous trial is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; if (2) the previous trial resulted in a final judgme | 1 | 1 |
People v. Howardgreen2 sentences1994It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.' ( Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 443 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 ]; see also People v. White (1986) 185 Cal. App.3d 822, 827 [ 231 Cal. Rptr. 569 ].) The principle thus precludes relitigation of an ultimate fact issue `"if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous trial is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; if (2) the previous trial resulted in a final judgme 1994It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.' ( Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 443 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 ]; see also People v. White (1986) 185 Cal. App.3d 822, 827 [ 231 Cal. Rptr. 569 ].) The principle thus precludes relitigation of an ultimate fact issue `"if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous trial is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; if (2) the previous trial resulted in a final judgme | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hawkins v. SunTrust Bank
green
1 sentence2023It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’ [Citation.]” (Hawkins v. SunTrust Bank (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393 .) Husband would have preferred that Wife be collaterally estopped from resurrecting the gun incident. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." ( Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436 , 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 , 475.) Courts often speak of applying full faith and credit to a sister state's judgment in order to implement res judicata principles. ( Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1258 , 1271, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 914 .) "With respect to judgments, 'the full faith and credit obligation is exacting.' [Citat 2016It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." ( Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436 , 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 , 475.) Courts often speak of applying full faith and credit to a sister state's judgment in order to implement res judicata principles. ( Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1258 , 1271, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 914 .) "With respect to judgments, 'the full faith and credit obligation is exacting.' [Citat | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Pettaway
green
2 sentences1994He contends that a contrary decision, People v. Pettaway (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 1312 [ 254 Cal. Rptr. 436 ], was wrongly decided. (4) "`Collateral estoppel' is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. 1994He contends that a contrary decision, People v. Pettaway (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 1312 [ 254 Cal. Rptr. 436 ], was wrongly decided. (4) "`Collateral estoppel' is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.